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ABSTRACT: My dissertation presents an institutional theory for career behavior in the European 
Parliament. By focusing on the careers of members of the European Parliament, the study 
presents a rigorous analysis of the powerful multinational legislature from within—
problematizing the link between institutional change and individual action, as evidenced in the 
changing career paths taken by MEPs.  
I address variation in the dependent variable of the dissertation—MEP career behavior—
in three different ways: (1) the incidence of MEPs who develop extended careers at the European 
level, (2) the incidence of MEPs who use their time in the EP in order to promote a broader 
career path, and (3) the strategies used by MEPs to advance internally within the EP’s unique 
committee system.  
The dissertation uses a major new source of quantitative data collected on the personal 
and professional backgrounds of all MEPs, 1979-2009. It also relies on extensive qualitative 
data, taken from over fifty interviews with legislators and other elites in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, and Poland. The dissertation has implications for the nexus of 
institutional change and the behavior of political elite, broadly, as well as the study of 
representative democracy in the EU, specifically. It should be seen as an important contribution 
to the fields of legislative studies, political sociology, and party politics.  
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CAREER AMBITION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
William T. Daniel, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
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1.0  CAREER AMBITION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Institutions change constantly. New sets of rules are adopted at work, innovative ideas come to 
the forefront of popular discourse, and circumstances beyond our control force us to modify 
standard operating procedures in our private lives. But, how do we gauge our reaction to these 
changes? What footprints are left in evidence of the course of institutional evolution? And if 
institutional change can be explained, can it also be measured? This dissertation addresses such 
questions within the context of the European Parliament (EP). In doing so, it examines the 
development of the EP into a powerful legislative institution and assesses the impact of these 
changes on the careers of its membership. By focusing on the changing career paths of members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs), I propose that we can better understand the symbiotic 
relationship between institutional change and individual behavior. 
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION 
What is to be gained by this inquiry? The European Union and its institutions have long been a 
popular venue for problematizing institutional change. Scholars of rational choice, historical 
institutional, and sociology have all found more than ample evidence of the rise and practice of 
political institutions within the EU (Hall and Taylor 1996; Kreppel 2002; Streeck and Thelen 
2005; Tsebelis 2002). Yet, few acknowledge the leverage to be gained by combining these 
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approaches. The development of the European Parliament is undeniably the product of the EU’s 
history; so too is it the product of visionary individuals, such as Jean Monnet or Altiero Spinelli. 
Yet, the choice to work as an MEP is a professional one and career development is perhaps the 
most rational of all individual calculations. Thus, the EP is the perfect laboratory to examine the 
multiple facets of institutional change.  
1.1.1 Why Study the European Parliament? 
The European Parliament was initially created following the 1957 Treaty of Rome to serve as an 
unelected advisory board to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Appointed from 
national parliaments of the founding six ECSC member states, delegates to the General 
Assembly—as it was then known—were responsible for providing collective oversight for the 
common use and export of raw materials taken from the multinational Ruhr Valley region. As 
the ECSC developed into a broadly powerful European Union, expanding its membership, 
growing first to include a customs union and then later a single market, and creating a common 
currency, so too did the fledging General Assembly develop into a popularly elected legislature.  
Today, the EP contains nearly 800 deputies, each elected from across the twenty-seven 
member states of the EU. MEPs are elected to national delegations, whose size is based roughly 
on member state population size. National governments retain the right to the ground rules for 
these elections, although elections must be carried out on the basis of proportional 
representation. Once elected to the EP, members sit not with their national parties, but with a set 
of highly developed transnational party groups. Formed along common ideological lines, these 
groups have changed somewhat over time, but are meant to represent the major party families of 
Europe: Christian democrats, national conservatives, social democrats, free-market liberals, 
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green movements, communists, and Euroskeptics. Party groups serve as both the main internal 
administrative divisions, as well as the EP’s voting blocs. To ensure that party groups are formed 
on an ideological and not a national basis, the EP requires groups to have members from multiple 
national backgrounds.  
This brief overview distinguishes the EP as a venue for the study of institutional change 
and individual career behavior that is rich in its variation. The EP contains hundreds of national 
political parties from dozens of national backgrounds, working together to represent prevalent 
societal differences before an increasingly powerful parliament. The EP is a highly unique arena 
for academic inquiry, to be sure, but its study also contains a number of useful implications for 
scholars whose main interest extends beyond the purview of EU studies.  
A central goal of this dissertation is to examine the impact of institutional changes in the 
EP on MEP career behavior in such a way that touches upon general questions from a variety of 
research areas: institutional change, legislative studies, federalism, political party organization, 
and policymaking. The EP and the careers of its membership are an important case for 
consideration, particularly in light of the legislature’s rich diversity in each of these areas. Thus, 
the dissertation is not the story of just one legislature, but a story of the thousands of individuals 
who have comprised it since its creation.  
1.1.2 Careers as endogenous indicators of institutional change 
In a recent special issue of Regional & Federal Studies, Borchert and Stolz (2011) discuss 
growing scholarly interest in political careers within multi-level systems and advocate a renewed 
focus on the pathways taken by politicians, themselves, as opposed to a continued interest in the 
individual jobs that they hold. In doing so, they criticize political scientists who limit their unit of 
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analysis to specific institutions in order to explain change—particularly, the national 
legislature—as opposed to studying how the careers of those working in such institutions 
connect them with others. While the articles in the volume do not consider the EP directly, we 
might imagine that the European Parliament lends an ideal backdrop for such a study of political 
careers. 
Directly elected since 1979, the EP is a bulwark of representative legitimacy within the 
European Union (EU) and the largest directly elected legislature in the democratic world. The EP 
has substantially increased its power under subsequent EU treaty reforms and now stands on 
even footing with the Council of Ministers with regards to the passage of EU legislation in many 
subject areas. As veteran EP scholar Amie Kreppel (2011) suggests, the EP has evolved into a 
sort of ‘lower house’ for the inter-institutional EU policy-making process. While institutional 
developments in the EP are now well documented by the scholarly literature, it remains less clear 
how such changes affect those serving in the institution itself. 
Indeed, if we are to take an interest in how institutions change, then we ought to also be 
looking at whom these changes affect. In the realm of legislative studies, legislators, themselves, 
are the closest that we can get to observe the pulse of an institution. Their careers are important 
to consider, as they form a link between the various professions where they have served. MEPs 
come from a variety of backgrounds, ranging from former ministers to novice campaign staff, 
and go on to serve as heads of government, CEOs in the private sector, or simply to retire. Their 
careers are not only dynamic indicators of the EP’s impact on professional behavior, but also 
demonstrate the extent to which MEPs exact change within the EP, in return.  
Accordingly, this dissertation should be of major interest to all scholars whose work 
touches upon political careers. It has wide-ranging applications to the study of institutional 
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change, the European Parliament particularly, and the course of representative democracy in the 
European Union. MEP careers depend not only on individual ambition, but also on the parties 
and voters they represent. Thus, the puzzle of MEP careers is also of direct interest to scholars of 
legislatures, political parties, and elections. By focusing the unit of analysis on the careers of 
politicians, themselves, we can take a critical eye to the numerous political phenomena that they 
connect and are affected by. 
1.2 CAREERS AS INSTITUTIONS 
The puzzle examined by this dissertation is how institutional variation found in the EP interacts 
with the professional behavior of its membership. Beyond the more obvious implications for 
legislative scholars, political sociologists, and devotees of the European integration literature, an 
examination of political careers and the institutions that they connect also touches upon the 
foundational theories of institutions themselves. We often consider career ambition to be among 
the most rational of an individual’s impulses—some take new jobs for the pay increase or added 
prestige, while others bide their time in an undesirable post, waiting for an ideal time to search 
elsewhere. Yet, the most common critique of rational choice theories is its inability to explain 
where these preferences come from and how they change. A combined focus on the EP’s 
development and the ambitions of its membership is the ideal venue to examine the source and 
change of professional preference formation.   
Throughout the dissertation, I refer to career paths as institutions. By this, I do not mean 
to imply that careers come with prescribed rules of procedure, as in a legislature, or with the 
precise legalese of a national constitution. Rather, I view career paths, particularly in political 
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settings, as containing a number of the same attributes as these more formal institutions. 
Politicians, as in any career, learn a set of more or less formal ‘rules of the game’ (to paraphrase 
Douglas North), which they deploy in order to climb the ranks of elected office. I discuss my 
view of career paths as institutions in more detail in Chapter Two.  
The analysis of career paths in multi-level systems such as the EU can reveal either strict 
hierarchies of advancement, non-overlapping sets of office with little interchange, or present 
multiple gateways for entry at various levels of government (Borchert 2011). The pathways 
themselves offer the best evidence for the relative importance and functioning of each institution 
within these systems. In this way, the institutions matter, but they are saved from being analyzed 
as if they operated in a vacuum. Within the context of the EP, MEP career behavior may reveal 
the varying ‘faces’ of the institution: the steppingstone parliament, the retirement home, the 
prime arena for EU policy, and so forth. I propose three such ‘ideal’ paths for careers within the 
multi-level EU in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Three Ideal Paths for Multi-Level Careers in the European Parliament 
 
The left column in Figure 1 illustrates the usage of the EP as a sort of prolonged exit from 
active political life. Having served in national government for the bulk of his career, the MEP 
retiree is sent to Strasbourg to drink coffee with analogues from other European countries, biding 
time on the pension clock and musing about matters of continental importance as an avocation. 
However popular (and even academic) this conception of the typical MEP career may be, the 
remaining two professional paths shown in Figure 1 are, in fact, more likely to be found in 
today’s EP. In fact, the evidence from the project suggests that are far more likely to either enter 
the European political stage before an extended career in national politics or to bypass national 
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office altogether, in favor of lengthy career at the EU level. The empirical goal of the 
dissertation, naturally, is to tease out which MEPs are taking which of these pathways and under 
what conditions.   
Variation in the careers of its legislators can also reveal the EP’s relative position in the 
hierarchy of other European political offices. If career time in the EP level is shorter than at the 
national level, then it is not necessarily becoming a “more important” legislative body. 
Conversely, if a growing number of politicians develop entire professional lives within the EP, 
over multiple terms of office, then the EP might be increasing in its importance. Such a finding 
would not only be important for those concerned with the EU’s democratic deficit—indeed, if 
the only elected body in the EU is of minimal importance to voters and politicians, then 
democracy in the EU may be in trouble—but also for those with an interest in the party systems 
that direct the broader careers of MEPs, themselves.  
The EP’s relation to national parliaments is also important to party politics scholars. In 
the multi-level European system, national political parties serve as principal gatekeepers for 
candidate selection and nomination to elected careers at both the national and European levels. 
When selecting ideal candidates, parties are forced to consider the EP’s function and select 
appropriate candidates for that venue. An examination of political careers between these two 
legislative bodies can tell us a number of things—not just about the relative position of two 
legislatures, but also about the inner-workings of political parties themselves. If MEPs look 
different from national members of parliament (simply referred to as MPs, hereafter) in one 
country, but not in another, this may serve as a proxy for the parties’ respective views of the 
institution. Variation in the national electoral laws and candidate selection processes used in the 
EP allows us to explore such propositions.  
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Finally, the careers of MEPs impact the continued development of the legislature itself. 
Returning to theories of institutional development, we see that career variation is not just an 
endogenous indicator of when a legislature is becoming more prestigious, or increasingly 
specialized, but can also impact the legislature’s future development. High rates of member 
turnover and transience can affect a legislature’s institutional memory, and thus performance, 
while uneven rates of prolonged careerism from specific national or political backgrounds can 
concentrate power in the hands of a few. In this way, the ‘feedback loop’ between the legislature 
and the careers of its legislators is likely to vary in ways that are important for the EP’s 
continued development.  
1.3 THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
My dissertation advances a theory for the interplay between institutional development and 
professional behavior in three novel ways. First, I argue that as the EP became a more attractive 
place of work—increasing in its legislative powers, developing an internally complex system 
worthy of substantial professional attention, and appropriately compensating members for the 
unique demands of supranational parliamentary service—the incidence of MEPs to develop 
lengthier careers at the EP level increased accordingly. Although this theory considers previous 
discussions of legislative institutionalization and professionalization (i.e., Polsby 1968; Squire 
1992), as well as age-old evaluations of political ambition (i.e., Schlesinger 1966), it also relies 
upon an appreciation for the unique roles and capabilities of the EP.  
Second, I posit a theory of party management for MEP careers across multiple levels of 
office, in order to account for the role of political parties as gatekeepers for both European and 
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national legislatures. I argue that parties from more federalized countries within the EU are more 
accustomed to dealing with candidate selection and nomination across multiple levels of 
government and are therefore more likely to draw qualitative differences between MEPs and 
MPs. Thus, we might expect MEPs from federal countries to specialize at the European level and 
thus their EP delegations to have less turnover than their unitary counterparts. 
This line of argument contributes to the literature not only on candidate selection and 
nomination, but also on political parties as organizations and their roles within the legislature 
(i.e., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Norris 1997; Panebianco 1988). We might expect that parties 
who ‘specialize’ their politicians across multiple levels of government are less likely to 
anticipate movement between these levels. Thus, MEPs who view their role as being ‘in Europe’ 
are less likely to view the office in relation to other elected positions, whereas MEPs who are 
less wed to their specific function within and the EU are probably more aware of a ‘second 
order’ perception of the EP will thus try and move elsewhere.  
Naturally, those who treat the EP as a transient stage in a diverse career are also less 
likely to become involved in its inner workings. Thus, career behavior also affects the ways in 
which the EP continues to develop its internal distribution of power. I therefore argue third and 
finally that careerist MEPs are more likely to specialize within the institution, occupying 
important internal leadership positions and serving as policymaking heavyweights in a way that 
would not be possible for one-term members with an eye for a different job. The institutional 
development of the EP clearly impacts the incidence of such careerism, as the increasing 
importance of the legislature vis-à-vis other EU and national policymaking bodies further 
encourages politicians to build careers at the EP level and specialize in its policy development.  
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By exploring the endogenous nature of career advancement and institutional 
development, my dissertation proposes a number of expectations that can help to further an 
understanding of legislator behavior. The literature on career paths expects career behavior to 
change in accordance with a job’s attractiveness, availability, and accessibility (Borchert & Stolz 
2011). However, the literature has remained mostly silent on predicted professional outcomes in 
one of the world’s largest and most institutionally complex parliaments. It is possible that the 
more attractive the EP can present itself as a place of employment, the more likely we are to 
notice careerism among MEPs. Further, the more available seats that national political parties 
make for politicians with a specific interest in EU affairs, the less turnover with national 
parliaments we should expect to see. And those MEPs with longer careers within the institution 
are more likely to have access to its inner-workings and thus greater influence the course of its 
further development.  
However, supporting these propositions with empirical evidence implies grappling with 
certain theoretical and methodological challenges well beyond the scope of extant scholarship. 
Whereas existing work on career paths has focused mostly upon professional levels within a 
given country, the nature of the European Parliament requires us to consider the political and 
institutional variations of twenty-seven national political systems, each relating in a different 
way to the supranational parliament. While scholars have examined the development of the EP, 
or the relationship between candidate recruitment and electoral success in the EP, or even the 
internal balance of power within the EP, none have attempted to integrate all three. A major aim 
of this dissertation is therefore meant to assemble the growing body of research on the EP under 
the common roof of political careers, as well as to create a standard approach for the empirical 
evaluation of these claims.  
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1.4 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In this introductory chapter, I have presented my general research question, discussed its 
importance, as well as provided a brief overview of my theory. In Chapter Two, I provide a more 
complete theoretical background for my theory of institutional change and career behavior. I also 
propose a set of testable hypotheses that are in line with my theory of MEP career behavior and 
discuss a mixed method research design for testing these assertions. 
Chapter Three introduces a significant source of new data for EP research, containing 
information on each and every MEP elected to the EP, 1979-2009. I use this data in order to test 
my theory for EP influence on career advancement via a series of multi-level regressions that 
demonstrate the EP’s increasingly ‘desirable’ nature—as it developed internally and increased in 
its external power—and the corresponding positive effect on careerism among MEPs. This 
careerist streak demonstrates an increase in reelection seeking to the EP and a decline in its usage 
as a steppingstone or retirement home, as previously illustrated in Figure 1. 
Chapter Four considers the changing role of the national political parties as gatekeepers 
for both national and European legislatures. In doing so, I trace variation in MEP behavior in 
relation to national parties and the organization of their states of origin. I expect that parties that 
are already accustomed to working across multiple levels of government, as in a federal system, 
will be more likely to treat the EP as simply another level of representation, with its own unique 
membership characteristics and qualities. Thus, MEPs from more federal systems will likely 
display lengthier careers within the EP and move around less between political institutions.  
Chapter Five explores the importance of MEP careerism within the legislature, using a 
series of tests to account for the distribution of legislative power within the EP. In doing so, I 
demonstrate that MEPs with longer backgrounds in the EP, as well as those with higher levels of 
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education, are more likely to be granted legislative rapporteurships, which are essential for 
impacting the course of legislation within the specialized EP committee system. This finding is 
particularly augmented since the advent of co-decision with the Council of Ministers. This 
evaluation speaks to my theory of MEP behavior and its effect on the further development of the 
EP as a legislative institution. If the EP caters increasingly to careerists, and parties reap policy 
benefits from sustaining specialist MEPs in European office, then the allocation of 
rapporteurships is an important benchmark for gauging the course of both the EP’s development 
and political party response to it.  
Chapter Six presents three cases in which MEP career variation has differed along 
national lines. By examining MEPs from France, Germany, and Poland, I suggest that the 
relationship between institutional development and career behavior is generalizable, but 
continues to have a strong source of variation along national lines. A classic unitary case, 
France’s MEP delegations have been among the most volatile, as political parties frequently 
swap their politicians between national and European functions. Germany, in contrast, has a long 
history of highly productive specialist MEPs, who have also developed lengthy careers at the 
European level, which suggests that the role of national parties is quite different in this classic 
federal system. The Polish case demonstrates the appeal of the EP in post-authoritarian Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE). Here, we view one example where the EP’s professional 
attractiveness is perhaps stronger than a career in national politics.   
 Chapter Seven offers a discussion of the findings of the dissertation on the whole, 
considering evidence brought to bear by the empirical tests and qualitative inquiries. I 
demonstrate the importance of my findings for understanding the EP within a greater context, its 
implications for the changing career options of European politicians, and its potential interest for 
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politicians, policymakers, and scholars of European integration alike. I also return to the theme 
of representative democracy, asking just how well the EP has done at resolving the EU’s 
democratic deficit. 
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2.0  AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR MEP CAREER BEHAVIOR 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for the interaction of the European Parliament’s 
institutional development with the career behavior of its membership. Variation in the dependent 
variable of the dissertation, MEP career behavior, is addressed in three distinct ways: (1) the 
incidence of MEPs who develop extended careers at the European level, (2) the incidence of 
MEPs who use their time in the EP as one stage of a more diverse career path, and (3) strategies 
used by MEPs to advance within the EP, itself. For each of these facets of MEP career behavior, 
I argue that a corresponding set of factors related to institutional change in the EP plays a 
mediating role. The institutionalization of the EP as a professional legislature has a positive 
impact on legislators’ tenure in the EP. The role of national political parties as gatekeepers for 
both European and national elections shapes the broader careers of MEPs. And a change in the 
policymaking opportunity structures, as the EP expands its purview in the EU legislation 
process, affects strategies used by MEPs for advancement within the parliament itself.  
Before expanding upon this three-part theory, I first discuss a view of institutions and 
institutional change that incorporates aspects of existing rational choice, historical, and 
sociological institutional theories. I demonstrate how the career behavior of politicians is 
compatible with such a view of institutions. By viewing MEP careers as institutions, we can 
expand our analytic purchase on their study, but also view how MEP career behavior functions in 
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conjunction with developments in the legislature in which they serve. At the end of the chapter, I 
present my theory as a set of specific hypotheses, which are then tested in the following chapters.  
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND INDIVIDUAL ACTION 
I assume throughout the dissertation that institutional change will affect the course of individual 
action. In other words, developments in the European Parliament should impact the career 
behavior of its membership. Such an inquiry requires an ecumenical view of the nature of 
institutions. Taking cues from North (1990), I view institutions as “the rules of the game in 
society or, more formally… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (p. 
3). Within the context of a legislature such as the EP, institutions range from the more formal 
rules regarding the apportionment of deputy salaries and staff supports to the less formal sets of 
norms and standard operating procedures witnessed in the governing of the EP’s committee and 
group work.1  
While institutions vary between the more and less formal, I view the dividing line 
between a regularized pattern of action and an institution as stemming from a common currency 
of recognition and understanding generated by the creation of common group status or 
membership. Highly formalized rules, as in the case of MEP salaries and travel allowances, 
clearly govern the action of all members of the greater EP. Nonetheless, unwritten and informal 
norms—such as the drafting of electoral lists or the distribution of committee rapporteurships—
also develop into recognizable patterns that can constrain a member’s political strategies within a 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of norms as informal institutions, see March and Olsen 1989; Powell 1991. 
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political party or on a certain committee. If our view of institutions is expanded to include both 
these formal and informal practices, then we might similarly benefit from an analysis of MEP 
careers that treats the professional pathways taken by politicians as widely understood, yet hardly 
formalized, institutions themselves. 
2.1.1 Careers as Institutions 
While it is easy to see how the European Parliament would qualify as formal legislative 
institution, as well as contain a number of less explicit institutions, an expansive view of 
institutions leaves open the possibility that the careers of MEPs can be analyzed in a similar way. 
This notion is perhaps novel, yet is not intended to create controversy. Career advancement—in 
politics, as well as in many other fields—follows a path of more or less unspoken norms, arising 
from regularized patterns of group behavior. In the American political context, we often refer to 
a candidate as being an ‘outsider’ if he or she is seeking office without an extensive prior 
background in politics. What is an outsider, however, if not a politician whose career 
advancement does not meet the ‘normal’ pattern for advancement, as demonstrated by the 
majority of his or her professional cohort?  
Career behavior is an institution, not only because it is a regular and widely understood 
pattern of action, but because it places a premium on subscribing to the well-trodden path of ones 
professional colleagues in order to maximize individual success. Residents shadow doctors in 
their desired specialty to observe best practices. Junior associates replicate the actions of senior 
colleagues to bring in substantial new business and make partner. Freshly minted PhDs seek out 
academic jobs at universities with teaching or research expectations that are the best fit for them. 
Senators first learn the hoops of political life as mayors or city councilmen.  
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In his foundational work on US congressional careers, Schlesinger (1966) essentially 
demonstrates the creation of American political careers as institutions—namely, the emerging 
hierarchy of professional advancement from local government to the White House. The political 
outsider may make waves in the popular media, but the politician who follows the more 
incremental pathway to power is the standard bearer. The English language is clear on this point: 
‘normal’ politicians with ‘normal’ careers are synonymous with ‘the establishment.’ Political 
careers are institutions; the establishment is evidence of this fact.  
As in America, MEPs are also products of the various career structures present in the 
countries that they represent; however, their own hierarchies for advancement may not be as 
neatly uniform as those found in the US Congress. This might lead us to view the role of MEP 
career paths as idiosyncratic or unimportant. Taken from twenty-seven country cultures and 
dozens of different ideological backgrounds, it is easy to reach Navarro's (2009b) conclusion that 
MEP career behavior is inchoate and irreducible to a common theme. However, such a view not 
only downplays the importance of MEP careers as institutions, but also the study of the EP itself. 
The theory and empirical findings of this dissertation suggest that MEP career behavior is 
perhaps complex and varied, but certainly not idiosyncratic.  
Although the various professional and national political backgrounds of MEPs are 
seemingly too diverse to analyze at first glance, it would be unwise to assume that there is little 
room for MEP careers to be analyzed as a set of normal or regular patterns of professional 
behavior. Although we may not be able to locate a ‘normal’ MEP, globally speaking, there is 
plenty of room to theorize mid-level explanations for standard types of MEP career behavior, 
based not only upon an MEP’s country or political party of origin, but also upon their individual 
role as a legislator. What might such a view of MEP careers look like? 
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One might take Navarro’s (2009b) view of the disparate career patterns present within the 
EP as indicative of the absence of equilibrium needed to view MEP careers as institutions: there 
are simply too many sources of variation to derive a common theory for the analysis of MEP 
career behavior; the development of the ‘normal’ MEP has yet to emerge. I argue, instead, that 
developments in MEP careers are in fact becoming more regularized, as the legislature itself 
continues to develop a strong role in EU policymaking. The variation in MEP career behavior 
that we witness today is a direct reflection of the EP’s own path of development. MEP career 
behavior is important to cast in institutional terms because it is endogenous to developments in 
the legislature, itself.  
MEP careers were initially linked with those of national parliamentarians, insofar as 
MEPs were nominated from national parliaments. This practice was replaced formally by the 
initiation of direct elections in 1979, yet many MEPs continued to serve a dual mandate with 
national parliaments until this practice was outlawed. Dual mandates were first banned by a 
handful of national electoral rule changes and later by an institutional directive that made holding 
a mandate in national parliament “incompatible” with EP office in all cases (Council of Ministers 
2002). However, this is not the only source of change in the EP’s composition. Along the way, 
we also note a shifting tendency away from retirees and elder statesmen to an increase in 
specialized political functionaries, interested in the particular policymaking demands of 
European office, itself.  
On the one hand, it might be easy to account for the idea of MEPs as an ‘elder 
statesmen,’ given the institutional history of the EP as a nominated advisory board. Indeed, it 
would seem logical to nominate politicians with heightened profiles and lengthy careers behind 
them to such an office, particularly if we think of the original iterations of the EP as a sort of 
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guardian class of political institutional memory—not unlike the UK House of Lords or the 
French Senate. The initiation of direct elections to the EP might have changed this, yet scholars 
show that EP elections have been viewed of as ‘second order’ in importance to national ones 
from the start (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2005). If direct elections, at least initially, 
demoted the EP’s status vis-à-vis national parliaments, then it would also seem logical to view 
the EP as a sort of ‘kindergarten’ for political debutantes.  
I argue that MEP career paths have shifted in correspondence with both the legislature’s 
internal developments and changes in its external stature. While MEPs may have many uses for 
the EP as a part of their broader careers (recall, for example, the three ‘ideal’ career paths 
brought out by Figure 1 in the first chapter), their career behavior is not ‘inchoate’ in the sense of 
idiosyncratic or unintelligible, but rather a multi-faceted representation of the legislature’s own 
circuitous path of development.  
2.1.2 How institutions change 
So far, I’ve explained my view of institutions and shown how MEP career behavior fits into this 
definition. More controversial than the definitional limits of institutions, however, is our 
understanding of how they change. I’ve noted that career paths emerge as institutions when 
enough politicians follow the same pathway for the purposes of professional advancement. This 
position presupposes a rational choice; a politician follows the career sequence most likely to 
lead to his or her maximum career payoff. Utility maximization, in this sense, could mean 
prestige, power, influence, visibility, access to resources, or any combination thereof.  
Traditional rational choice approaches often come under fire for their lack of attention to 
institutional change, however, as they tend to be more concerned with explaining continuity and 
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equilibrium (see, for example, Tsebelis 2002). When rational choice does account for change, it 
is often criticized for its simplistic view of individual preferences as fixed, exogenous, and 
clearly understood (see, for example, Green and Shapiro 1996; Mansbridge 1990; Scharpf 1997; 
all in Schmidt 2010). Surely, MEP career preferences may change in response to institutional 
developments in the EP, yet, traditional rational choice is incapable of both explaining individual 
preference formation and endogenizing preferences within the processes of institutional change 
(but, see also discussions of bounded rationality in Peters 2005). 
Historical institutionalism may provide us with a more appropriate set of tools for 
analyzing the sources of institutional change in a setting as diverse as the EP. Schmidt (2010) 
discusses the common claims of historical institutionalists. Conceived of as “regularized 
practices with rule-like qualities” (p. 10), institutions arise and consolidate within a context of 
path dependent historical processes. Indeed, the original decision to pay MEPs in line with 
national MP salaries has much to do with the fact that MEPs were originally appointed from 
national parliamentary delegations, yet this rule remained in effect until 2009—long after 
national MPs were barred from sitting concurrently in the EP. However, while historical 
institutionalism may provide us with a clearer understanding of how institutional change comes 
about, it does not necessarily do a more ample job of predicting where and when future changes 
may take place.  
 In his volume on institutional developments in the US Congress, Schickler (2001) offers 
a view of rule changes that might be viewed in light of both the historical nature of Congress, as 
well as the rational impulses of its lawmakers. He concedes that institutional complexity may 
favor equilibrium in general, yet certain ‘holes’ remain for future ‘disjointed’ developments. 
Hacker (2005) presents a similar story on his study of US pension schemes, showing that while 
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the public system has become seemingly too complex to revise adequately, private market-based 
401(k) and IRA programs were easily launched alongside public pensions—benefiting from 
various vacancies within extant regulations. Eventually, these ‘complementary’ institutions 
usurped the public system in popularity altogether (see also the chapter by Palier 2005).  
In their edited volume, Streeck and Thelen (2005) refer to such processes as the 
“layering” of institutions. New institutions are created alongside existing ones and their 
interaction produces an outcome that neither one would have been able to produce 
independently. This interaction of institutional development may be just the view needed for an 
analysis of MEP careers under institutional change. If we view MEP career behavior as a 
separate institution, alongside the more formalized institutions of the legislature itself, then it 
becomes easy to see how changes made to the EP’s operating procedures or status among the 
other EU institutions can effect change in the career behavior of MEPs. Internal complexity and 
external influence may attract increasing numbers of MEPs to seek reelection; national parties 
may nominate higher profile politicians to European office; internal advancement among MEPs 
may shift in accordance to the legislature’s organization 
2.1.3 A theoretical view for MEP career behavior  
So far, I have argued that the career paths of MEPs can be viewed as a dynamic institution, 
endogenous to developments in the EP, itself. My view of institutional change is sympathetic to 
rational choice, to the extent that career behavior is often the product of individual preferences 
and calculations about ones personal utility. However, unlike in traditional rational choice 
theory, I seek to endogenize individual preference formation among MEPs within the changing 
role of the EP as a legislature. Change in the EP is a process that is closely related to its historical 
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development and I take a number of my cues from historical institutionalism. History can explain 
major changes in the EP’s institutional design and account for the impact of these changes on 
MEP careers. MEP career behavior is an institution, in the sense that it has become regularized 
over time, and derives its meaning from both developments in the legislature, the national 
parties, and the incentive structures present for internal advancement within the EP itself.  
In the remaining sections of the chapter, I present a detailed theory for MEP career 
behavior. I begin by discussing the potential impact of legislative professionalism on MEP career 
tenure. I then move on to examine how changes in the EP’s role in EU policymaking present a 
new set of incentives for political parties to consider when nominating MEPs for the job. I finally 
consider the individual incentive structures present within the EP for MEPs to develop careers at 
the European level and bring policy specialties to the table. At the close of the chapter, I present 
my theory as a set of testable hypotheses and discuss my research design for testing them in the 
remainder of the dissertation. 
2.2 LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND CAREER AMBITION 
One way that MEP career behavior has become increasingly normalized is the development of a 
class of careerist MEPs whose professional ambition lies predominantly at the European level—
that is, MEPs who seek to remain in the EP and do not use it as a steppingstone to elsewhere. I 
argue that the historical developments of the EP as a legislature have had a positive impact on 
the incidence of these careerist MEPs. The causal link is between the complexity of the EP as an 
institution—in other words, its ‘well bounded’ or professional character—and the incidence of 
individual MEPs who pursue a career at the EP level.  
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To develop this portion of my theory, I first review extant work on professional ambition 
within the EP and other elected contexts, before discussing the concept of legislative 
professionalization and its potential impact on MEP career behavior. In doing so, I show that a 
predominant strand of the literature has attempted to explain professional behavior among 
legislators by looking at their individual ‘roles’ within parliament. Although I find this instinct to 
be a natural one, it provides the social scientist with less analytic leverage than my view of MEP 
careerism as a consolidating institution, emerging from the changing capacity of the EP itself. I 
further explain the link between professionalism and ambition below, defining it in contrast to 
the more normative conception of legislator roles. 
Schlesinger's (1966) work on the ambition of US legislators sets the cornerstone for the 
study of political careers. For Schlesinger, politicians exhibit one of three types of ambition: 
discrete, static, or progressive. Discretely ambitious politicians hold an interest in a particular 
office at a particular time, while static ambition pertains to politicians with a keen interest in 
lengthy service at a specific level of government. The progressively ambitious, naturally, use 
their post as a springboard elsewhere. The root causes and motivating factors for ambition can be 
viewed in light of a number of individual-level characteristics: having held previous office, 
possessing key social credentials such as race or class, and timing attempts at higher office 
strategically within the context of ones professional lifespan.  
How has the concept of political ambition been exported to the EP, then? 
Notwithstanding Hix's (2008) skeptical view of the consistently ‘second-order’ nature of 
European office (see also work by Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2005), much of the 
scholarship on careers within the EP has focused on explaining why politicians find themselves 
in the EP, instead of explaining how the EP fits into a larger picture of professional options 
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within Europe. A number of scholars have focused on the national sources of variation in seeking 
reelection to the EP (Kaiser and Fischer 2009; Marrel and Payre 2006; Patzelt 1997, 1999; 
Scarrow 1997)—noting higher rates of careerism from the UK delegation and the French and 
Italian tendency to rotate politicians between the EU and national level2. While such case-
oriented research can shed much light on the experiences of MEPs from specific national 
contexts, it does little to tell us about the general state of individual-level ambitions across the 
legislature as a whole.  
As a result, the bulk of the literature concerned with individual MEPs takes on a more 
sociological tone, comparing the demographics of MEPs and their individual roles as legislators 
with those of national MPs, predominantly as a way of illustrating differences in the culture of 
national and EU legislative careers. For example, Norris (1999) demonstrates that the age 
distribution within the EP is curvilinear. Young politicians lacking elected experience go to the 
EP for a term, before returning home to run for office. Older politicians, conversely, are ‘kicked 
upstairs’ to Europe by their parties—using the EP as a sort of semi-retirement for the elder 
statesmen or as an exile from national positions of power (see also Meserve, Pemstein, and 
Bernhard 2010). 
Following in the tradition of Eulau et al. (1959), Katz (1997), and Searing (1994), others 
take the view that MEPs have different personal motivations for their service and attempts to 
categorize these roles as one of a handful of possible types. For Bale and Taggart (2005), 
progressively ambitious MEPs are likely to serve as constituency advocates—signaling their 
loyalty to home constituencies as a way of currying favor with national voters for future pursuits. 
                                                 
2 For example, Marrel & Payre (2006) discuss the “tourniquet” system used by the major French political parties in 
the early years of the EP, where politicians were constantly rotated between the national and European levels in six 
month intervals, in a conscious attempt to stunt the professionalization of the legislative body. 
 26 
Policy advocates, conversely, use the EP as a soapbox for advancing specific policy platforms 
and tend to be more static in their pursuit of office at the EU level. Operating under the 
assumption that MEP roles are headed not towards professional uniformity, but rather increased 
diversity, Navarro (2009b) develops his own set of five ‘ideal type’ MEPs: the publicity-seeking 
animateur, the policy specialist, the constituent intermediary, the road-blocking antagonist, and 
the celebrity dilettante (see also Navarro 2009a). 
Such taxonomies are attractive for their categorical parsimony and general applicability; 
nonetheless, they lack the causal capacity to predict which MEPs are more likely to demonstrate 
which role, as well as how these roles connect and serve their broader professional impulses. 
Indeed, they provide only snapshots of particular moments in a politician's career. Accordingly, 
the major lines of debate are somewhat muddied over whether an MEP’s ambition is attributable 
to some roles more than others or simply idiosyncratic to the individual level. The result is a 
general dearth of predictive theory worthy of providing us with insights into the typical career 
paths of MEPs across national and partisan settings.  
In some ways, it is unsurprising that the literature on MEP career ambition has reached 
such an impasse. Whether attempting to classify MEPs by their roles or simply differentiate 
between their personal characteristics, the literature on MEP careers has had no overarching 
theoretical framework. The classificatory schemes have been descriptive and deductive, taken 
more with the enumeration of taxonomical categories than with causal typology building. Thus, 
we have a relatively large amount of documented variation in MEP career behavior, along with a 
fairly small arsenal of theory to account for it. In order to fill this lacuna, I propose the 
mechanism of legislative professionalization as one way of predicting when an MEP’s ambition 
will lie within the EP, instead of elsewhere.  
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Extrapolating from Polsby's (1968) classic work on the US Congress, I expect that a more 
"well bounded" legislature will do a better job of retaining its membership. Within the context of 
the EP, this should mean that a more professional EP advantages static ambition and thus 
careerism. The causal mechanism at play is well elaborated by the professionalization hypothesis 
for US state legislators as posited by Squire (1992). I briefly explain the impulse behind Squire’s 
work, before demonstrating how his concept of professionalization can be used within the 
context of the EP to predict careerist among MEPs.  
Squire’s central claim is that legislatures that pay members and pay them well, provide 
them with adequate staff supports to focus on their legislative tasks, and meet for longer periods 
of time, are more professional. Correspondingly, members who serve as legislative professionals 
and not as seasonal workers or part-time amateurs will be more likely to launch full-blown 
careers at the state level and not continue on elsewhere. The logic behind such a measure is 
intuitive within the US state legislatorial context (see, for example, Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 
2001). The Montana Legislature—meeting once every two years for a quick seasonal session, 
and operating on a heavily volunteer basis—simply does not have the same professional 
character as its analogous body in New York State. Using a constructed index, Squire and others 
attempt to predict a variety of resultant outcomes based upon the professionalization scores of 
different state legislatures (King 2000; Squire 1992, 1993).  
So, how should the EP’s professionalization impact career behavior among its 
membership? Quite simply, more professional legislatures should attract more professional 
legislators. For legislators to maintain long-term careers in elected office, they must not only live 
‘for’ politics, but also be able to live ‘from’ politics (Weber 2009). The spirit of this claim has 
been evaluated within a number of national contexts, from the French Assemblée Nationale to 
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the German Bundestag (Coates and Munger 1995; Gibel 1981; Saalfeld 1997), but not directly 
within the EP. Nonetheless, we should expect a more professionalized version of the EP to bring 
about a greater incidence of static ambition among its membership (see also a similar discussion 
in Norris 1999).  
That a more professional EP should produce higher degrees of static ambition among its 
membership may seem obvious. In fact, given the dramatic rise of the EP as an institution in 
such a relatively short time period, it may seem almost tautological to suggest that as the EP 
develops institutionally, its membership will become more stable and reelection seeking will 
increase. However, it is important to consider not only the time variant nature of the EP as an 
institution, but also the variation in degrees of professionalism within the EP itself.  
In terms of basic salary, MEP pay has traditionally been paid by national governments, at 
a rate corresponding to that of national parliamentarians from that country. The EP, in turn, has 
generally provided a series of allowances for travel and lodging in Brussels and Strasbourg, 
indexed to differences in national purchasing power, in order to smooth major differences. Only 
in the early 2000s did the EP decide to assume an even salary system across all countries, which 
did not come into full force until the 2009-2014 session began3. As such, MEP salaries have 
traditionally varied across both time and space a great deal.  
In a given year, an Italian MEP might find herself making five times the base pay of a 
Polish deputy, although they may serve alongside each other in the same transnational party 
group and hold similar committee portfolios. Although the EP has traditionally compensated for 
this discrepancy, via a complex system of allowances and supports for travel, support, and 
lodging, the system varies in its application according to both national and EP party groups lines 
                                                 
3 MEP, personal interview, March 22, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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(Padowska and Brück 2010; Welti 1998). With an increase in policy competencies and the 
addition of EU members located far from the major worksites of Brussels and Strasbourg, the EP 
continues to offer a heterogeneous level of professionalism to its membership.  
Thus, I take a view of the EP’s professionalization that is conscious of teleology, while 
still making a strong argument for endogenizing MEP career behavior to the legislature’s level of 
professionalism. It is a fair critique of this theory to suggest that a legislature may become 
‘more’ professionalized, but not ‘less so.’ However, the unique amalgamation of various systems 
found within the EP, stemming from its patchwork development across the various member 
states, suggests that the EP is not headed along a unitary and inevitable path towards optimal 
professionalism, but rather has professionalized quite unevenly. MEP behavior will be expected 
to ‘layer’ accordingly, reacting to the varying degrees of professionalism afforded to them.  
Professionalism is not simply a matter of salary and support, however, but is also related 
to the functioning of the EP itself. As Kreppel (2002) documents in her examination of the EP’s 
emerging legislative power, the EP has greatly expanded its purview in the legislative process 
under co-decision with the Council of Ministers—a legislative option that has increasingly been 
invoked since its initiation under the Maastricht Treaty framework. This expansion of power has 
coincided not only with a proliferation of new ad hoc committees and the consolidation of 
transnational party group influence, but has also advantaged the role of individual MEPs within 
the policymaking process via the rapporteur system. Here, too, the argument might be made that 
the EP has increased in its institutional capacity in a way that cannot be reversed. On paper, this 
argument is probably correct. Yet, formalized institutional capacity does not necessarily 
guarantee the EP an increasingly visible role within the EU.  
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The EU financial crisis is an interesting example of the continuing gap between the EP’s 
expected role in theory and actual role in practice. The nature of emergency politics and the 
leadership style of the major Council participants—particularly Angela Merkel and Nicolas 
Sarkozy—managed to limit the debate over the EU’s fiscal compact limited almost entirely to 
the Council, even though under current legislative processes, one might have expected the EP to 
play a more visible role. While many scholars may view this as evidence of a continued 
intergovernmental streak in European integration (i.e., Moravcsik 1998), we might also view the 
EP’s diminished role in the crisis as indicative of a lower level of professionalization than one 
might have expected. Unlike in a traditional parliament, the national leaders debating fiscal 
reform are not directly responsible to the EP, disadvantaging the legislature from weighing in 
with any level of clout. Thus, even though the EP stands on equal footing with the Council under 
co-decision, it cannot usurp the Council’s function as a forum for intergovernmental action. 
Once again, we view the professionalization of the EP as uneven and layered.  
I have shown that professionalization within the EP is likely to have interesting 
consequences for the incidence of careerism among its members. I have also suggested that 
professionalization may be somewhat more heterogeneous than one would imagine—as MEPs 
are confronted with many different ‘versions’ of the EP, based on the time period and their 
country of origin. However, it is also important to note that MEPs are not left alone to decide 
their career behavior. Rather, MEPs are agents of the national political parties who nominate 
them for office. Thus, to fully analyze MEP career behavior, one must look to the national 
parties’ role of candidate recruitment and selection at both the national and the European level, in 
order to fully appreciate the interaction between the EP’s professional development and its 
members’ career behavior. 
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2.3 PARTIES AS GATEKEEPERS ACROSS MULTIPLE LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
Although legislative professionalization may be useful for explaining the career behavior of 
MEPs whose goal is to stay at the EP level, it is perhaps less meaningful for distinguishing 
between the careers of MEPs and other elected politicians. One major area that remains 
underdeveloped within the EP sub-literature and that may be helpful in this capacity is the 
connection between MEPs and their national political parties. National political parties have the 
sole responsibility to distinguish between candidates best destined for either national or 
European legislative service. Thus, they also have an opportunity to direct political careers 
across multiple levels of office. A focus on how this professional triage takes place should 
indicate how the EP ranks in comparison to national political office, as well as how its changing 
stature has impacted longstanding party organizations.  
In this section, I develop the expectation that parties already accustomed to working 
across multiple levels of government—particularly those from more federal systems—will foster 
the creation of distinct sets of politicians at both the national and European levels and thus 
encourage less movement between national and European political life. Conversely, parties from 
strong unitary backgrounds, whose function is essentially to select prime national candidates, 
will be more likely to treat the EP as a ‘reserve’ institution, leading to the increased volatility of 
MEP careers from these countries. I first review the extant literature on candidate recruitment 
and selection processes in national and European elections, before illustrating how variation in 
political party organization is likely to interact with differences in national regime type, in order 
to influence MEP career behavior. 
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2.3.1 Candidate selection and recruitment 
Most of the extant literature on national parties and their involvement in EP affairs addresses the 
extent to which parties exert influence on MEP legislative behavior after elections. Parties 
control MEP voting behavior, they negotiate and broker the obtaining of committee 
chairmanships, and they promote national policymaking priorities (see, for example, Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Müller and Saalfeld 1997; Whitaker 2001, 2009). However, parties 
also influence MEP career behavior before European elections, insofar as they recruit and select 
candidates suitable for the job. A suitable question to ask, therefore, is whether there is anything 
‘unique’ about MEPs, as compared with national politicians, and how political parties assess 
these differences in directing elections at both the national and the European level.  
How does the process of candidate selection and recruitment take place at the European 
level? Holland's (1987) discussion of the UK Labour Party’s strategy in recruiting MEPs for the 
initial 1979 elections presents one example: local councils filter potential candidates up through 
a series of reviews and selections before finally slating national party ballots. Gherghina and 
Chiru (2010) present a similar story for Romanian parties in the 2009 EP elections, 
demonstrating the importance of party favor, local bases of support, and previous electoral 
success as determinant for ballot access and the probability of elections (see also Protsyk and 
Matichescu 2011). Such detailed accounts point to the importance of party organization in the 
candidate selection process, yet they offer few clues as to how parties treat EP elections 
differently from (or perhaps similarly to) national contests.    
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One way to address this gap is to return to the theoretical literature on candidate selection 
processes. Hazan and Rahat (2006) present the most cohesive work to date on the major sources 
of variation for such practices, using a two-stage model. In the first stage, a candidate is 
nominated for an election from a theoretically limitless pool of would-be politicians. Nomination 
practices can be open to all registered voters at a most inclusive level (such as in the United 
States), to party members only, or to a restricted subset of party members having fulfilled a set of 
special requirements. For example, the authors detail the previous policy of the francophone 
Belgian Parti socialiste, where candidates for public office were required to be party members in 
good standing for more than five years, subscribe to the PS newspaper, send their children to 
secular state schools, make appropriate donations to party organizations, and partake in the party 
youth and women’s guilds. Such exclusive measures clearly restrict candidate movement and 
personal initiative (see Rahat 2009).  
In the second stage of the proposed candidacy, Rahat and Hazan (2006) stress the 
importance of courting favor with the party ‘selectorate,’ whose job is to winnow the pool of 
eligible candidates down to a list for use in the given election. The selection process ranges along 
a continuum from open primary elections at its most inclusive to selection via a single party 
leader at its most exclusive—with numerous tessellations of local and central committee control 
in between.4 Selection practices clearly matter, as they demonstrate with an Israeli example, 
where potential Knesset candidates from a minor clerical party are easily eligible for party 
nomination, but must first be selected by a small clique of rabbis at the peak of the national party 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of additional sources of institutional variation in candidate selection processes, see work by 
Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008), as well as Narud, Pedersen, and Valen (2002).  
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organization. How, then, should this matter for MEPs and their relation to politicians with 
national legislative mandates?5 
MEPs belonging to parties which organize their selection processes more centrally—
restricting candidacy to a small subset of voters or selecting potential nominees at a central party 
level—are more likely to operate at the mercy of their parties in their career behavior. Simply 
put, more centralized recruitment processes restrict candidate agency, and increase the chance 
that a politician’s career will be centrally managed, rather than allowing politicians the 
opportunity to direct their own careers, in accordance with personal ambition. As Norris (1997, 
1999) puts it, parties can either organize as ‘siloes’—funneling members up and down along 
well-established ladders of elected service—or they can function as disperse ‘lateral networks’ 
that permit entry and exit at multiple stages of the game (see also Katz 2001). Thus, party 
organization is likely to affect MEP career behavior to the extent that parties control candidate 
placement along multiple tiers of office. However, what incentives do parties have to direct MEP 
careers? One major source of variation impacting political parties across Europe is the extent to 
which national regimes are organized as federal or unitary states. I now consider how this 
variation may interact with party organization, in order to direct MEP career behavior. 
2.3.2 Party organization across multiple levels of government 
Initial work by Scarrow (1997) suggests that there is a strong basis for national variation when it 
comes to MEP tenures. Her article details the propensity for French and Italian MEPs to 
demonstrate much shorter careers in the EP than their German and British colleagues. While this 
                                                 
5 For an interesting discussion on the relationship between national parties and their MEPs, see (Raunio 2000). 
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high rate of ‘turnover’ for MEPs is often cited as detrimental to the institution’s development as 
a serious legislature, it should be noted that this career volatility is likely attributable, at least in 
part, to MEPs’ national parties. I have already suggested that parties can be more or less 
centralized in their control of candidate careers. These organizational differences, in turn, are 
largely predicated on the federal regime type of their country of origin.   
In relatively unitary systems, such as in France or Italy, political parties are accustomed 
to slating electoral lists for the entire country, for both national and European elections. 6 If the 
same party selectorate is accustomed to nominating candidates for two elections from a common 
pool, it is logical to expect some ‘shadow of hierarchy’ to develop in the minds of politicians 
between the two institutions. For example, it’s not uncommon for well-known French politicians 
to stand for election at the European level, in order to raise the visibility of their party lists, 
without ever intending to fulfill their mandate. Or, as another politician put it, the EP may be 
offered as a “second place” prize for national MPs who have lost their mandate.7 The assumption 
made in both of these situations is that the EP is a secondary arena to be used by a common set 
of national politicians. That is, French politicians are treated as a single set, to be divided among 
the various institutions of government, as dictated by party need.  
I anticipate that the unitary system of government found in France creates and 
exacerbates this mindset, as the majority of French governing competencies rest in Paris. Indeed, 
the longstanding tradition of the cumul des mandats in France supports this idea. Politicians 
increase their national profile by combining positions at the local commune, the regional council, 
                                                 
6 Although French electoral laws for the European Parliament were changed in 2004 to replace national lists with a 
set of regional ones, selection is still carried out at the national level. For a discussion of the effects of this change on 
EP campaigns, see Costa, Kerrouche, and Pélerin (2007). 
 
7 French MP, personal interview, November 15, 2011, Assemblée Nationale, Paris. 
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and the national legislature. Even today, a cursory glance of national legislator websites reveals 
that a majority of French MPs legislators continue to serve as either mayors or regional 
representatives back in their home districts (see also work by Abélès 2000; Jan 2005). In the 
French case, all politics is not only local, but also national. The addition of a European level of 
representation simply provides for another arena to conquer, or another mandate to accrue, and 
thus the basis of comparison between the EP and the national parliament is understandably 
linked to the institution’s perceived prestige.  
If Paris has only ever been the only game in town, why should this change under the 
additional career option of Brussels? The same could be said for any other heavily unitary 
system, however. If politicians (and thus their parties) are prone to comparing the EP with the 
national legislature in terms of prestige, instead of function, then we should expect greater 
fluidity in career behavior between the national and European levels of elected government.  
By contrast, federal systems are accustomed to dividing competencies along multiple 
levels of government, usually linked to geographic areas. In such systems, politicians are wont to 
gravitate to the functional areas that make the most sense for their professional interests. Taking 
an equally extreme example, such as Belgium, a Francophone politician with an interest in 
cultural policy would be better suited by a career in a the Francophone language community 
parliament than the national Chamber of Deputies, while a Flemish politician with an interest in 
health policy will be of more use working for the Flemish Parliament. In a system of divided 
competencies, multiple governing units already exist; however, they are less likely to be as 
associated with a given level of prestige. In such a system, the EP simply becomes another 
legislature, complete with its own set of competencies and interests. Thus the politician inspired 
by Europe will likely focus her attention there. 
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Parties, similarly, will already be accustomed to working across these multiple levels—or 
at least have a clearer idea of their existence. As opposed to unitary systems, we should expect to 
see not one set of politicians, shared across multiple offices, but rather separate sets of 
politicians—cultivating around each constellation of government. Insofar as this applies to my 
theory of MEP career behavior, we should expect federal systems to disfavor movement between 
the national and European levels, allowing for MEPs to build lengthier careers in Europe. Put 
more crudely, Paris may be the only game in town for an ambitious French politician, but Berlin 
is already used to sharing the stage with Postdam, Düsseldorf, and Bremen—and must therefore 
also with Brussels, as well.   
So far, I have suggested that the EP’s institutional development is likely to influence the 
career behavior of MEPs interested in pursuing a career at the European level. I have also shown 
that national political parties are likely to impact the movement of politicians between the EP 
and elsewhere, based upon the interaction between differences in party organization and state 
regime type. However, I have yet to discuss how MEPs advance in their careers within the EP, 
itself. In the next section, I expand my theory for MEP career behavior and discuss the 
development of a unique system for internal advancement within the EP, which favors 
experience in European policymaking, as well as individual technical expertise.  
2.4 EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION: INTERNAL ADVANCEMENT IN THE EP 
Thus far, I have discussed MEP career behavior as a function of the EP’s course of institutional 
development, as well as the interaction between political party organization and state regime 
type. However, developments within the evolution of the EP have also impacted pathways of 
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internal advancement. In this section, I briefly discuss possibilities for internal advancement 
within the EP, before illustrating the increased tendency for the most influential MEPs to belong 
to a class of career European politicians, often possessing skilled technical backgrounds relevant 
to specific policy areas. I then consider the consolidation of this elite ‘clique’ of MEPs and its 
effect on the continued development of the legislature as a part of the EU legislative process.  
2.4.1 Individual influence within the EP 
As the European Parliament has developed as a legislature, its increased internal complexity is 
not only demonstrated by the proliferation of a strong committee system, used in the amending 
and preparation of legislation for plenary votes, but also the enumeration of a complex hierarchy 
of influential positions. At the head of the EP stands a president, elected from within the body, 
along with his or her council of 14 vice presidents. Although one might expect this system to 
function on paper in the way that most parliaments select a prime minister and opposition 
leaders, the system has in fact reflected a complex brokerage scheme between the transnational 
party groups that favors a rotating presidency between the two major groups (today’s center-left 
S&D and center-right EPP party groups), along with a balance of vice presidents from the other 
party groups. The leadership core is further augmented by a College of Quaestors, who join the 
vice presidents and president within the Bureau, and whose job is to regulate the administrative 
and financial activities of the EP. 
Alongside this mostly administrative structure is a relatively opaque system of 
transnational party group leadership, voting whips, and committee-based group coordinators, 
who work with policy advisors and party group secretariats in order to regulate and direct the 
legislative behavior of the MEPs. Within the committee system, the allocation of leadership 
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positions is of direct interest to the political side of these operations, as the party group 
apparatchiks also administer the nomination and allocation of committee chairmanships and vice 
chairmanships, which are distributed in relation to the party group’s relative group size within 
the EP. 
As one might expect, each of these positions is associated with a degree of personal 
notoriety and prestige, and may thus be of professional interest to an individual MEP. However, 
unlike in other committee-based legislatures, it is not the committee chair or the voting whip that 
has the greatest amount of direct influence over the course of individual legislation, but rather the 
legislative rapporteur.  
2.4.2 Rapporteurship allocation and individual control 
Legislative rapporteurs are assigned to each draft piece of legislation upon its entrance into a 
given committee. Within the EU policymaking process, the EP acts either in consultation or in 
co-decision along with the Council of Ministers; however, legislative proposals originate most 
often from the bureaucratic Commission. Rapporteurs are thus individually responsible for 
articulating their committee’s position on a given piece of legislation, which then translates into 
the opinion of the EP at large during plenary votes (as is shown formally in the work of Ringe 
2010). Thus, rapporteurships are of critical interest to MEPs whose ambition rests in advancing 
within the European Parliament. How, then, are rapporteurships allocated? 
At the start of a given legislative session, each committee distributes a number of points 
to the responsible party group coordinator, based upon his or her party group’s relative size on 
the committee. Group coordinators then use these points to bid on reports that are referred to the 
committee. More important reports (i.e., those pertaining to co-decision) are worth more points. 
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Thus, the group coordinator has a clear stake in deciding which reports his or her party group 
should pursue. However, once a given party group has been awarded the report, it is less clear 
which MEP on the committee will be named rapporteur. 
Kaeding (2004) illustrates a general bias for the awarding of rapporteurships to the so-
called “high demander” legislators—chosen because of their lobbying connections, profile in 
industry, or political characteristics. Conversely, Høyland (2006) finds a political bias in the 
awarding of rapporteurships to MEPs whose national party is currently in government, which he 
shows to be a way of alleviating information asymmetries and inefficiencies across the multiple 
EU institutions. Others have looked to more structural factors, such as national delegation size 
within the committee; another camp attempts to identify expert MEPs in subject specific 
committees as more or less likely to become rapporteur (Benedetto 2005; Lindberg 2008; 
Mamadouh and Taupio Raunio 2003; Yordanova 2011; Yoshinaka, Mcelroy, and Bowler 2010). 
Inherent to each of these contentions is the notion that the rapporteur possesses a set of desirable 
personal characteristics that will favor a productive outcome for the report and thus a legislative 
‘win’ for the EP.  
One key problem with the extant literature in this area, however, is its relative dearth of 
generalizable data. Conclusions are drawn either from cherry-picked committees, specific 
legislative periods, or with only a few key countries in mind. This begs the question of whether 
or not the findings are truly generalizable. It may be logical for a German MEP from the CDU to 
receive a budget report when Merkel is in office, or for a marine biologist to have a 
disproportionate amount of reports on the fisheries committee, but should this logic extend to the 
hundreds of reports awarded in areas that are less politically sensitive or technically 
sophisticated? Further, the EP has not served in the same inter-institutional capacity across all 
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periods, particularly expanding its capabilities under the advent of co-decision in the early 1990s. 
Therefore, it is important to take up the issue of report allocation in a more broadly generalizable 
way.  
2.4.3 The Rapporteur as technician and chief negotiator 
In their discussion of personal characteristics best suited for MEPs, Beauvallet and Michon detail 
the increased importance for MEPs to posses advanced skills for negotiation and deliberation. As 
the nature of legislation at the EP level is comparatively technical, they also note the need for 
expertise in specific subject areas (in Déloye and Bruter 2007). The themes of technical 
expertise and deliberative experience seem generalizable within the allocation of 
rapporteurships, as well.  
In a recent interview with a British MEP, the deputy explained that reports in the 
environment committee, on which she served, were frequently allocated based upon the merits of 
prior professional training held by the numerous scientists on the committee.8 Likewise, a former 
Polish MEP pointed to his background as a trained economist, as well as his status as a former 
finance minister, in his nomination for a highly sensitive economic report.9 Thus, the perception 
of education is clearly important when it comes to the allocation of certain sensitive, or otherwise 
technically complex, reports.  
However, technical training may take a backseat to negotiating in other cases, as 
explained one Swedish MEP, who felt that his ability to compromise and listen to the opinions of 
                                                 
8 MEP, personal interview, March 22, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels.  
9 Polish MP, personal interview, December 20, 2011. Sejm. Warsaw.  
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others had been decisive in his having received a number of reports.10 While he would not credit 
himself as being an expert on the financial decisions that he reported on, he nonetheless pointed 
to his ability to problem solve and collaborate with other deputies as paramount to his ability to 
draft reports. He learned this lesson early on in his tenure, when he attempted to lecture his 
committee on the ‘correct’ answer for another piece of legislation. A prominent former prime 
minister scoffed at him, reminding him that the European Parliament had “survived for many 
years without [him]… and without Sweden” and would continue to do so without his dogmatic 
attitude.  
Such anecdotes highlight the necessity for influential MEPs to possess high levels of 
education, as well as be accustomed to the unique consensus-driven approach of EP legislative 
negotiations, in order to receive rapporteurships. Technical expertise comes with education and 
institutional expertise can only come from prior experience in the EP, thus we might expect more 
highly educated and experienced MEPs to be favored in the allocation of reports. This is not only 
important for the satisfaction of personal ambitions for internal advancement, but also tells us a 
great deal about the output of the EP on the whole. If these assumptions hold true across the 
entire legislature, then a specific set of expert and longstanding MEPs are likely to emerge as the 
disproportionate wielders of influence in EP policymaking output.  
                                                 
10 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels.  
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2.5 HYPOTHESES 
My theory for MEP career behavior examines the institutionalization of MEP careers within the 
context of a developing legislature. In doing so, it traces MEP behavior to developments within 
the legislature, a view of national political parties that is highly contingent on national context, 
and the emerging patterns of institutional advancement to be undertaken by MEPs with an 
interest in an extended career within the European Parliament. While the claims discussed in this 
chapter rely on both extant research and anecdotal evidence from MEPs themselves, they are 
also falsifiable propositions. In this section, I restate my theory in the form of testable 
hypotheses, before spending some time discussing the research design pursued by the rest of the 
dissertation.  
H1. As the European Parliament expands its legislative power, its membership will 
increasingly seek reelection. 
One of the most important factors in the development of the EP as a legislature is its 
increased power vis-à-vis the other European institutions and national parliaments—first under 
extended consultative powers and later under co-decision. As the EP increases its legislative 
capacity, it’s logical to expect politicians will take a greater interest in developing extended 
careers as MEPs. Thus, we should see a correlation between the incidence of reelection seeking 
and the EP’s formal legislative powers.  
H2. As the European Parliament increases in its professionalization as a legislature, its 
membership will increasingly seek reelection. 
On the other hand, we might also expect that a more ‘professional’ legislature will have a 
similarly positive effect on the likelihood of an MEP seeking an extended career. Not simply a 
matter of formal powers, legislative professionalization pertains more directly to the perks of the 
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job of MEP itself: suitable financial compensation, an internally complex system of posts and 
functions, and a demanding full-time professional commitment. Part time work may be fine 
between jobs, but MEP careers are unlikely to flourish if the legislature cannot make a case for 
its professional capacity.  
H3. MEPs from federal backgrounds will build more extensive careers in the European 
Parliament than MEPs from highly unitary systems.  
MEP careers operate not only at the whim of individual ambition, but also at the mercy of 
political parties who nominate them. My discussion of the interaction between party organization 
and national regime type suggests that MEPs from federal backgrounds are likely to display 
lengthier careers within the EP. Parties in federal systems tend to be organized in such a way that 
already facilitates the selection of working with multiple sets of politicians across varying levels 
of government. This leads to a less hierarchical view of the EP’s placement in relation to national 
offices and thus suggests a basis of interest in the EP that is not as reliant on the mandate’s 
perceived prestige. 
H4. MEPs with higher levels of education will have greater influence over the EP 
legislative process via the accrual of rapporteurships.  
MEPs wishing to advance within the EP itself are able to do so via a set of leadership 
positions, of which rapporteurships provide the greatest potential for individual impact on 
European legislation. The nature of EU policymaking is often technically sophisticated. 
Furthermore, committees vary greatly in size and MEPs are confronted with numerous votes 
during each plenary session. Thus, the institutional structure of the EP favors the nomination of 
specialist MEPs to serve as legislative rapporteurs in situations of technical complexity.  
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H5. MEPs with more experience in the European Parliament are more likely to serve as 
rapporteur.  
The institutional complexity of the EP, as well as the large number of deputies from 
dozens of ideological and national backgrounds, requires that even the most recognizable of 
politicians invest energies in the creation of interpersonal networks within the EP, in order to 
cultivate the sort of personal profile needed to influence the course of legislation. A reputation as 
hardworking and able to reach consensus is indispensable to the EP policymaking process, yet 
such reputations do not develop overnight. Thus, experience within the EP over the course of 
multiple legislative mandates will favor the accrual of rapporteurships and thus influence within 
the Parliament.  
H6. Education and experience matter more in the assignment of higher profile 
rapporteurships, as under co-decision.  
The advent of co-decision under the Maastricht Treaty elevated the EP to the status of 
‘veto player’ along with the Council of Ministers. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, this 
status was further expanded. These developments indicate that the EP’s opinion on a given piece 
of legislation is increasingly valuable. This would also seem to indicate, therefore, that report 
allocation has become increasingly valuable to MEPs, whose opinions now have the opportunity 
to derail entire pieces of proposed Commission regulation. MEP education and experience are 
not only important determinants of rapporteurship allocation in general, but are expected to be 
increasingly important as the EP increases its legislative clout. 
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2.6 RESEARCH DESIGN: QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE APPLICATIONS 
How do we explain MEP career behavior? This central question is evaluated by a theory that 
relies on the institutional capacity and professionalization of the EP, the influence of national 
political parties in candidate selection and nomination processes, and the behavior of MEPs 
themselves within the legislature. My theoretical background takes a critical view of institutional 
change that favors a symbiosis between institutional development and individual action. I argue 
that career behavior is an institution in and of itself, and the development of this institution is an 
extension of the legislature in which it operates. To examine the effect of institutionalization on 
MEP behavior, I employ a series of quantitative and qualitative tests.  
Chapter Three tests the first two hypotheses presented in this chapter—namely, that an 
increase in the professionalization and legislative capacity of the EP will favor the incidence of 
reelection seeking among MEPs. I evaluate this claim using individual-level data from all 
members of the EP, 1979-2009. I conceive of reelection seeking as contingent on influence at 
multiple levels—individual ambition, national background, and developments within the 
legislature—thus, I employ a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test these hypotheses.  
Chapter Four tests the third hypothesis and evaluates the influence of political parties on 
legislator volatility. I test the assumption that domestic regime type will impact MEP reelection 
seeking, using the new data source described in Chapter Three. I then use a series of multinomial 
logit models to indicate the relative likelihood that MEPs from federal systems will seek 
reelection to the EP, as compared with a number of other professional possibilities, and explain 
this behavior in terms of party organization at the national level.  
Chapter Five tests the remaining hypotheses and addresses MEP behavior within the EP. 
I test the assumption that a clique of highly specialized and careerist MEPs is wielding an 
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increasingly disproportionate amount of influence on the EP legislative process via the accrual of 
rapporteurships. I return once again to the main source of quantitative data to test these 
hypotheses, before placing this development within the greater context of the increasingly 
‘technocratic’ EU institutions. I return to the normative implications of this increase in 
technocracy, even in the most democratic of EU institutions, in the concluding chapter.   Chapter Six presents a qualitative assessment of my theory for MEP career behavior, applying it to the national delegations of France, Germany, and Poland. To evaluate differences in these country delegations, I rely on both quantitative and qualitative collected about MEPs from the three countries. France is presented as the ‘weak’ case for MEP behavior, as professional paths remain inextricable from party control and volatility between multiple levels of government remains great. In contrast, German MEPs are shown to posses extraordinary degrees of technical specificity and lengthy careers within the EP. Thus, they roughly demonstrate the ‘elite clique’ of MEPs described by Chapter Five. Finally, the Polish case demonstrates the appeal of the EP to recruit top legislators from the new member states, hinting at the professional power and legislative capacity of the institution.  
Chapter Seven offers a summary discussion and conclusion of my findings, as well as 
discussing some of the normative results of the institutionalization of MEP behavior. Although 
the EP is frequently cited as a balm for the democratic deficit within the EU, I suggest that the 
EP’s behavior is less democratic than we might think. If institutional changes in the EP unevenly 
favor the development of lengthy careers by only a set of MEPs, and these MEPs in turn wield a 
disproportionate amount of influence on the legislative process of the institution, then link 
between voter preference and representative democracy may not be satisfied. Instead, the EP 
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may be headed towards a ‘two-speed’ institution, where some voices are heard more clearly than 
others and the preferences of the European publics remain obfuscated.  
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3.0  PROFESSIONALIZATION, POWER, AND AMBITION 
The first chapter concluded with a discussion of three ideal pathways for the treatment of the EP 
by ambitious politicians, each following from a popular understanding of the legislature: (1) the 
EP as a retirement home, (2) the EP as a springboard to national office, and (3) the EP as 
permanent place of employment. The following two chapters will examine the latter of these two 
possibilities, asking how MEPs are likely to incorporate the EP into broader careers, as well as 
how successful MEPs build extended careers in EP politics, itself. For the present, this chapter 
takes a more longitudinal view, assessing how the EP has perhaps become less of a retirement 
home or a steppingstone and more of a serious legislative institution in its own right.  
Identifying the mechanism for MEP career stability requires a separation of two distinct 
forces of political development. On the one hand, the Polsbian view of legislative 
professionalization discussed in the previous chapter suggests that careerism in the EP is likely a 
function of increased material perks related to the job (salary, support, and so on), as well as the 
‘well-boundedness’ of the legislature (Polsby 1968). It is logical to assume that the EP has 
indeed become a more desirable place to work, over time: it has paid its members somewhat 
better in recent years, proliferated its internal institutions in a response to its bulked up legislative 
capacity, and grown from an under-funded talk shop run out of a rented space in Strasbourg to a 
highly developed collection of campuses—complete with facilities for research, dining, and 
exercise—in three different countries.  
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On the other hand, however, the opportunity structures present for MEPs do not 
presuppose that only material concerns will dictate career behavior. Weber’s (2009) distinction 
between careerist politicians living “from” instead of “for” politics is an important one. 
However, the professionalization of political careers is likely only to enhance the means towards 
a preexisting goal already present in the minds of ambitious politicians. The increased 
institutional capacity of the EP does not necessarily create a set of new incentives for politicians 
without a previous interest in European politics, but it can certainly make the goal of working as 
an MEP a more easily realizable one. What else, then, is likely to pique the interest of an 
ambitious politician? Strøm (1997) contends that legislators are in the business of seeking votes, 
policy, and office. Each of these objectives is meaningless without a degree of institutional 
professionalism, but also without the promise of adequate and readily identifiable power once in 
office. What good are votes and an office if they do not come with the mechanisms available to 
actually advance ones policy goals? 
In the remaining sections of the chapter, I discuss the evolution of the EP’s professional 
capacity and test its effect on membership stability. I begin with a discussion of the institutional 
professionalization of the EP since initial direct elections in 1979. Evidence from parliamentary 
archival holdings demonstrates that the EP has not exceeded a normal rate of inflation for many 
of its professional capacities since 1979, although the overhaul of the MEP salary system in 2009 
is one notable exception to this lack of meaningful variation. On the other hand, the EP has 
vastly expanded its legislative capabilities, as well as its power vis-à-vis the other European 
institutions, particularly since the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty. The expansion of the EP’s 
legislative power does show a strong and significant effect on MEP behavior.  
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In the following section, I differentiate between an increase in power and an increase in 
institutional professionalization within the EP, before summarizing their predicted effects on 
MEP career stability, as presented in the previous chapter. I then introduce a major new source of 
empirical data for the study of MEP career behavior in the second sections, collected from a 
variety of archival and EP sources. In the third section of the chapter, I use techniques from 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), as well as maximum likelihood estimation, to gauge the 
predicted effect of the EP’s institutionalization on the career behavior of its MEPs. I find that an 
increase in the EP’s legislative power does have a net positive effect on reelection seeking to the 
EP, but major sources of variation for MEP background—particularly differences in a given 
MEP’s country of origin—are worth exploring further. This finding motivates the continued 
empirical analysis in the following chapter.  
3.1 LEGISLATIVE POWER AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFESSIONALIZATION 
As already discussed in the theoretical framework from the previous chapter, the question of 
MEP career behavior is closely linked to the evolutionary development of the EP as a ‘new’ 
legislative institution. The incidence of seeking reelection to the EP is one identifiable measure 
for gauging the course of this development, but how do we assess changes within the structures 
of the EP that might affect the incidence of MEPs desiring to maintain their current position in 
Brussels and Strasbourg? As late as the 1994 European elections, only 49.3% of current MEPs 
sought reelection. This figure ballooned to more than 56% of MEPs seeking reelection in the 
most recent elections in 2009, reflecting a steady pattern of growth in the rates of MEP reelection 
 52 
seeking, even as the legislature itself dramatically expanded by nearly 300 seats during the same 
time period.  
The question therefore is not, ‘Is the EP becoming a more stable legislative body?’ but 
rather, ‘Why is the EP becoming a more stable body?’ For the purpose of my analysis, I assume a 
rational model for career behavior that predicts an individual legislator from legislative wave t to 
seek reelection for legislative wave t+1, if doing so maximizes the personal utility derived from 
his or her remaining in office. Because the rapid course of institutional development undertaken 
by the EP between 1979 and 2009, I expect that changes in the institution itself have had an 
effect on this utility function. I examine two specific mechanisms, the power of the EP and its 
professional institutional capacity, that have both expanded since 1979 and are likely to impact 
the desire of an MEP to seek further election to the EP. 
3.1.1 Power and Prestige 
Kreppel's (2002) authoritative exploration of the EP’s institutional development points to the 
substantial expansion of the institution’s legislative power between its founding as an unelected 
advisory board for the ECSC in 1958 and its current status as a popularly elected veto player for 
EU legislation. Her discussion of the EP’s expanding legislative powers under the parade of EU 
treaty reforms indicates the presence of a strong expansion of the legislature’s power to effect 
change in Council decisions in a relatively short time period, likely also to impact how 
legislators view their service in the EP.  
Beginning in 1958, the EP legislative process revolved mostly around a procedure known 
as ‘consultation.’ Not unlike the House of Lords in Westminster, the EP was allowed to draft 
opinions on legislation proposed by the Commission, which would then be referred to the 
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Council of Ministers for possible inclusion into the Council’s binding decision on the piece of 
legislation. As Kreppel (2002) indicates, the only major innovation on the part of the EP under 
consultation was their ability to strategically delay problematic legislation, as developed in the 
1980 “Isoglucose” case (pp. 71-73). The EP had no right to initiate legislation and no right to kill 
legislation—only the chance to delay its passage and offer an opinion.  
In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) brought about not only major structural changes 
for the implementation of the common market, but also the addition of the ‘cooperation’ 
legislative procedure, to be used by the EP in certain subject areas. Under cooperation, the EP 
was given a second reading of Commission proposals, allowing it some powers of dialogue with 
the Council of Ministers. It could also force the Council to override EP opinion via unanimity (as 
opposed to a qualified majority), should an absolute majority of MEPs still disagree with the 
Council’s position following its second reading. Under the SEA, the EP retained no rights of 
initiation or legislative vetoes, but it could effectively force the slow and painful death of 
unpopular legislation. As a result, Kreppel’s (2002) work demonstrates that the Commission and 
Council were more likely to take EP opinions seriously in the amending of legislation following 
1987 (pp. 79-80).  
Finally, the Maastricht Treaty reforms and subsequent treaties of Nice and Amsterdam 
finally attributed veto player status to the EP in 1993, expanding the purview of this status to 
further subject areas in 1999. The new ‘co-decision’ process, which is discussed at greater length 
in Chapter Five, not only allowed the undisputed right of the EP to amend and veto legislation 
proposed by the Commission, but also to dialogue with the Commission on equal footing to the 
Council of Ministers. As in the US Congress’ ‘reconciliation’ process, both the Council and the 
EP were forced to come to agreement on a wide variety of Commission proposals related to the 
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implementation of the single market, providing the greatest single expansion of the EP’s 
legislative power over the course of its history.  
The effect of the EP’s expansion of power could not be more distinct. Gazzo Dilley 
(1974)’s journalistic assessment of the EP in a UK news magazine refers to the legislature as a 
“talking-shop” with “no real political power at all… [and an] embryo of what could at some 
future date be a European legislative body” (p. 47). Her view of the legislature in the 1970s is 
strikingly different from that of a recent interviewee from Spain, who bragged about his being 
“good friends with Berlusconi” and knowing “the American ambassador to Spain quite well,” as 
well as his personal connections with a former French prime minister.11 The MEP in question 
also noted that, although his colleagues continue to have a “complex” about their level of power, 
they often fail to see how much they have won in such a short amount of time. As another 
longstanding MEP put it, it’s “only every 100 years or so that one gets to build a legislature.”12 
Surely no other legislative body in an already consolidated democracy has seen such a dramatic 
reversal of its fortunes in such a short period of time. The development of the EP’s legislative 
power is therefore a reasonable suspect for the driving mechanism behind increases in its relative 
prestige, as well as the stability of its membership.  
3.1.2 Institutional capacity and professionalization 
Nonetheless, the journalistic evaluation of the early EP mentioned above also references the 
“most precarious [of work] conditions” experienced by the original MEPs, of which “the only 
one who has an office of his own is the president” (Gazzo Dilley 1974: 47). Knowing that work 
                                                 
11 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010. European Parliament, Brussels. 
12 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels.  
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in contemporary elected politics must not only be an avocation, but also a vocation, which trends 
in the EP’s professionalization as a legislature have been witnessed since the initiation of direct 
elections in 1979? For the purposes of this assessment, it is helpful to look at the criteria for 
legislative professionalization proposed by Polsby (1968), Squire (1992), and others: legislative 
salaries, institutional support, and professional commitment.  
As previously discussed in Chapter Two, the base salaries of MEPs were paid by their 
home countries for the majority of legislators between 1979 and 2009. Although the initial 
protocols for the direct election made reference to the need for a harmonized system of salaries, 
the historical basis of the EP’s membership—nominated by the national parliaments between 
1958 and 1979—led MEPs to initially receive their salary in parity to that of a national legislator. 
This fact did not go unnoticed by the popular press. A 1978 article from The Guardian, in the 
run-up to the first direct elections, describes the unfairness of German MEPs “paid at three times 
as much as British” ones, but nonetheless argues against the use of a common salary (Langdon 
1978). As Figure 2 demonstrates, disparities between the salaries of MEPs vary dramatically by 
country for much of the EP’s history.  
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Figure 2. MEP Salaries by Country, 1979-2009 
Figure 2 displays the monthly base salary, converted into comparable 2009 US PPPs, for 
members of the EU-15. The data reveals that MEPs from countries such as Germany or Italy 
received three to four times the base salary of MEPs from others, such as Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal. The introduction of a harmonized salary during the 2004-2009 period—set in relation 
to the a fixed percentage of the base salary of a judge from the European Court of Justice—
greatly increased the earnings of most MEPs, although the new salary is somewhat lower than 
MPs from Austria and Italy are accustomed to receiving.13 Although salaries vary in relation to 
one another, once inflation is controlled for, it becomes apparent that most MEPs did not 
                                                 
13 Grandfathering provisions for the new harmonized salary allow current MEPs to choose between their present 
salary and the new EU salary for as long as they remain in the legislature. Thus, the figure reflects the assumption 
that Italian and Austrian MEPs will continue to choose their higher national salary, whereas all other MEPs will 
switch to the new system. This assumption is also maintained in the regression analysis at the end of the chapter.  
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experience much in the way of ‘real’ salary growth between 1979 and 2009—at least until the 
initiation of the harmonized salary. In other words, if we expect an increase in 
professionalization to bring about greater reelection seeking, we would hope to see salary figures 
that track with the steady growth of reelections seeking to the parliament—not a relatively static 
set of salaries.  
If salary growth is unlikely to explain an increase in the EP’s professionalization, there 
are still many other factors related to the EP’s institutional capacity that might explain growth in 
the reelection seeking of its membership. Staff and other institutional supports are obviously 
integral parts of a job’s professional attractiveness. Unlike MEP salaries, staff and travel 
allowances were maintained at uniform levels by the EP throughout the 1979-2009 period. In 
fact, the diversity of base salaries was actually explicitly compensated by a routinely generous 
set of benefits provided to all MEPs. The legislature’s internal administrative unit, the College of 
Quaestors, has maintained the EP’s “Rules Governing the Payment of Expenses and Allowances 
to Members” document since 1979.  
According to these administrative documents, all MEPs are provided with allowances for 
travel to and from their principal residence, per diem allowances for days that the EP is in 
session in Brussels or in Strasbourg, stipends to be used in the hiring of individual staff, standard 
offices in both of the EP’s main locations, an EU insurance and medical policy, additional 
training for the acquisition of languages and computing skills, subsidized meals and exercise 
memberships within the EP compound, and even lifetime access to the legislature’s business 
facilities, following the end of their mandate.  
According to a communiqué from the College of Quaestors, the 2009 rates for travel 
reimbursements provided for by the EP included direct reimbursement of fully flexible airfare to 
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and from Brussels and Strasbourg or a per kilometer rate for travel by car, in addition to a 4148 
EUR annual lump sum for travel. Further, MEPs were provided a 298 EUR per diem for every 
day spent working in Brussels, Strasbourg, or on official business. Each MEP was also granted 
an additional 21,742 EUR allowance per month, in order to cover office and staff expenses and 
salaries (Fazakas 2008). Although the support schemes afforded to MEPs are certainly 
generous—in many cases much more so than those afforded to national MPs—each of the rates 
has been index automatically to inflation since 1982 and does not represent a substantial increase 
upon the institutional levels of support provided by the EP since the initiation of direct elections 
in 2009.  
One final way in which scholars have considered variation in the level of institutional 
professionalization is to examine the professional commitment demanded by a legislature. 
Squire's (1992, 1993) index of US state legislatorial professionalization includes variables for the 
specific time commitment demanded by the legislature. The popular anecdote necessitating this 
variable, of course, is a comparison of Montana’s seasonal legislature—meeting for a summer 
term every two years—to New York or California’s round-the-clock professional commitment 
demanded of state legislatures. If the EP has varied between these two extremes, it’s worth 
considering whether a more professionally demanding EP might also inspire a more long-term 
professional commitment on the part of its legislators.  
Evidence for substantial growth in the time commitment of MEPs is negligible. The EP 
calendar has remained fairly similar since the 1980s. Disagreement over the legislature’s official 
location have led to mandates even within the treaty structures of the EU itself, ordering the 
legislature to convene for set plenary dates in Strasbourg each month. The current monthly 
schedule of an MEP alternates between a week of plenary in Strasbourg, a week each for both 
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committee and party group work in Brussels, and a ‘green week’ for MEPs to spend at home in 
their constituencies. If we examine the variation described even among US House members in 
Fenno's (1978) discussion of legislator “home style,” it is clear that the EP is used to following a 
heavily regimented routine for the schedules of its members.  
 
Figure 3. MEP Size and Legislative Productivity, 1979-2009 
What other indicators, then, might provide us with information about the possibility for 
growth in the level of the EP’s professional commitment? Although the time MEPs spend at the 
office may not have changed much over the years, the amount of work they do there may 
certainly have increased. Figure 3 provides some evidence of this increase, looking at growth in 
the number of legislative reports completed by the EP, in relation to the legislature’s size. As the 
figure displays, both the EP, as well as its legislative output, have grown substantially since 
2009. However, the average number of reports completed by an MEP has not changed 
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significantly during the same time period. While Chapter Five will address the importance of 
these legislative reports, both as a measure of productivity and personal clout within the 
legislature, it is worth noting that the raw gross output of the legislature has not varied that 
greatly since 1979, excluding obvious increases in the legislature’s ability to draft additional 
reports following the addition of the cooperation and co-decision procedures.  
3.1.3 Changing legislators, changing roles 
Although the EP’s level of institutional professionalization may not have grown at the same rate 
as its legislative power, it’s clear for longstanding MEPs that a change is in the air among their 
colleagues. One of the most senior MEPs interviewed in the project indicated that her colleagues 
today were much “more interested and better informed” than when she began work as an MEP 
back in the 1980s.14 Another longstanding MEP, having previously served in national office, said 
that while there was “not a great difference in the amount of work required” by both legislatures 
in which he had served, he did notice a “qualitative difference” in the conduct of MEPs, who 
were more quick to seek consensus and less partisan in their debates.15 
Many MEPs interviewed for the project agreed that their work in the EP was much more 
pleasant than back at home. As a senior MEP from the UK put it, “British politics is about 
arguing, European politics is about making friends.”16 Although the view of MEP roles as 
consensus-seekers is nothing new to the literature, others pointed to a change in the nature of 
parliamentary debates with the addition of the 2004-07 enlargement states. One German from the 
                                                 
14 MEP, personal interview, February 29, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels. 
15 MEP, personal interview, June 2, 2010. European Parliament, Brussels. 
16 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels. 
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EPP, attempting to diplomatically describe difficulties in working with MEPs from the new 
member states, was reminded that “one has to visit history a bit” in understanding why some 
MEPs were more difficult to reach consensus with than others.17 A Czech from the S&D 
disputed this assessment, defending his colleagues’ desire to argue for what could be 
accomplished in Prague “in the span of a day,” but “takes months” to complete in Brussels.18 
For whatever reason one initially becomes interested in seeking election the EP, it is 
impossible to tell with any certainty how an individual will react to the different style of politics 
at play in the EP, as well as the complex institutional framework and long time horizons for the 
completion of legislation. A number of MEPs interviewed mentioned that it took them the 
majority of their first term in the legislature to feel comfortable enough navigating the 
complicated interpersonal networks of vast institutional resources available to them, in order to 
even begin to think about accomplishing the policy objectives that had motivated them to seek 
office in the first place. While later chapters will address the importance of seniority within the 
EP at greater length, it important at this stage to understand that the diversity of individual 
legislator roles is extremely important in predicting how MEPs will react to the large institutional 
shifts in the legislature. 
3.1.4 Hypotheses 
The remainder of the chapter provides an empirical analysis for the effect of both the EP’s 
legislative power, as well as its degree of institutional professionalization, on the behavior of 
MEPs. More specifically, it tests the following two hypotheses:  
                                                 
17 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels. 
18 MEP, personal interview, June 2, 2010. European Parliament, Brussels. 
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H1. As the European Parliament expands its legislative power, its membership will 
increasingly seek reelection. 
H2. As the European Parliament increases in its professionalization as a legislature, its 
membership will increasingly seek reelection. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, I expect that the dramatic increase in the EP’s 
legislative power, particularly after the SEA and Maastricht treaties, is likely to have a positive 
effect on the reelection seeking of the legislature’s membership. Similarly, any comparative 
assessment of the EP with other legislatures suggests that as the legislature increases its 
professionalization and institutional capacity, it will similarly positively impact the reelection 
seeking of its membership. Nonetheless, as the previous section also suggests, political ambition 
is undeniably linked to a highly diverse set of individual legislator roles. These roles will be 
examined with greater precision as major control variables in the empirical analysis. In the 
following section, I describe the collection and assembly of a new quantitative data source to test 
the empirical claims made by the project. 
3.2 NEW QUESTIONS, NEW DATA 
The scope of the research undertaken by this dissertation entails an ambitious program of data 
collection. In order to test claims about the effect of institutional change in the EP on the career 
behavior of specific MEPs, complete data on all members elected to the European Parliament 
between 1979 and 2009 is needed. Individual data on MEPs, their careers, and their personal 
backgrounds exists for portions of the time period examined, but is neither uniform, nor 
exhaustive. In order to test the empirical claims put forth by the dissertation, I collected 
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individual data on each of the more than 4000 MEPs present over the course of the six waves of 
the EP.  
 Initial data collection was greatly facilitated with software developed by Høyland, Sircar, and Hix (2009), which allows users to lift publicly available data from the EP website’s 
membership archives. From this data, I was able to develop a list of each MEP, separated by 
wave, as well as collect basic demographic data, such as gender, age, country of origin, and 
political party affiliation. The data collection tool also provided information on each MEP’s 
status on legislative and administrative committees, such as whether or not they had served as a 
committee chair or as a member of the EP’s administrative Bureau.  
From there, I needed also to collect data on institutional variables of concern. I consulted 
archives in the University of Pittsburgh’s exhaustive Commission holdings, which provide the 
most complete copy of the Commission archives outside of the EU. Internal documents provided 
from the EP aided in the initial collection of salary and support information, which was later 
augmented and cross-checked by new work from Brans and Peters (2012).19 The EP’s official 
archival and documentary assistance service at its secretariat in Luxembourg (CARDOC) was 
instrumental in providing data not available from the website, such as specific support figures 
and information on legislative reports prior to their indexation on the Internet.  
Collecting information on the career behavior of individual MEPs proved to be the most 
challenging part of dataset construction. Archival holdings at the French Bibliothèque Nationale 
research library, the German Statistisches Bundesamt, as well as the electoral archives at Science 
Po – Paris’ CEVIPOF unit were able to provide electoral lists and official European election 
materials and publicity from a number of EU member states, in order to examine whether or not 
                                                 
19 Other notable sources of data include Déloye and Bruter (2007), Larhant (2004), Lodge (1990, 2010) and the 
European Parliamentary Yearbook and internal articles from the EU’s European Report circular. 
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MEPs sought reelection in subsequent terms. Personal webpages maintained by MEPs, their 
parties, and their home governments filled in most of the remaining gaps in the data and were 
also used to collect statistics on MEP levels of education used in Chapter Five. Additional data 
sources are explained, as they appear, in the relevant chapters. The end result is a fully 
comprehensive dataset of the elected EP membership, complete with a surprisingly low 
incidence of missing data and the ability to answer questions about the EP’s effect on the career 
behavior of its members.  
3.3 TESTING THE PROFESSIONALIZATION AND POWER HYPOTHESES 
If H1 and H2 are true, I expect an increase in the professionalization and power variables to lead 
to a greater incidence of reelection seeking among MEPs over time. Taking cues from my 
previous discussion of the importance of individual characteristics and roles as determinant of 
professional ambition, I anticipate that specific individual characteristics, such as EP leadership, 
partisan affiliation, or gender, may also predispose the incidence of static ambition. Naturally, 
these explanations are not mutually exclusive. It is quite likely that both professional and 
individual variables interact in an individual’s decision to seek reelection to the EP. The 
relationship between professionalization, power, and ambition in the EP involves the 
investigation of a number of variables, captured at multiple theoretical levels and time points. 
Individual-level characteristics, such as an MEP’s role within the EP, are impacted on a broader 
systemic level by higher-order concerns, such as member pay, staff support, and time 
commitment. To account for the underlying multi-level nature of this relationship, I specify 
predictive models using techniques from hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).  
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HLM makes sense for a number of theoretical and statistical reasons. Using simple 
multivariate regression when variation occurs on different theoretical levels can lead to critical 
estimation errors and incorrect inferences. Usually, researchers attempt to correct for multi-level 
variation by generalizing higher-level variation at the individual unit level, thus reformatting 
these generalizations into lower-level observations, or vice versa (Singer and Willett 2003). The 
problem with treating a system variable as an individual one, or an individual variable as a 
systemic one, is that these generalizations can lead to ecological or atomistic fallacies. Beyond 
the inaccuracy of such techniques at a theoretical level, modeling multi-level causality at a single 
level can create huge statistical issues; disaggregated group-level variation attributed to specific 
individuals in the model can pool in the error terms and create efficiency problems or error term 
correlation biases (Luke 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).   
To correct for these hazards, I model the impact of professionalization and power on 
reelection seeking over time, using a predictive three-level longitudinal model. Theoretically, we 
know that the decision to seek reelection is comprised of both individual and higher-order 
influences. Thus, I estimate this relationship as three nested levels: the individual, nested within 
the country delegation, nested within the legislative time period. Using the MEP dataset 
described in the previous section, I organize the data as a longitudinal cross-section of the full 
EP. This allows for six waves of observation (parliaments are elected to five-year terms) and a 
total population of 3,942 MEP-wave observations.  
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3.3.1 Variables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Chapter Three models) 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the data used in the chapter. I use the dichotomous 
dependent variable Seek Reelection and code it with positive values when the MEP in question 
sought reelection at the end of the current wave. Seeking reelection is the most outwardly visible 
sign of MEPs displaying what Schlesinger (1966) refers to as static ambition. For the purposes of 
this study, higher levels of static ambition correlate positively higher levels of MEP stability. I 
expect that MEPs running for continued service in the EP have a specific interest in the office; 
thus, static ambition is modeled in the affirmative direction.  
The principal independent variables of interest are derived from the Squire 
professionalization index and modeled at the country (Level 2) and institutional (Level 3) levels 
of variation. For the purposes of my analysis, I use two continuous variables—Salary and Total 
Rapports—to proxy for professionalization. Salary values are scaled to inflation and converted 
into US dollars, to account for the fact that MEPs were traditionally paid in accordance with 
 67 
national figures. Salary represents the average monthly MEP base salary figure for the given 
term. I assume that a discrete increase in salary will lead to a greater probability of reelection 
seeking. Total Rapports is a count variable for the total number of legislative reports concluded 
in a given session and is another measure of the EP’s level of institutional professionalization. 
This variable is modeled at the institutional level. Because of the comparatively large variation in 
both salary and report figures, I use the natural log of both variables throughout the econometric 
analysis. 
As previously discussed, the passage of time is also of critical interest, as it is directly 
related to the EP’s legislative clout. Thus, I use the trend variable Wave to capture variance 
subsumed by each successive wave of the EP. For the first directly elected EP session in 1979, 
Wave = 1. The expected effect of Wave on MEP ambition is clearly positive. As the European 
Parliament evolves over time, gaining new powers of review and oversight vis-à-vis the other 
EU institutions, a general increase in the level of MEPs seeking reelection is expected. Thus, the 
expected sign on Wave is positive. This time effect, which affects the whole legislature, is also 
modeled as Level 3. I also substitute the count variable with a dichotomous indicator of EP 
power, Co-decision, to indicate waves of parliament where MEPs had an option to veto Council 
decisions. 
To control for individual variation in roles and preferences, I model a series of control 
variables at Level 1. EP Leader is a dichotomous indicator for individuals holding an 
administrative leadership position (Bureau, Vice President, Quaestor, or President) in the EP. 
Committee Leader is a dichotomous variable for MEPs having served in a position of 
committee leadership (Chair, Vice Chair, etc.) during the given wave. Seniority is a count 
variable for the number of terms in the EP served by a given MEP. Dropout controls for those 
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MEPs who did not complete their full term and Age is the MEP’s age at the end of their current 
mandate. 
Other controls include Party in Government, for MEPs whose national political party 
was serving in the governing coalition of their country at the end of the current term, which is a 
possible indicator of an MEP’s likelihood of returning to national office during political boom 
time. New Member State is a dichotomous indicator for MEPs whose country is new to the EU 
during the current term of the EP and Local Elections is a trichotomous indicator used by Beck 
et al. (2001) for whether an MEP’s country of origin has a substantial subnational governing 
presence, if these offices are elected directly, or both. Country dummies are used throughout the 
analysis, excluding Ireland as the reference category.  
3.3.2 Constructing the Model 
Multi-level models can either be expressed in terms of their component-level equations, as in a 
system of equations, or in a ‘mixed’ form that encompasses all levels into one equation via basic 
algebraic properties of substitution. My model contains three theoretical levels: (1) and 
individual level, (2) a country level and (3) a temporal level. The individual-level essentially 
looks like a standard OLS model, where individual i from country j has individual-level traits [X] 
that more or less predispose them to seek reelection at the end of wave t: (1) Seek Reelectionijt = β0j + βnj[X] + ei 
The corresponding country-level equations are essentially a parallel model, containing 
variables [Z] that change by country for all individuals in country j at time t: (2) β0j = γ00t + γ01ln(Salary)j + γ0nt[Z] + ζ0j 
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Notice here that β0j value in Level 2 corresponds with a random intercept in Level 1 (that 
is, the direct effect of the country-level variables), but does not interact with the slope 
coefficients of the Level 1 betas. Theoretically speaking, this indicates that I see no reason why 
salary, the presence of local elections, or any other country-level variable would impact females, 
elderly MEPs, or EP leaders in a systematically different way.  
Finally, the corresponding Level 3 effects are modeled to include institution-wide 
variation at time t: (3a) γ00t = γ00t  + 01γWave/Co-decisiont + γ02ln(Total Rapports)t (3b) γ01t = 11γWave/Co-decisiont + γ12ln(Total Rapports)t 
The Level 3 variables assume no random error term of their own and essentially collapse 
into the second wave. The values of γ01t do interact with the slope of the salary variable in Level 
2, however, indicating that there is a reasonable expectation for salary and productively to matter 
more or less at different time points. After a bit of algebraic substitution, the full mixed model 
contains interaction terms between each of the constituent multiple levels. These raw coefficient 
values are displayed in the regression results found in Table 2. As the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I estimate the model the logit link function, logit (p) = ln(p/1-p). 
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3.3.3 Results and Analysis 
Table 2. The Effect of Professionalization and Power on Reelection Seeking in the EP 
 
Table 2 displays regression results for the effect of professionalization and parliamentary power 
on the decision to seek reelection to the EP. Model (1) estimates a simple effect, using only the 
continuous wave counter and salary data, as well as a set of individual controls. Model (2) tests 
the robustness of the wave counter, using the dichotomous co-decision variable. Model (3) 
incorporates legislative output data from the total number of reports measure. Because the 
models use logistic regression, the magnitude and substantive significance of the coefficient 
values cannot be directly interpreted. Furthermore, the interactive nature of the models makes 
variables in the shaded portion of the results table especially difficult to interpret substantively. I 
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will return to assess these variables graphically, but let us first consider what the models are 
telling us about the state of reelection seeking in general.  
The controls perform similarly all specifications and offer an important snapshot as to 
which MEPs are more or less likely to run for reelection. Senior MEPs, as well as older MEPs, 
are less likely to seek reelection. MEPs whose national party is currently in government at home 
are also likely to defect from the EP, perhaps suggesting a return to national politics. Conversely, 
committee leaders are much more likely to seek reelection to the EP—perhaps indicating a self-
selection effect for MEPs who are truly interested in EP work to seek out these leadership 
positions. MEPs from new member states are also somewhat more likely to seek reelection.  
 
Figure 4. The Conditional Effect of Time on EP Reelection Seeking 
Returning to an analysis of the key independent variables of interest, I use predicted 
probabilities generated by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King's (2001) CLARIFY software to estimate 
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the substantive effect of professionalization and power on reelection seeking, as estimated in 
model (3). Figure 4 displays the conditional effect of the Wave counter on the decision to seek 
reelection, when all other variables are held at their mean. In other words, if all other variables 
are simply taken at their averages, the conditional effect of the passage of time has a strong and 
positive impact on reelection seeking. For example, MEPs in the first wave had only a 45% 
likelihood of seeking reelection, whereas this effect increases to nearly 55% at the conclusion of 
the most recent parliament. Given the closeness of these predicted probabilities to the actual 
outcomes from the data, the regression results indicate that the passage of time—and the 
accumulation of legislative powers associated with it—is the principal driving feature of 
increased stability among MEPs. This offers support for H1. What effect, then, do the 
professional variables have? 
 
Figure 5. The Conditional Effect of Salary on EP Reelection Seeking 
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Figure 5 plots the conditional effect of salary on the decision to seek reelection for each 
subsequent wave of MEPs. Regression results are taken from model (3) and manipulate only 
existing values in the salary and wave data, as well as their interaction, when all other variables 
are held at their mean. The slope of each wave is therefore plotted to reflect the total effect of a 
particular salary on reelection seeking. The substantive interpretation is somewhat confusing. 
The graph would seem to indicate that, for MEPs in the first wave, low earning MEPs were 
actually more likely to seek reelection than high earning MEPs. Conversely, in later waves, 
MEPs with higher salaries do seem to seek reelection at greater rates.  
An examination of confidence intervals between the different waves suggests that there 
may not, in fact, be substantively distinct differences between predictions for each of the 
intermediate waves and salary conditions. In other words, the coefficients in model (3) are 
statistically significant in their total effects: higher salaries have a positive effect, salaries matter 
more in later waves, waves with higher legislative output have a positive effect, and so forth, but 
the substantive effect for the professionalization variables is not particularly large or distinct 
from the wave trend. Although the coefficient values behave in the expected directions and are 
statistically significant, the substantive implications of H2 do not seem particularly large.  
3.4  TOWARDS A BROADER VIEW OF MEP CAREER ADVANCEMENT 
The empirical analysis indicates a strong and significant effect for the impact of the EP’s course 
of development on the reelection seeking of its membership. The dataset provides evidence for 
the increasing numbers of MEPs seeking reelection as time goes on. The analysis in the previous 
section has suggested that a driving force behind this increase is the EP’s expansion of legislative 
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powers. However, while the findings may not indicate that a Polsbian view of legislative 
institutionalization and professionalization is a wrong one, the empirical analysis suggests that 
variation in the professionalization variables (salary and legislative output) does not have a 
strong and independent effect. Why might this be so? 
Considering the distribution of the data, remember that EP salaries and per capita 
legislative output have not varied that greatly since 1979. While certain countries may receive 
higher salaries than others, each of these figures has remained fairly constant over time. Thus, 
most of the effect of salaries on reelection seeking is probably an artifact of between country 
differences, which are all controlled for separately by the model. For example, once variation in 
Greek MEPs is controlled for, the lingering effect of a below average salary is not a large one. 
Within country salary variation will be considered more closely in the French, German, and 
Polish case studies found in Chapter Six. Where salaries may matter, however, is in their effect 
on the most recent 2004-2009 wave of the EP.  
Harmonized salaries have the potential for greatly increasing the appeal of MEP careers 
for certain low-earning countries. As one Polish MEP put it, MEPs from developing Central and 
East European countries could “build an empire with the money” allocated to them in per diems 
and travel allocations alone, not even considering that their base salary exceeds national MP 
remunerations manifold. Consider Romanian national MPs who are some of the lowest paid in 
the EU and made only the equivalent of $3480 a month in 2009. If an MEP had to choose 
between running for a national office at $3480 a month and running for the EP, with its base 
salary of $11,220, a strong case could be made that these high level salary differences must have 
some effect on their individual professional calculus. What remains to be seen, however, is just 
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how the effects of these salary differences persist over time. With the next elections for the EP 
not arriving until 2014, it will be at least a year before we can began to examine this question.  
This chapter has offered some initial empirical data for the career paths taken by MEPs 
since the initiation of direct elections in 1979. In doing so, it has presented a major new source of 
quantitative data for study of the EP. The findings of this chapter suggest that an expansion of 
the EP’s influence on EU policymaking have had a tangible and sizeable impact on the incidence 
of MEP reelection seeking, offering support for H1. Increases in the EP’s professionalization are 
shown to have a marginal effect, providing tepid support for H2. If the EP is increasing its 
visibility and power among the various European legislatures and institutions, it may be 
becoming a more attractive career option for ambitious politicians from across the EU. In the 
following chapters, I examine major country-level differences in the treatment of the EP by 
ambitious politicians across multiple levels of elected government. I then shift my attention to 
how MEPs develop fuller careers at the EP level in the fifth chapter. 
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4.0  FEDERALISM AND PARTY GATEKEEPING 
The third chapter tested an empirical assumption about the European Parliament’s development 
as a legislative institution, drawing the link between an increase in the Parliament’s legislative 
powers, professionalization and the stability of its membership. In this discussion, institutional 
change accounted for developments in MEP career behavior. Growth in the EP’s legislative 
power and increasingly professional internal structures both served as strong predictors for re-
election seeking among MEPs. Yet, this discussion explains only a part of the story for MEP 
career behavior. The career behavior of MEPs is also greatly determined by a more stable source 
of variation, external to the EP: the political organization of an MEP’s country of origin.  
In this chapter, I explore variation in the national political systems of EU member states 
and its effect on the career behavior of MEPs. As discussed in the second chapter, one major 
source of variation between EU member states is the presence of federal or decentralized forms 
of governance. With regard to my theory for MEP career behavior, more highly federal or 
decentralized systems are expected to foster separate political groups, prone to career 
specialization at various levels of government. Thus, MEPs from federal and decentralized 
systems are likely to demonstrate greater levels of static ambition with regard to EP careers. 
Conversely, centralized and unitary systems create a political environment in which the 
national government is used to being the ‘only game in town’ in the minds of ambitious 
politicians, vis-à-vis local and regional levels of government. Thus, with the additional 
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possibility of elected representation at the EU level, politicians from highly unitary and 
centralized countries are more likely to view the EP as merely a backup job—a ‘second place’ 
prize to national office. Accordingly, MEPs from unitary and centralized systems will 
demonstrate greater volatility in their tenure at the EP level. For such politicians, the EP is only a 
farm league or a waiting room—an added balcony over the backbench of national parliaments. 
The concepts of federalism and decentralized governance take on many different guises, 
appearing separately or in concert. Accordingly, I begin the present chapter by outlining major 
differences in the two concepts. In doing so, I am careful to distinguish between federalism as a 
formal organizing principle for governments and decentralization as a functional differentiation 
in governing competencies. I then discuss the effect of these differences on the behavior and 
organization of national political parties—who select candidates for both national and European 
office and are thus the major gatekeepers of multilevel political careers.  
Using the MEP dataset first presented in chapter three, I demonstrate the empirical effect 
of federalism and decentralization on career volatility at the EP level. I find that MEP career 
behavior is not only associated with temporal variations within the EP, but also in conjunction 
with a more fundamental source of variation within the EP’s membership—that of an MEP’s 
country of origin. This finding suggests that for the EP to maximize its potential to attract a cadre 
of professional politicians, capable of expanding the institution’s role in elected governing at the 
EU level, it must strive to make itself appear to be the ‘only game in town’ for politicians serious 
about working on European legislation. 
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4.1 FEDERALISM, DECENTRALIZATION, AND THE NATIONAL PARTIES 
In order to construct a causal link between the sources of variation found in the political 
organization of EU member states and the career behavior of individual MEPs, it is first useful to 
separate the formal organizing principle of constitutional federalism from the more functionally 
oriented concept of decentralization. I then discuss the impact of this distinction on the operation 
of national political parties, who serve as the main management organizations for the selection 
and promotion of politicians at both the European and national levels. In doing so, it should 
become apparent why I expect more volatile MEP career behavior to emerge from unitary and 
centralized systems, where elected political life at the national level continues to dominate the 
professional aspirations of ambitious politicians.   
4.1.1 Federalism and decentralization 
The concept of federalism takes on nearly as many definitions as there are examples of it in the 
world today. Accordingly, it is helpful to begin by distinguishing which of these properties are 
indicative of a formal federal system and which of these characteristics are simply indicative of 
decentralized competencies at multiple levels of government. For the purposes of my theory, I 
rely on the spirit of work by Blume and Voigt (2012; 2011), who consider federalism to be a 
‘constitutional choice,’ whereas decentralization is part of an evolving ‘reality’ of governance. 
Federal constitutions may designate multiple levels of elected government, while keeping most 
actual political power at the center, whereas decentralized governments may ascribe substantial 
budgetary discretion to subnational decision-makers on an ad hoc or per issue basis, without 
formally outlining an organizational hierarchy. For scholars familiar with theories of European 
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integration, this important distinction echoes Wibbels' (2000) differentiation between ‘political’ 
and ‘fiscal’ forms of federalism. 
In their 2012 article, Blume and Voigt identify up to 25 different commonly used 
indicators for federalism and decentralization—ranging from constitutional decisions about the 
presence or absence of subnational elections to local veto powers and the degree of vertical 
transfers between national and local levels of government. Using factor analysis to examine 
correlations between these indicators, their work reveals that formal federalism does not 
necessarily correlate with more functional forms of decentralization at a reliably consistent level. 
They then go on to test the effect of their indicators on outcomes commonly ascribed to 
federalism—including national revenue, governing stability, and even the happiness of 
populations—in order to show that the concepts of federalism and decentralization not only fail 
to co-vary statistically, but also can have largely different effects on the governments that use 
them.  
The important distinction between federalism and decentralization is crucial to my 
empirical analysis of MEP careers. If we have reason to believe that a country’s domestic 
organization will impact the career behavior of its supranational elites, we ought to be very 
careful about identifying the specific mechanism at play. If MEPs from formally federal 
countries are remaining at the EP level for longer tenures than their colleagues from countries 
with unitary constitutions, then the distinction may be attributable to differing perceptions of 
prestige. If, however, politicians from functionally decentralized countries remain in the EP for 
longer than countries where major political power rests at the center, then the distinction may 
have something to do with qualitative differences between the types of politicians interested in 
work at the European level. 
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For example, contemporary French subnational government might be classified as having 
some formally federal components, insofar as the Fifth Republic currently allows for elected 
representatives at the communal, regional, national, and European levels and attributes some 
degree of self-rule to these sub-national bodies. However, the functional differentiation between 
the governing powers of Paris and those found Bordeaux or Lyon remains pronounced. By 
contrast, while the array of elected offices found in the Belgian federal hierarchy, with its local 
and regional governments, shares many similarities with the French on paper, the regional 
parliaments of Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia retain a large degree of veto power over the bulk 
of legislation passed in the national Chamber of Deputies. Thus, the decision for a French 
politician to serve in a representative capacity outside of Paris is likely to differ from that of a 
Belgian politician’s decision to seek elected office outside of Brussels, even though both 
countries might be viewed as being ‘federal’ to some extent.  
The facility of national politicians to work at multiple levels is not only likely to be 
correlated with simply the existing number of jobs available, but also with their qualitative 
differences. Thus a German politician interested in health or cultural policy will likely prefer 
work in his or her regional Landtag, because health and cultural policy decisions are made 
primarily at the regional level. Similarly, a sitting German MEP was quick to identify his interest 
in the EP on the grounds that his specialization in agricultural policy was most directly impacted 
by decisions made at the EU level.20 Conversely, in countries less accustomed to functional 
differentiation corresponding to territorial levels, a lack of appreciation for the separate policy 
functions of the EU and EP is more likely to pervade the organization of both political parties, as 
                                                 
20 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels. 
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well as the opportunity structures of individual politicians. I discuss this link in more detail in the 
following sections.  
4.1.2 Connecting subnational and supranational forms of representation 
I have thus far identified two distinct bases of variation for the study of subnational 
governments—formal federalism and functional decentralization—and suggested that these 
variables may yield very different outcomes, both for governing realities, as well as for the 
career behavior of individual politicians. However, how does variation at the subnational level 
apply to our study of European legislators? To consider the effect of subnational variation on 
supranational careers, it is helpful to revisit Reif and Schmitt's (1980) notion of the European 
Parliament as ‘second order’ elections. The ‘second order’ election hypothesis suggests that 
European elections, being of lower interest to Europeans than their national analogues, will have 
lower turnout rates and privilege fringe parties—whose diehard supporters are more likely to 
show up to the polls and attract other votes with their ‘hearts,’ rather than their ‘minds.’  
It is worth noting that the authors’ findings are virtually parallel to those of Hough and 
Jeffery (2006; 2001), who examine the relative importance and outcomes of regional and 
subnational elections in formally federal contexts. Thus, the supranational context may function 
in a similar way to the domestic one when operating along multiple levels of government. Both 
voters and politicians likely view elections at the subnational and supranational levels as being of 
‘second order’ in their importance to national ones.  
While second order elections may bolster the electoral results for a few, fringe politicians 
and their militant followers, it is far more likely that mainstream politicians and voters alike will 
view the result of these competitions as less interesting than those of national elections, even if 
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the devolution of power to both subnational and supranational government may indicate that the 
elections are just as consequential in their outcomes. Regardless of popular demand, however, 
political parties have a rational incentive to maximize election results at all levels of competition, 
regardless of their interest to the general public. Accordingly, it is worth considering how 
national political party organizations handle recruitment and selection strategies for politicians at 
different levels of office.  
4.1.3 Political parties and multi-level elections 
Deschouwer (2003) argues for the use of a renewed ‘multi-level language’ in the treatment of 
political parties at multiple levels of elected government. In his view, political parties in federal 
systems are likely to differ from party organizations in unitary systems, asserting that “since two 
different games are being played, one at the federal and one at the regional level… one can 
expect an internal difference of the political parties” (p. 221). Recognizing that electoral contests 
are held at multiple levels of government, parties in federal contexts are likely to organize their 
recruitment and selection strategies differently from parties in more unitary contexts. As a result, 
separate levels of the party organization consider distinct pools of candidates, based upon the 
specific level of the electoral contest. The more pronounced the distinction between multiple 
levels of governing, the more developed the lower levels of the party organization will be.  
Most scholarly work on multiple levels of party organization has discussed potential 
coordination problems for the national party organization, when local actors have an increased 
role in the selection and recruitment of candidates at the subnational level. Van Biezen and 
Hopkin (2006) refer to this problem as a potential crisis of leadership, with both candidates and 
voters unsure of whether to take cues from the national or subnational party platform. This 
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intuitive confusion is clearly demonstrated by the American system, where state politicians must 
decide whether to ‘ride the coattails’ of national party leaders or avoid them, altogether, in favor 
of a locally focused campaign.  
Others consider the potential organizational perils of operating political parties at 
multiple levels in a cohesive manner (Fabre 2011; van Houten 2009; Thorlakson 2006, 2009). 
Should party mechanisms allow for candidates to be ‘pushed up’ the line to national office or 
should parties be more concerned with allowing subnational organizations to autonomously 
manage their own candidates, free from central party control? In societies with pronounced 
cleavages present only in some regions, this debate can be of great importance (see, for example, 
Caramani's (2004) work on ethnic fragementation and national party management strategies). 
Whether or not federalism complicates the organization and management of political 
parties, it is obvious that parties are more likely to diversity their organizational structures—and 
thus, multiply candidate selection and recruitment strategies—in federal and decentralized 
systems. Poguntke (2007) examines the effect of party selection on both national and EP lists by 
local organizations, showing that the decision to draw German MEPs from local, rather than 
national, pools of candidates has a diminishing effect on the previous elected experience of 
German MEPs. Meanwhile, Chhibber and Kollman's (2004) work on the construction of national 
party systems discusses an inverse effect for party organizations in systems moving towards 
more central forms of governance, as parties are able to centralize management strategies in 
increasingly nationally oriented systems.  
If it is reasonable for parties in federal and decentralized systems to have greater 
organizational capacities for managing elections at multiple levels, then there is not only a 
psychological effect at play in the minds of federal MEPs—used to picking a level at which to 
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work—but also a reinforcing organizational effect as well. In the most extreme cases, German 
MEPs, just as their colleagues from the Landtage, answer to local party leaders. Conversely, all 
French MEPs eventually answer to the party secretariat in Paris.  
4.2 A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY FOR MEP CAREER PATHS 
The previous section addressed key theoretical differences in the concepts of federalism and 
decentralization, as well as their connection to the organization of political parties and 
consequent effect on MEP career behavior. In the current section, I emphasize a set of theoretical 
claims for the effect of government organization on the professional behavior of MEPs. In doing 
so, it should become clear that while many politicians view the EP as a ‘second order’ legislature 
on balance, its comparative importance with national political life is likely to vary according to 
the organization of domestic governments—particularly the extent to which governing structures 
are federal or decentralized.  
4.2.1 Federalism and career specialists 
The logic of federalism is often specific to the particular country under consideration: 
subnational autonomy may bolster national ethnic minority rights; differences in lawmaking 
abilities may predispose certain levels of government to consider some policy questions more so 
than others; separation of powers across multiple levels may diffuse the chance of domination by 
a central governing majority. In her authoritative opus on the subject, Norris (2008) argues that 
power sharing institutions, such as those found under federalism, may be advantageous to 
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maintaining governing stability and domestic harmony. How, then, might federalism impact the 
careers of politicians beyond the national level? 
In the second chapter, I developed a general argument for why political parties, as 
gatekeepers of politicians at both national and supranational levels, have incentives to designate 
separate ‘teams’ of politicians at each level of elected government. I argued that political parties 
in federal systems, already used to fielding candidates across formally distinct levels of elected 
office, will use diverse candidate recruitment and selection strategies to identify the politicians 
most suitable for each elected level. There are a number of reasons why an impulse towards 
specialization at different levels of office may be desirable for both the politician and his or her 
political party.  
Specialized careers at one level of government allow politicians to maximize their 
influence in specific legislative areas of interest over the course of an extended career. 
Individuals used to working at one level of government better learn the system, create valuable 
interpersonal networks across party lines, and have a chance to promote issues that are important 
to them. One green MEP mentioned his interest in the environmental policymaking conducted at 
the EP level as indicative of his decision to build a career at the European and not the national 
level.21 Similarly, a German initially serving in her local Landtag switched to European office 
because of her interest in protecting organized labor from the effects of globalization.22 In both 
instances, the MEPs’ national parties identified them as individuals with interests better suited 
for EP (and not national or local) service and continued to nominate them for office at the 
European level.  
                                                 
21 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010, European Parliament, Brussels. 
22 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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In the context of the EP, such ‘policy specialists’—as Bale and Taggart (2005) or 
Navarro (2009) would likely identify them—have an increased chance of advancing policy 
agendas, either by relying on their acquired seniority in the EP or by revealing their expertise in 
certain policy domains. The legislative influence afforded to these long-serving policy specialists 
clearly benefits national party programs and will be explored in the following chapter in greater 
detail. For the present, it is worth considering how parties are more or less likely to identify 
potentially valuable politicians across all levels of representation.  
It is the contention of this chapter to test whether or not parties in federal systems are the 
driving mechanism of MEP career stability—organized across multiple spheres of government 
and accustomed to triaging potential candidates to the level most suitable to their interests and 
abilities. Consider, however, the opposite situation suggested by this proposition. In a unitary 
system, the main candidate management strategy for political parties is not to match candidates 
with their ideal level of representation, but rather to funnel the most talented or loyal politicians 
to the political center. If unitary party systems therefore focus on only one level of elected 
representation, the national one, then MEP careers will be more volatile in these contexts, as they 
are taken from the wings of European office and moved onto center stage.  
Every single French elected official interviewed for this project, regardless of their 
political affiliation, noted the capriciousness of national political parties in directing their careers, 
as they routinely witnessed colleagues sent from the EP to fill seats in the Assemblée Nationale 
or shifted advisory roles in the Élysée. One former French MEP detailed her career in this way. 
Initially elected to the national parliament, she lost reelection and was moved to Brussels by her 
party to “wait for the next national election.” Two years into her MEP mandate, she once again 
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was offered a seat back in Paris, as her party was committed to maintaining a female candidate 
from the region.23  
The French delegation, although similar in size to both Germany and the UK in terms of 
EP seat allocations, routinely experienced the most turnover of any country in the dataset, with 
most French seats alternating between at least two MEPs over the course of a given five-year 
mandate. This specific case will be explored in greater detail in the sixth chapter. For now, it is 
worth considering whether or not the driving mechanism influencing French MEP careers is also 
generalizable in all unitary EU member states. 
4.2.2 Decentralization and the centripetal hypothesis 
While Norris (2008) and others suggest that formal, federally organized constitutions may be 
useful for delegating responsibility, it is also worth considering the effect of the more 
functionally (but not necessarily formally) decentralized modes of governance present in many 
European countries on our study of MEP career behavior. A rival hypothesis to the Norris 
position is that the ‘centripetal’ nature of governance—where ‘inclusive’ and ‘authoritative’ 
governing power is centralized and not delegated—is more likely to result in system stability and 
efficiency gains (Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2005). While the centripetal hypothesis may 
naturally rival the normative claims for quality democracy evinced by Norris, what might a more 
or less centripetal system of government mean for MEP career behavior? 
In the centripetal hypothesis, formal indicators of federalism are adjusted using functional 
characteristics of centralized governance. Taking cues from Pascal’s assertion that “plurality 
                                                 
23 MP, personal interview, November 15, 2011, Assemblée Nationale, Paris. 
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which does not reduce itself to unity is anarchy” (in Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2005: 16), 
the authors advocate for a centripetal government, working to ‘focus’ power to the center. We 
know from our previous discussion of work by Blume and Voigt (2012) that this sort of 
functional centralization has an empirically different effect on a number of governing outcomes 
than does formal constitutional federalism; therefore, the result for centripetal governance on 
MEP career behavior may also be distinct from the federal hypothesis discussed above. 
Most centripetal systems have strong national parties whose job is to focus power at the 
center and avoid the confusion of multiple levels of government. Thus, centripetal countries may 
have a destabilizing effect on MEP careers, as in unitary systems. However, the aim of 
centripetalism, in the view of Gerring et al., is to increase governing ‘authority’ and ‘inclusion’ 
at all levels of government. Thus, MEPs from centripetal countries may find their desire to move 
from EP service to national office desirable for participating in central decision-making and not 
just indicative of national office being more prestigious. Conversely, less centripetal systems 
may encourage diffuse governing authority and separate bases of power at the political 
periphery—even if these multiple levels of government do not carry the formal designation of 
those found in federal entities.  
Thus, while the direction of the federal and centripetal hypotheses may be the same, with 
more centralized and unitary forms of governance increasing MEP volatility and more diffuse or 
federal regimes engendering the greater stability of EP membership, the theoretical and statistical 
basis for the twin concepts of federalism and decentralization are distinct and can be tested 
separately to better account for all possible mechanisms at play. That is, the same effect on MEP 
careers may be found in countries with federal constitutions as well as in formally unitary 
countries with high degrees of functional decentralization. These effects can be empirically 
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estimated using separate sets of variables, which will be discussed at greater length in the 
following section.  
4.2.3 Hypotheses and additional explanations  
Following from the above theoretical discussion, we can summarize the anticipated effect of 
federalism and decentralization of domestic governments on MEP careers in the form of two 
related hypotheses: 
H3a. MEPs from federal systems will build more extensive careers in the European 
Parliament than MEPs from unitary systems.  
In keeping with the previous discussion, I expect that MEPs from federal countries will 
demonstrate less volatility at the EP than their analogous cohort from unitary systems. This 
effect can be tested in a number of ways. We might expect MEPs from federal systems to seek 
reelection to the EP at greater rates than unitary MEPs—indicating a desire to specialize in EU 
policymaking and increase their seniority within the EP. However, we might also notice this 
effect in terms of an MEP’s career path, following their tenure in the EP. If MEPs from federal 
systems are mostly finishing their career after their EP mandate, while their unitary system 
colleagues are seeking further office at the national level, then we can identify the effect of 
federalism not only on EP stability, but also on the fuller career paths of MEPs beyond the 
European level. Both of these contentions will be addressed in the following empirical analysis.  
H3b. MEPs from functionally decentralized countries will build more extensive careers in 
the European Parliament than MEPs from centripetal systems.  
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Acknowledging that the mechanism at play may be the same for MEPs from countries 
where functional competencies are decentralized—but no formally federal constitution exists—
we should consider that the corollary hypothesis for such systems might also impact MEP career 
behavior. If we simply classify federal countries by their formal constitutional documents, our 
roughshod measures may be open to omitted variable bias in the empirical analysis. H3b, a 
logical corollary to H3a, suggests the additional value of considering multiple forms of 
government decentralization. 
 Whereas the previous chapter examined the effect of institutional sources of variation 
(evolution of EP power and its professionalization), this chapter is more concerned with 
domestic sources of variation on the similar outcome of MEP career paths. Thus, a similar host 
of controls will matter for our consideration of the effects of federalism and decentralization on 
MEP career behavior. These include both temporal and political factors, as well as individual 
demographic differences between MEPs. Nonetheless, the additional value of the present chapter 
is its consideration of MEP careers beyond their time in the EP. Using similar variables from the 
previous chapter, I also consider differences in the future careers of MEPs after their present 
term in office. I will elaborate upon this discussion in the following section.  
4.3 TESTING THE EFFECT OF FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION 
To test for the effect of federalism and decentralization on MEP career behavior, I use 
individual-level data for all MEPs in all completed waves of the EP since the initiation of direct 
elections, 1979-2009. The basic data is collected in the same way as in previous chapters. 
Sources include Høyland, Sircar, and Hix's (2009) tool for extracting publicly available data 
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from the EP website, as well as a variety of public records kept by the EP archives in 
Luxembourg, national political archives and research library holdings. Main indicators for 
federalism and decentralization are taken from the Norris (2008) and Gerring, Thacker, and 
Moreno (2005) volumes. The unit of analysis is individual MEP mandate, with a total of 3942 
observations in the full sample, across 6 waves of parliament. The dataset is fully 
comprehensive, including all MEPs in all completed EP settings. Missing data, although 
relatively minimal, is distributed randomly across variables, MEP backgrounds, and time 
periods—suggesting a lack of major concern that gaps in the data will bias the empirical results.  
4.3.1 Data and coding choices 
The main dependent variable is an unordered indicator for an individual MEP’s career Outcome 
following the conclusion of the present wave of the EP. The variable is dichotomized to test an 
MEP’s decision to Not Seek Reelection to the EP, Leave Politics entirely (retire, private 
business, etc.), run for a position as National MP, present his or her candidacy for a National 
Executive (or be assigned a cabinet portfolio), join an EU Institution (such as the European 
Court of Justice or the Commission), or simply return to one of a number of positions in 
National Politics (combining values from both national MPs and executives). The dependent 
variable is clearly indicated for each of the models considered.  
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Table 3. Select Federalism and Decentralization Scores, 2009 
 
The independent variables of interest are three commonly used indicators of government 
federalism or decentralization. Selected values for the indicators are displayed in Table 3, in an 
effort to support the claim that federalism and decentralization are theoretically and empirically 
distinct concepts. Local Elections is a trichotomous indicator of the presence of direct 
subnational elections in a given MEP’s home country and is taken from the dpi_state indicator 
initially developed by Beck et al. (2001, as cited in Teorell et al. 2011). Countries with no direct 
subnational elections were coded with 0, while countries with either a directly elected 
subnational executive or legislature were coded with 1 and both a directly elected subnational 
legislature and executive were coded with 2. Higher values of Local Elections indicate an 
important source of variation for formal federal organization. Another important indicator formal 
indicator of federalism is the dichotomous Federalism indicator, taken from Norris (2008). 
Positive values indicate a country with specific mentions of federalism in the national 
constitution. 
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To account for the possibility that functional decentralization, even in formally unitary 
contexts, may lead to specific MEP career outcomes, I also rely on a recoded version of the 
Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno’s (2005) centripetalism index. Each country in the sample was 
first assessed a trichotomous value based upon their constitutional organization (0=unitary, 
1=semi-federal, 2=federal). They were then assigned a separate three-point value, based upon the 
balance of power and congruence between within the national legislature between the lower 
(national) and upper (subnational) house.  If the membership of the upper house was highly 
incongruent (as in Germany, where the upper house in nominated by the subnational Länder), the 
country was coded with 2. If the upper house was directly elected from the same constituency as 
the lower house (a national one), or did not exist at all, it was coded with 0. Intermediate values 
(reflecting some power over the lower or some electoral differences) received 1 point. 
Anarchism24 is the resulting average of both federal and decentralized measures of power and 
accounts for the theoretical possibility posited by H3b that the mechanism at play is not one of 
formal federalism, but functional decentralization.  
All three independent variables were updated for each country at the end of the six waves 
of the EP and vary in accordance with the constitutional evolution witnessed in a number of EU 
member states since the 1970s. The indicators do not show significant degrees of piece-wise 
correlation, suggesting reason to believe that each indicator captures a distinct facet of either 
federalism or decentralization. A number of familiar controls were also included on an individual 
MEP basis, including Seniority (number of completed terms), Dropout MEPs who left the EP 
prior to the end of term, dummies for EP leaders (discussed in more detail in the next chapter), 
                                                 
24 Anarchy is the term used by the authors to describe the opposite of centripetalism. 
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demographic controls, dummies for party group membership, and year effects by wave of the 
EP. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the chapter are displayed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (Chapter Four models) 
 
 
4.3.2 Results and analysis 
I begin by estimating the effect of federalism and decentralization on likely outcomes of MEP 
career behavior. As all of the dependent variables used in this sequence are dichotomous, the 
lack of normal distribution in the data makes OLS unsuitable for use. Accordingly, I rely on the 
logit link function, which allows us to estimate the impact of the independent variables on the 
outcome’s likelihood of occurring. Beta coefficients are displayed in Table 5, including t-
statistics and conventional indicators of statistical significance.  
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Table 5. The Effect of Federalism and Decentralization on MEP Careers 
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Model (1) displays the effect of federalism and decentralization on an MEP’s decision to 
not seek reelection to the EP after a given term. Both the presence of local elections in a given 
country, as well as the absence of centripetalism in the country’s governing system, have a 
significant and dampening effect on an MEP’s decision not to seek reelection to the EP. In other 
words, MEPs from more federal and decentralized contexts are more likely to remain in the EP 
for multiple terms of elected office, offering support for H3.  
The main controls also perform in logical ways: dropping out coincides with the decision 
not to seek reelection; older MEPs are more likely to leave the EP; committee leaders are less so. 
Although time effects are considered25, the model shows an important theoretical improvement 
upon the analysis performed in chapter three. Not only are MEPs more likely to seek reelection 
over time, but also the organizational background of their home country is consistently important 
for the stability of MEP careers.  
Model (2) examines the likelihood of an MEP to seek election to their national after 
service in the EP. Positive outcomes for the dependent variable include MEPs who ran for 
national MP positions after the considered wave of the EP, as well as during it. Recalling the 
three ‘ideal types’ for MEP career behavior discussed at the end of the first chapter, model (2) 
provides evidence of MEPs who use the EP as a ‘springboard’ for national legislative office. 
Once again, we find support for the federalism hypothesis, with MEPs from federal countries 
seeking further election in their national parliaments at lower rates than unitary colleagues. 
Seniority and age also have negative effects on the use of the EP as a springboard, indicating that 
after a certain point in an MEP’s career, politicians are likely to stay put. This finding is also 
                                                 
25 Both ‘time effect’ dummies for each wave of the EP were used, as well as a count variable for the six waves of the 
EP. Results did not vary significantly across specification. All reported models use wave dummies. 
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consistent with the theory of ‘springboard’ uses of the EP. In other words, we would expect 
volatility among MEPs to be at its highest during their first elected term.  
Models (3) and (4) test for the likelihood of MEPs to pursue positions in national 
legislatures, as well as in national executives. The dependent variable in the models is less 
restrictive than in model (2) and includes MEPs who not only became MPs, but also cabinet 
ministers or national executives (viz., prime ministers, presidents, sub-national governors). The 
models test whether or not federalism and decentralization have an effect on the use of the EP as 
a ‘springboard’ not only to domestic legislatures, but other types of visible national positions. 
Models (3) and (4) perform similarly to the second model, suggesting that MEPs from federal or 
decentralized contexts are comparatively less likely to use the EP as a springboard to national 
office.  
The main difference between models (3) and (4) is the inclusion or exclusion of the 
dichotomous indicator for dropout MEPs. Notably, MEPs who left the EP before the end of their 
elected term display a strong and significant chance of pursuing office at the national level. This 
effect is so strong that it nearly washes out the significance of the main independent variables of 
interest in model (4), although the proxy for formal federalism—the presence of sub-national 
elected government—remains a significant predictor for MEP career stability. The strength of 
the dropout variable suggests that there may be an interactive effect between the decision to 
dropout of the EP early and an MEP’s federal background.  
Model (5) displays the interaction effect for an MEP’s decision to seek a position in 
national politics, based upon his or her federal background and having dropped out of the EP 
before the end of term. The coefficients perform similarly to previous regressions, both in terms 
of sign and significance. As coefficient values in logistic regressions are not directly 
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interpretable and the interactive nature of the model may make substantive interpretation 
misleading at best, I analyze the model using the CLARIFY estimator developed by Tomz, 
Wittenberg, and King (2001).  
 
Figure 6. The Interplay between National and EU Politics 
Figure 6 displays predicted probabilities for the effect of federalism on the decision to 
seek national office after work in the EP. While only 13.5% of all MEPs in the dataset were 
likely to run for national office, with all variables held at their means, the effect is notably higher 
among MEPs from systems with no sub-national elections—where more than 16% of all MEPs 
used the EP as a springboard for national office. By contrast, federal MEPs show a lower than 
average rate of using the EP as a springboard at only 12.5% of the sample. Model (5) also 
displays a strong and significant effect for the behavior of dropout MEPs, regardless of their 
desired career outcome. When only dropout MEPs are considered, regardless of their federal 
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background, a full 53.6% of the observations sought a future posting in national office following 
their early leave from the EP.  
Interestingly enough, there is no significant difference between dropouts from federal 
systems and dropouts from unitary contexts, suggesting that politicians with the greatest 
ambition for national office—that is, a strong enough desire for national office that they leave 
their current job in the EP—do so at similar rates, regardless of the country context. Thus, while 
the average MEP from a unitary country may use the EP as springboard to national office more 
often than their federal colleagues, the majority of all MEPs leaving office early (although this 
includes only about 13% of all MEPs in the dataset) do so for the purposes of seeking national 
office.  
Initial results from the full dataset reveal some interesting findings in support of H3a and 
H3b. While both formal federalism and functional decentralization affect the decision of MEPs 
not to seek reelection to the EP in similar ways (with more federal and more decentralized 
countries demonstrating lower rates of volatility among their EP delegations), the formal 
indicators of federalism—particularly the presence of local elections—are more robust when we 
consider the specific outcome of MEPs interested in national office. This finding indicates that 
the data may offer more support for H3a than for H3b.  
The theoretical implication is that a country’s formal institutional arrangement, as 
codified in the referent constitutional document, apparently has a more robust effect on the 
multi-level careers of its politicians than does the ad hoc arrangements of specific governing 
competencies. In other words, politicians and political parties already used to working across 
formally distinct levels of elected representation are more likely to treat the EP as ‘just another 
level’ of governance and not as a farm league for national politics.  
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4.3.3 Career paths across multiple levels 
So far, the analysis finds evidence of increased volatility for MEP careers in formally federal 
countries, offering some support for the claims made by H3. However, the dependent variable is 
fairly expansive, providing us with only a rough gauge of the possible outcomes for MEPs to 
take following a given wave of parliament. The decision to take one job over another is not 
always binary, however, and the full dataset provides us with information about the future 
careers of MEPs across a number of possible venues.  
MEPs careers were also coded for the possibility of Leaving Politics (retire, die, enter 
the private sector, etc.), seeking a position within the National Executive only, seeking a 
position in another EU Institution (like the Commission or ECJ), and seeking Reelection the 
EP, specifically. Using multinomial logistic regression, we can also examine the relative tradeoff 
between all of these options, when a specific outcome is held as a baseline.  
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Table 6. MEP Career Outcomes Instead of Seeking Reelection to the EP 
 
 102 
Table 6 provides the results for these outcomes, in comparison to the baseline decision of 
MEPs who decided to seek reelection. MEPs from formally federal countries are not only less 
likely than their colleagues from unitary countries to leave politics (Model 1) rather than seek 
reelection to the EP, but they are also less likely to seek national executive or parliamentary 
positions (Models 2 and 4). These findings are similar to those of the previous section, revealing 
the lower incidence of volatility in federal EP delegations.  
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Table 7. MEP Career Outcomes Instead of Seeking National MP Election 
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Table 7 provides similarly organized results, based in comparison to a baseline of those 
MEPs who decide to seek election to their national legislatures. The results provide yet another 
way of supporting the findings from the principal analysis. MEPs from federal systems are 
significantly more likely than their unitary state colleagues to seek reelection to the EP than to 
seek election to national legislatures (Model 4). A further finding of interest is that MEPs from 
formally federal countries would rather run for national executive postings than national 
parliamentary ones, but the sign is reversed when countries with subnational elections are 
considered (both in Model 2). This particular finding is probably driven by the small set of 
relevant cases in both of these categories and should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, 
the table does provide some additional support for our view of federalism and its effect on the 
broader career paths of MEPs.   
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The previous chapter examined the evolution of the European Parliament as a legislative 
institution and the subsequent stabilization of its membership. In Field of Dreams, Kevin Costner 
tells us, “If we build it, they will come.” Along similar lines, the third chapter argued that, ‘If 
you improve it, they will stay longer.’ The present chapter asks a similar question—what predicts 
the long-run stability of membership in the EP—but answers it using a very different logic, 
looking instead to differences in the constituent member states of the EP.  
I argue that federal and decentralized countries are more likely than their unitary or 
centralized counterparts to have stable MEP delegations. The chapter draws a causal link 
between formal federalism, functional decentralization, and the organization of national political 
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parties across multiple levels of government. It then hypothesizes that both decentralization and 
federalism will positively effect the stability of membership, albeit via different causal 
mechanisms. Using data from all waves of the EP and its full membership, I find some support 
for both variants of the hypothesis, although countries with local elections (a formal indicator of 
federalism) are the most likely to have stable delegations to the EP.  
The connection between federalism and career specialization is another important piece 
of the puzzle in our exploration of MEP career behavior. However, why does it matter? In the 
following chapter, I examine the EP’s internal balance of power via the assignment of legislative 
committee reporteurships. The analysis reveals the benefit of experience and seniority within the 
institution—experience that can only come with MEPs who are committed to staying in the EP 
for multiple terms of service. As I explain in the next chapter, for national political parties to 
achieve desired policy goals within the EP, they must adapt candidate recruitment and selection 
processes to benefit from this burgeoning EP seniority system.  
As the contrasting French and German case studies in the sixth chapter will then show, 
parties who prevent MEPs from achieving seniority in the EP—constantly shuffling them 
between national and European office—stand to lose the most in the allocation of committee 
reports, particularly when politicians with greater levels of experience in EP negotiations are 
ready and available to do the job. For the moment, the present chapter is content to explain one 
important source of variation in MEP term length—the effect of federalism and decentralization 
on the stability of MEP careers. For the EP the become ‘the only game in town’ and not a dreary 
second order legislature, it is first incumbent upon the national political parties to recognize 
which of their politicians are best suited for EP service. However, accomplishing this goal may 
come at the expense of age-old national differences in the view of multi-level politics. 
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5.0  RAPPORTEUR SELECTION AND INTERNAL ADVANCEMENT 
I have thus far argued that the career behavior of MEPs has become somewhat of an institution 
itself, developed into a set of spoken and unspoken rules for professional advancement that are a 
reaction to both the European Parliament’s internal professionalization, as well as its relationship 
with other national and international institutions. However, MEP career behavior is not only 
related to questions of external advancement—the decision to build ones career at the European 
level or use ones time in the EP as a steppingstone towards further national office—but rather, 
MEP career behavior also entails a system of professional advancement within the EP’s internal 
structures, with careerist MEPs often winning the spoils of EP legislating power.  
MEPs have the opportunity to seek one of a number of positions in building their political 
careers at the EU level. As the parliament has expanded its legislative purview, numerous elected 
and appointed possibilities from internal advancement have arisen. Administratively, an elected 
president leads the EP, along with a set of vice presidents and a college of quaestors. Within the 
transnational party groups, group coordinators steer positions on legislative committees and party 
group leaders attempt to unify the diverse national backgrounds present in each political bloc. 
Finally, a highly developed system of standing committees is replete with a set of chairs, vice 
chairs, and rapporteurs. Although each office carries with it a varying degree of internal and 
external prestige, few individual MEPs have as much direct power over the legislative process as 
the committee rapporteur.  
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This chapter examines the selection and assignment of committee rapporteurs in the EP 
during the legislature’s first six directly elected sessions, 1979-2009. In doing so, I argue that 
rapporteurships have been increasingly assigned to a subset of highly educated and experienced 
MEPs, who represent only a portion of the legislative body’s personal demographic. The 
tendency to award committee reports to this elite clique of legislators has risen dramatically since 
the initiation of the EP’s legislative co-decision on Commission proposals with the Council of 
Ministers, suggesting that although the EP has augmented its power vis-à-vis the other EU 
institutions, this power has found itself concentrated in the hands of a few—a perhaps troubling 
finding for those in favor of the EP as a representative balm to the EU’s widely perceived 
democratic deficit. Ultimately, however, the consolidation of committee rapporteurships amongst 
a handful of senior and educated parliamentarians is perhaps more indicative of the EP’s 
heightened level of legislative professionalization. 
I begin with a brief discussion of how legislative rapporteurships are traditionally 
awarded within EP committees, noting the importance of the office of rapporteur for both the 
crafting of legislation, as well as raising the EP’s profile within the EU. I then present a testable 
theory for rapporteur assignment, based primarily upon the criteria of education and seniority, 
which are tested in the third section. The concluding section summarizes my empirical findings 
and places the results within the broader context of the legislature’s professionalization.   
5.1 THE PROCESS OF COMMITTEE REPORT ALLOCATION 
In each legislative committee, the transnational party groups begin an EP session with a share of 
‘points,’ set in proportion to their relative size on the committee and in the EP, which they then 
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use to ‘buy’ legislative dossiers that have been referred to the committee. Once the successful 
party group has been awarded a dossier, the group coordinator—an MEP on the committee who 
serves as the party group’s whip for legislative positions—decides in conjunction with the 
committee leadership which MEP from his or her group will serve as the rapporteur—
individually responsible for steering the piece of legislation through the committee revision 
stage. “Shadow” rapporteurs are also named from all other party groups, who collaborate and 
negotiate with the rapporteur in the drafting of the committee’s policy recommendations. The 
committee then votes on the resulting report, before advancing it to the full EP plenary.  
As extensive work by Ringe (2010) and others have shown, reports that are upheld at the 
committee stage are rarely defeated in plenary votes. Thus, the rapporteur has the unusual 
advantage of being able to craft the entire body’s position on a proposed piece of EU legislation 
in a highly individual capacity. In a legislature whose membership approaches nearly 800 voices 
and favors broad-based consensus, it is truly remarkable that one individual legislator might 
contain such personal power. It is therefore of major importance to consider which set of factors 
most regularly determines a rapporteur’s selection. 
5.1.1 Rapporteurs as ideological moderates 
Lindberg (2008) offers the clearest picture of this allocation process in his case study on 
rapporteur assignment during the controversial services directive debate, which was taken up by 
the Legal Affairs and Internal Market (JURI) committee. A highly contentious and politically 
divisive issue dealing with market liberalization as a part of the Lisbon agenda, the EP’s opinion 
on the proposed directive was of major importance to the legislature’s constituent party groups, 
as well as precedent setting for the EP on the whole. Lindberg’s account demonstrates the 
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internal bargaining at play within JURI, showing that the choice of Evelyne Gebhardt—a 
German member of the social democratic bloc (S&D)—to serve as rapporteur was the result of 
her membership in one of the major party blocs, her moderate voting record in both her national 
and EP party group, and her membership in the important German delegation (pp. 1200-1201).   
Moderation is important, as rapporteurs are constantly constrained to a degree by their 
group policy, but also by the need to build broader consensus opinions with the shadow 
rapporteurs from the other groups. Without such consensus, the report is less likely to pass to a 
plenary vote. Evidence from the plenary vote on the directive, once Gebhardt’s report had passed 
her committee, suggests that moderation was an important factor in her selection, as the plenary 
vote relied on large portions of both the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) and S&D 
blocs supporting the controversial measure. Had she taken a more extreme position within the 
committee, it is unlikely that the directive would have received enough votes from the EPP to 
pass in plenary.  
The case study offers one possible dimension of rapporteur assignment; however, such 
divisive and sensitive decisions represent a small fraction of the legislation considered by the EP. 
Thus, while rapporteur assignment may be desirable for to an MEP’s individual prestige and that 
of the party that he or she serves, it is unlikely to be a contentious political decision for the 
committee leadership under most circumstances. The services directive is a useful example for 
such a high-level report, but generalizing from Gebhardt’s selection is more likely an example of 
atomistic fallacy on the part of legislative scholars.  
Lindberg’s work is the not the only instance in which scholars have been quick to jump to 
complex conclusions about the balance of the MEP’s notoriety, voting record, or political 
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connections, in the process of rapporteur assignment. 26  The literature has thus resulted in a 
general view of rapporteurs as a sort of political token, selected for their social connectedness, 
ideological position, or voting record. The problem with such a view is that the data are routinely 
taken from either well-known cases or heavily divided committees. The findings are thus open to 
a strong selection bias. Our understanding of rapporteur assignment has thus far missed the forest 
for the trees.  
5.1.2 Timing and importance of committee reports 
One specific element that is overlooked in the study of rapporteur assignment is the increased 
importance of the rapports themselves. Only Costello and Thompson (2010) given due attention 
to the importance of co-decision in rapporteur assignment. Since the initiation of the co-decision 
legislative procedure in the early 1990s—whereby the EP can effectively block the Council of 
Minister’s opinion on EU legislation—the work of the rapporteur has greatly augmented in its 
importance. However, the authors also posit that co-decision increasingly limits the extent to 
which an MEP is individually able to shape the course of legislation. As reports become more 
valuable to the EP and the outcome of a report matters more to the EP’s standing vis-à-vis the 
Council, rapporteurs are increasingly confined to taking moderate and consensus positions.  
This may suggest the increasing need for a political moderate to serve as rapporteur, but 
the point system used by committees still ensures a balance of reports among all ideological 
backgrounds. Further, even if an individual with a less moderate record is awarded the report, the 
                                                 
26 For work on rapporteurs as outliers with connections to special interest, see Kaeding (2004). For information on 
rapporteurs as median voter MEPs, see Hausemer (2006). For information on rapporteurs as representatives of major 
national parties, see Benedetto (2005). And for information on rapporteurs as national majority party insiders, see 
Høyland (2006).  
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proposal itself is unlikely to pass the committee stage if the report reflects only the outlying 
member’s individual views. More important than a moderate voting record, MEPs must possess 
the individual qualities needed to work together with people of different political stripes.  
The advent of co-decision also grants rapporteurs a privileged role in inter-institutional 
debates with the Council under the trilogue system. In the trilogue, rapporteurs are invited to 
participate in privileged discussions about the EP’s stance on legislation with key members of 
the Commission and the Council, before the EP legislative committee takes a vote on the report. 
The trilogue is an effort to reach common ground between the institutions before formal 
decisions are taken. Before a trilogue can take place, however, rapporteurs must be aware of both 
their shadows’ positions, but also that of the other EU institutions. Ideally, all sides reach an 
informal consensus before the report is even circulated for a committee or plenary vote. As such, 
the rapporteur is both a point person for committee work and an important stakeholder for the EP 
on the whole.27 This not only supports the increased importance of rapporteur selection under co-
decision, but also personal qualities embodied by the rapporteur him or herself. 
5.2 A THEORY OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE 
Although most scholars would agree that rapporteurships are important to accrue and that their 
assignment is often contested, there is less agreement on just which characteristics matter in the 
selection of a rapporteur. I suggest two particularly important determinants: an MEP’s level of 
education and their seniority within the EP. While previous work has attempted to link specific 
                                                 
27 For a more detailed account on the dynamics of inter-institutional bargaining between the EP and Council under 
co-decision, see work by Häge and Kaeding (2007), Héritier (2012), Rasmussen (2011), and Shackleton and Raunio (2003). 
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instances of expertise on select committees (i.e., does the marine biologist always get the 
fisheries report), the use of an MEP’s general level of education is also likely to provide us with 
more generalizable insights on member aptitude, even when technical expertise is less relevant. 
Similarly, scholars have posited the likely importance of seniority in rapporteur assignment in a 
legislature with the institutional complexities of the EP; yet, the lack of longitudinal data on 
rapporteurships has hindered the ability of scholars to rigorously test the veracity of such claims.   
The course of European integration favors two trends in the creation of EU policy—
specialization and complexity. One need not stray too far from popular discourse in order to 
discover debates on the EU’s view of correctly shape of bananas, the purity of commercially 
available beverages, and the particularities of bond swaps across the common currency. The EU, 
led notably by the Commission, has existed from the start as a major source of regulation for 
Europeans—stemming predominantly from the regulatory and stability needs of the single 
market project (Caporaso 1998; Majone 1994; McGowan and Wallace 1996).  
However, as the competency of the EU has expanded and the weight of decision-making 
has extended to other EU institutions, the role of the EU as a specialist has continued in these 
new institutional forms. So too, then, has the EP witnessed the growing need to comment on the 
passage of legislation in a sophisticated and technically expert fashion. Whereas the EP initially 
existed to offer a popular voice in advising the course of Commission proposals and their 
passage through the Council, the current system envisions the EP in a decision-making capacity, 
with a strong role in the crafting of legislation.   
The trend towards EU policy specialization has expanded the EP’s committee system and 
favored the development of a strong and expert rapporteur. I briefly discuss the specialization 
and complexity inherent to the EP’s strong committee system, before demonstrating the effect of 
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this mode of committee power on rapporteur allocation. In a later section, I consider the notion 
that as reports gain additional legislative importance under co-decision, the tendency to award 
them to an educated and experienced set of MEPs is amplified. 
5.2.1 Specialization and complexity in the European Parliament 
As detailed by McElroy (2008), the number of standing committees has ballooned over time, 
increasing to more than twenty permanent committees by the end of the 2004-2009 session. 
Unlike in many of Europe’s national parliaments, however, this relatively high number of 
standing committees permits organization around a set of fairly specific legislative topics: 
fisheries, international trade, and women’s rights, to name a few. Much like in the US Congress, 
committees vary in their level of prestige, with ambitious MEPs seeking seats on the desirable 
Environment, Industry and Research, or Economic and Monetary committees and freshmen 
MEPs filling remaining spots on less popular committees, such as Regional Policy or Culture 
(ibid., p. 362-366). Unlike in the US Congress, however, committee assignment, leadership, and 
rapporteurship allocation are not as rigidly limited to seniority rules, but are left mostly to the 
discretion of EP leaders.  
Developments in the EP’s powerful committee system are viewable in light of both the 
parliament’s form and function. With nearly 800 members, the EP is one of the world’s largest 
democratic legislatures—necessitating smaller working units in order to reach consensus on the 
wide range of legislation passed in plenary sessions. However, the large number of committees 
also relates to the diverse array of topics addressed by the EU. Much in the same way that the 
course of European integration has led the Commission to multiply the number of commissioners 
and directorates general, the specialization of the EP’s standing committee system is testament to 
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both the need for efficiency gains in the legislative process, as well as to the wide variety of 
subjects covered within the parliament.  
As the committee system moves in favor of topic specialization and organizational 
complexity, so too have individual MEPs found themselves in increasingly specialist roles within 
the policymaking process. Institutionally, this specialization is reflected in the emerging power 
of the committee rapporteur. While the literature suggests that rapporteur selection relies heavily 
on identifying MEPs with a particular political profile, it is also worth noting the logic of 
rapporteurs as both topic specialists and drafters of consensus legislation. As one MEP put it, the 
rapporteur system allows for a balanced and focused view to emerge over time, in direct 
opposition to national parliaments, who often “legislate as a kneejerk reaction to a crisis.”28 To 
spearhead the crafting of such consensus proposals, a degree of education and experience in the 
unique political environment of the EP are indispensable.  
5.2.2 Education and expertise 
An MEP’s level of education should matter in the drafting of committee reports. In a recent 
interview, one MEP explained that reports on harmful chemical waste reduction in the 
environment committee, on which she served, were frequently allocated based upon the merits of 
the professional training held by a number of scientists sitting on the committee.29  Similarly, 
another MEP noted that his reputed policymaking background in public transit issues, developed 
while serving as that mayor of a regional hub, were the impetus behind his frequent participation 
                                                 
28 MEP, personal interview, March 22, 2012. European Parliament. Brussels.  
29 MEP, personal interview, March 22, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels.  
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on transportation committee reports.30 Moreover, a former German MEP pointed to her legal 
background as important to her leadership in border security issues.31 Even a Euroskeptic MEP, 
usually hostile to the aiding and abetting of productive work in the Parliament, once served as 
rapporteur on changing the nomenclature of a particular species of fish—lending his expertise as 
a biologist.32  
In each of these instances, MEPs called upon professional and technical expertise in 
science, policymaking, and constitutional law in order to form the EP’s opinion. Although the 
MEPs each have substantively different professional backgrounds that contributed to their 
selection as rapporteur, they each possess advanced educations, commensurate with the expertise 
required to make policy in their individual domains. I thus propose that MEPs with higher levels 
of education will be more likely to serve as rapporteur. 
In some cases, education is a clear proxy for substantive expertise in a given domain. A 
graduate degree in biology matters in the naming of fish, just as a chemist is best equipped to 
comment on the dangers of chemical waste. Analyzing education from a more general 
perspective, as opposed to trying to connect technicians with previous professional expertise, 
allows us to apply the theory across both different time periods and committees. However, 
education may not always be a matter of technical knowhow. The effects of education, when 
considered at a more general level, imply the addition of a number of personal qualities, which 
may be essential in the brokering of consensus policy positions. 
It is exactly this secondary connotation of advanced education that is illustrated by an 
interview with a Swedish MEP, who felt that his reputed ability to compromise and listen to the 
                                                 
30 MEP, personal interview, April 25, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels.  
31 German MP, personal interview, May 9, 2012. Bundestag, Berlin.  
32 MEP assistant, personal interview, February 24, 2012. European Parliament, Brussels.  
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opinions of his colleagues had been decisive in his having been chosen for a number of reports.33 
While he would not credit himself as being a technical expert on the financial decisions that he 
led, he nonetheless pointed to his history of high-level management in the private sector, and the 
education background that came with it, as an important determinant of his ability to problem 
solve and collaborate with other deputies. The value of an MBA is not only measured in the 
imparting of technical wisdom, but in the cementing of the very interpersonal and leadership 
skills needed to broker a consensus political view. 
Naturally, in an advanced economy such as Sweden, experience in the boardroom 
correlates with high degrees of education. I expect such MEPs with white-collar backgrounds—
lawyers, CEOs, or captains of industry—to typically posses either university of post-graduate 
training. I expect, furthermore, that an MEP’s level of education is easily noticeable. Beyond a 
visible credential, published on a CV or a campaign website, education should be noticeable in 
the way that politicians debate policy, write questions, or simply construct their interpersonal 
networks.  
Not simply a useful heuristic for the decision of the group coordinator, the political 
psychology literature suggests that higher levels of education correlate with lower levels of 
dogmatism, and thus the ability to reach broad consensus with other views (see, for example, 
Golebiowska 1995). In the democratization literature, liberal democracies are shown to have the 
most educated leaders, as citizens judge the value of their leaders based upon their educational 
background (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011). Education likely also correlates with the presence 
of linguistic skills needed to work in a multi-lingual like the EP. It is notable that almost every 
MEP interviewed pointed to their extensive and diverse foreign language skills as crucially 
                                                 
33 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels.  
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important to their success as a rapporteur. Particularly as the brunt of the rapporteur’s work 
moves towards coordinating with both committee shadows and members of the trilogue, the 
ability to work without the assistance of translators cannot be understated. MEPs able to work in 
multiple languages are undoubtedly more likely to come from educated backgrounds.  
Higher levels of education, when measured in a generalizable way, can thus proxy for 
both the presence of specific technical expertise, as well as for the increased likelihood of 
successful professional and interpersonal skills needed for consensus politics. The key, of course, 
is to devise a coding system that is general enough to match the various education backgrounds 
present in the EU member states, while still specific enough to differentiate between different 
groups of MEPs. 
Devising such a variable is actually quite possible in Europe, where differences in 
educational background vary in similar ways across different countries. Most education systems 
in Europe divide secondary education between college-preparatory and technical training and 
higher education is clearly separable between undergraduate and graduate degrees. Although 
nomenclature varies by country (although less so, since the initiation of the Bologna process for 
the standardization of higher education within the EU), if educational background and expertise 
matter for the allocation of rapporteurships, then an MEP’s education should be easily 
recognizable. However, another indicator of interpersonal skills is also likely to be crucial in the 
rapporteurship allocation process—an MEP’s experience within the EP itself.  
5.2.3 Seniority and institutional memory 
I also expect that policymaking experience, particularly within the EP, should also matter in the 
assignment of rapporteurs. Academics cannot simply parachute into elected office and expect to 
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make drastic changes to policy (as much as we may sometimes like to think it possible!). 
Therefore, education must also be accompanied by previous experience in elected office. As the 
EP follows a legislative model that is unlike most national European parliaments and may thus 
be unfamiliar to freshman politicians, rapporteurship allocations may be expected to occur along 
a functional seniority basis within the EP.  
Numerous MEPs interviewed mentioned that they spent their first few years in the EP in 
a state of confusion—learning the ropes, making connections, and find their way in the massive 
and diverse legislature. However, long-serving MEPs were able to find a return on their personal 
capital. A veteran French MEP illustrated this point nicely, when she pointed out that her ability 
to gain a major report on the financial crisis had been cleverly secured by her office, in exchange 
for her crucial support of another MEP’s nomination to the EP Bureau. Essentially, when she 
wanted an important report, she knew how to get it.34 Without her highly developed 
interpersonal networks and knowledge of the bargaining processes at stake in a report’s 
assignment, she would have been far less likely to successfully get the report. The connectedness 
of certain MEPs and its importance should not be underestimated. After meeting with a high-
ranking administrator from a major party group and asking if he could help in securing 
interviews with a few of his colleagues, a few phone calls made by his office landed me a half 
dozen interviews that same afternoon.35 Connections matter in the EP and they only come with 
time.  
Multiple MEPs described the first time that they received report. One conservative 
French MEP summarizes nicely this experience. In her first few months in office, she was 
unknown to most of her colleagues. However, over time, she was able to contribute positively in 
                                                 
34 MEP, personal interview, March 1, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels.  
35 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010. European Parliament, Brussels.  
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her committee’s work—submitting questions to the Council as a means of oversight, suggesting 
amendments to the rapporteurs, and finally obtaining a shadow report dossier. The next time the 
EPP obtained a report on her committee, she was chosen.36 Another conservative French MEP 
tells a similar story, explaining that most MEPs have to put a lot of preparatory work into 
receiving their first report. If it goes well, they more easily obtain reports the next time.37 
Credibility and reputations are not earned overnight. Thus, a strong bias in favor of MEPs with 
lengthy experience in the EP is likely to be apparent in the balance of rapporteurship allocation. 
5.2.4 Hypotheses and alternate explanations  
The remainder of the chapter tests the following hypotheses:  
H4. MEPs with higher levels of education will accrue more committee reports. 
H5. Senior MEPs will accrue more committee reports.  
H6. Education and seniority both matter more in the assignment of rapporteurships since 
the initiation of EP co-decision powers.  
Beyond these formal hypotheses, we might expect a host of other personal and 
professional characteristics to matter. For example, we can easily test Høyland’s (2006) assertion 
that MEPs from national governing parties receive more reports. Following the logic of Cox and 
McCubbins (2007), we might also expect MEP leaders—whether within the committee system 
or within the EP, more generally—will receive more reports. My research design considers these 
additional explanations, as well as a host of demographic controls, as also potentially 
determinant in report allocation. I return to these alternate and additional explanations for report 
                                                 
36 MEP, personal interview, April 26, 2012. European Parliament. Brussels.  
37 MEP, personal interview, April 10, 2012. European Parliament. Brussels.  
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allocation later on in the analysis section. For now, I move to discuss my data and method for 
testing the education and experience hypotheses. 
5.3 TESTING THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION AND SENIORITY 
To test for the effect of education and seniority on rapporteurship allocation, I use individual-
level data for MEPs in each completed wave of the EP since the initiation of direct elections, 
1979-2009. Sources include Høyland, Sircar, & Hix's (2009) tool for extracting publicly 
available data from the EP website, as well as a variety of MEP records kept by the EP archives 
in Luxembourg, national political archives and research library holdings. The unit of analysis is 
individual MEP mandate, with a total of 3948 observations in the full sample, across all six 
waves of parliament. Unlike in previous work on rapporteur allocation, the dataset is fully 
comprehensive, including all MEPs in all completed EP settings. Missing data, although 
relatively minimal (only 148 out of 3948 MEPs are not included in the regression analysis), is 
distributed randomly across MEP country delegation and time periods – resulting primarily from 
the lack of information on MEPs who were either elected to the EP formally, but chose not to 
remain in the EP, or from MEPs who served as replacements for a brief period.  
5.3.1 Variables and coding 
The dependent variable throughout the empirical analysis is Reports, which is measured as the 
number of rapporteurships allocated to an individual MEP over the course of the elected five-
year mandate. In the principal multivariate analysis, the count is agnostic about the legislative 
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mode under which the report was decided (co-decision, consultation, and so forth). In later 
sections of the chapter, further analyses and robustness checks differentiate between report 
legislative modes, and thus their relative legislative importance.  
The main independent variables of interest are Education and Seniority. Education is 
the four-point index for highest degree earned. Those whose educational background ended with 
a technical or vocational degree were given a 1, while those who completed a university-
preparatory secondary school curriculum were coded with 2. Politicians with undergraduate 
training at a university were coded with 3, while those having obtained a postgraduate degree 
(masters, PhD, or equivalent) were assigned a 4. The appendix provides a lengthier discussion as 
to the assignment of these values across the diverse education systems of the EP members. 
Seniority is measured both as a dummy variable, coded positively for MEPs having already 
served a previous term in the EP, as well as a count variable for the total number of terms served 
in the EP by the individual. The differences in this measure are clearly indicated in the various 
results tables.  
A number of control variables were also collected, in order to account for additional 
explanations and potential spuriousness. Committee Leader is a dummy variable for MEPs 
holding a committee chairmanship or vice-chairmanship during a given term; EP Leader 
captures those MEPs with an administrative position in the EP (President, Member of the 
Bureau, Quaestor, etc.). Party in Government is a dummy variable for MEPs hailing from a 
national party currently in government.  
Dummy variables are also assigned based on an MEP’s party groups to account for the 
possibility that fringe and extremist MEPs may receive fewer reports and include Christian 
Democrat, Socialist, Liberal, Communist, Green/Regionalist, Conservative, Euroskeptic, or 
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Non Inscrit political groups (today’s EPP, S&D, ALDE, GUE/NGL, EFA/Greens, ECR, EFD, 
and NI, respectively). Whereas the grand coalition between the center-right and center-left 
political groups might favor ‘majority’ MEPs from Christian Democratic or socialist 
backgrounds, unaffiliated NI members are likely disadvantaged in rapporteurship assignment. 
Additional variables also consider MEPs choosing not to complete their term, those who sought 
further reelection to the EP at the term’s conclusion, gender, MEPs from member states just 
having joined the EU in the current wave, and MEP age at the end of the current session.38 
5.3.2 The Data 
Table 8. Average Number of Committee Reports per Term 
 
A cursory examination of the data reveals that education is likely to correlate with 
rapporteurships. Table 8 shows the average number of reports completed by an MEP per term, 
sorted according to their level of education. The differences are particularly noticeable in later 
terms, such as EP 5 (1999-2004), where MEPs holding postgraduate degrees received almost 
twice as many reports as MEPs with a vocational or technical background. If education matters 
more as the EP specializes, particularly under the introduction of co-decision with the Council 
after EP 4, then it’s logical to see such evidence of a growing divide in rapporteurship allocation 
                                                 
38 For additional information on coding schemes, please refer to Appendix.  
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along education lines. However, it’s also important to explore the changing levels of MEP 
education over time, in order to account for the possibility of a maturation effect in the sample. 
In other words, if more educated MEPs are completing more reports later in the sample, but 
almost all MEPs are highly educated, then the theory is not as robust.  
Table 9. Highest Degree Completed (% MEPs) 
 
Table 9 examines the change in MEP levels of education over time. The percentage of 
MEPs without a college degree (1 or 2 on the coding scheme) has indeed dropped from more 
than a fourth of MEPs in the first session, 1979-1984, to just over 13% in the most recent wave, 
2004-2009. However, the number of MEPs with undergraduate degrees has remained fairly 
stable throughout the sample (at about 40%). The main difference is in the postgraduate 
category, where the proportion of MEPs with an advanced degree has expanded by over 10% 
since the first wave of the EP, effectively shifting the balance of MEPs towards a more educated 
population.  
This pattern is not terribly surprising and reflects the broader societal trends in the 
professionalization of politicians, as well as Europeans, more generally. However, we would 
think that if MEPs are more educated today than yesterday, this might make differences in 
education less meaningful for report allocation. Of course, these assumptions should be 
considered with the full host of available controls. Thus, I now move on to test for a correlation 
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between education, experience, and report allocation using a multivariate regression framework. 
Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics used in these models, across the full sample. 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics (Chapter Five Models) 
 
5.3.3 Modeling Choices 
Because the dependent variable is not normally distributed, I estimate the models using a 
negative binomial specification. Roughly half of the observations received no reports, with a 
steady decline in frequency outward to the maximum of 55. The negative binomial estimation 
allows me to fit the model more efficiently to the distribution of the data. As the alpha term is 
greater than zero in the estimated models, I choose this technique over the Poisson estimator. For 
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more information on these models, (see Land, McCall, and Nagin 1996). Poisson would not be 
appropriate in this case, because the dependent variable has a high rate of dispersion from zero.  
I also consider the use of a zero-inflated negative binomial estimation (ZINB); however, I 
do not choose this estimation technique, as the selection effect for rapporteurship allocations is 
not anticipated to occur from multiple data generating processes. Although the incidence of zeros 
in the data is quite high, we do not assume that the difference between receiving one report 
versus no reports is theoretically distinct from receiving one versus many reports. The ZINB 
model would imply that the theoretical difference between an MEP receiving one versus no 
reports is qualitatively different than an MEP receiving one versus fifty reports. Although fewer 
MEPs receive many reports, I expect that all MEPs are able to serve as rapporteur, depending 
upon their education background and level of experience. This choice is thus informed by theory 
and is in line with the statistical recommendations of Yau, Wang, and Lee (2003). 
5.4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
I begin by estimating a set of six separate regressions for each completed wave of the EP, using 
robust clustered error terms by country. This allows me to witness the changing effect of 
individual background on report allocation, as the EP matures over time. Table 11 displays these 
results.  
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Table 11. The Effect of Education and Seniority on Report Allocation (cross-sectional) 
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The results indicate a striking and dynamic story for the influence of MEPs over the 
course of the EP’s development. MEP education is shown to be a strong and significant predictor 
for report allocation in each session between 1989 and 2009, EPs 3-6, although the effect is 
insignificant from 1979-1989. On balance, this offers support for H4, but only under certain time 
periods. With regard to H5 and the level of MEP experience, MEPs having served in previous 
terms of the EP are clearly advantaged in the process of report allocation—indicating the 
importance of interpersonal networks, as well as institutional knowledge.  
As the EP has expanded its membership, other signifiers—such as EP and committee 
leaders—have seemingly become more important predictors of report allocation—perhaps as a 
way of distinguishing those MEPs with additional stature from a growing sea of other politicians. 
Unsurprisingly, MEPs who select out of the EP before the term concludes (the dropout variable) 
receive fewer reports, while MEPs who sought reelection for a following term were advantaged. 
Both of these variables proxy the sorts of self-selection that we might expect from MEPs who are 
professionally invested in their EP-level work. MEPs from new member states having just joined 
the EP are routinely disadvantaged in report allocation during their freshman term, and the major 
groups are advantaged (and the NI disadvantaged), when Euroskeptic and national conservative 
party groups are excluded as reference points. Returning to H5, however, why has education 
become increasingly important?  
One reason that education may have become an increasingly significant predictor of 
reports may lie in the changing distribution of the data. Reconsider Table 9, which also displays 
the distribution of highest degree earned by MEPs, separated by each wave of parliament. As 
previously discussed, a clear pattern emerges, indicating a growing proportion of highly educated 
MEPs in each successive wave. By the 6th wave of the EP, postgraduate degree holders achieve a 
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plurality for the first time in the data. While this may seem to make the connection between 
reports received and level of education more mathematically favorable, piece-wise correlation 
coefficients between reports and education remain surprisingly constant over time (outside of 
EP5) and suggest that an intervening variable, or set of variables, may cause education to have 
become more important in recent years.  
5.4.1 The Importance of co-decision 
Moving to a direct discussion of H6, recall that the advent of co-decision under Maastricht has 
permitted the EP to have a decisive say over certain kinds of EU legislation—elevating it to the 
status of a ‘veto player’ with the Council of Ministers. Under the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, and 
later the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, this status was further expanded.39 These developments indicate 
that the EP’s opinion on a given piece of legislation is increasingly valuable. This would also 
seem to indicate, therefore, that report allocation has become increasingly valuable to MEPs, 
whose opinions now have the opportunity to derail entire pieces of proposed Commission 
regulation. MEP education is not just important, but increasingly so.  
                                                 
39 A condensed guide to the EP’s additional competencies, following the instatement of the Lisbon Treaty, is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/docs/legal_bases_en.pdf.  
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Table 12. The Effect of Education and Seniority on Report Allocation (pooled) 
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Table 12 displays pooled regressions for all six waves of the EP. Because individual 
MEPs may appear multiple times in the sample, I use robust clustered error terms by a unique ID 
number associated with each individual deputy, which is derived from the EP website. The 
findings remain essentially the same as in the separate samples, although education is shown to 
be, on aggregate, a significant predictor in the simple pooled model (1). To account for the 
possibility that time may serve as a transformative variable, causing education become more 
important in later years, I introduce a simple wave counter in model (2), as well as a dummy 
variable for waves of the EP in which co-decision is an option in model (3). Both of these 
temporal variables are then interacted with education.  
Because of the nature of the interactive model, as well as the maximum likelihood 
estimator, direct substantive interpretation of the variable coefficients is misleading, if not 
impossible. Therefore, I use the CLARIFY package developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 
(2001) in order to evaluate the statistical and substantive significance of education on report 
allocation over time. I then graph these expected values in various ways. Figures 7 and 8 display 
two of these graphs.  
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Figure 7. The Conditional Effect of Time on Committee Report Allocation 
Figure 7 shows the predicted report allocation over time, based upon changing level of 
MEP education, when all other variables from model (2) are set at their means. As interacted 
variables are not always statistically significant at all values, I generate confidence intervals for 
each possible combination of education and wave. Apart from the first wave of the EP, where 
predicted probabilities reveal that different levels of education do not receive significantly 
different numbers of committee reports, better-educated MEPs are significantly more likely to 
dominate the reports allocation process over time.  
Each level of education receives a significantly different number of reports from the other 
in the second wave of the EP, at a 90% level of confidence, and in waves three through six, at a 
95% level of confidence. By 2009, MEPs with graduate degrees received, on average, nearly 
three times as many committee reports as an MEP with only a technical or vocational school 
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background. The evidence from model (2), as viewed in Figure 7, offers support for H4. More 
highly educated MEPs do receive considerably higher numbers of committee reports, controlling 
for their seniority, party background, and a host of other demographic and political measures. 
This effect is also shown to increase in its magnitude and significance over time, suggesting that 
co-decision may play a major role in the changing nature of report allocation.  
 
Figure 8. The Conditional Effect of Seniority of Report Allocation 
Having provided evidence of the conditional effect of education on rapporteur 
assignment, it is worth comparing this effect with the importance of seniority proposed by H5. 
Figure 8 shows different expectations for report allocation from model (6), based upon 
differences in MEP education and experience. The distribution of the data in Table 8 suggests 
that the most major substantive differences in MEP education might be between those MEPs 
with some higher education (the top two values on the four-point index) and those with no higher 
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education at all (the bottom two values). Accordingly, Figure 8 illustrates the substantive effect 
of seniority on report allocation for the dichotomous classification of MEP education levels.  
As shown by Figure 8, MEPs with some degree of higher education accrue more reports 
as they become increasingly senior in the EP, expanding their power on committees in an almost 
linear fashion. While more educated MEPs can expect to double the number of committee 
reports that they receive over the course of their careers, the effect of seniority is much more 
dramatic for MEPs without higher education. Although disadvantaged in their first term by 
comparison, MEPs with lower levels of education are clearly impacted by seniority, with the 
average five-term MEP in the category expected to receive more than five committee reports in a 
given session. It is important to note that the predicted values are generated using only real data 
(and thus there are no expectations for less educated MEPs in their sixth term—such a person 
does not exist in the data). Nonetheless, seniority appears to have a powerful and transforming 
effect on all MEPs, potentially even compensating for an MEP’s lack of education over time, and 
offering support for H5. 
While the evidence considered has offered support for both H4 and H5, it is worth 
looking into just how the time affects seniority and education in committee report allocation, as 
posited by the discussion of co-decision in H6. Recall that the advent of co-decision under 
Maastricht has permitted the EP to have a decisive say over certain kinds of EU legislation—
elevating it to the status of a ‘veto player’ with the Council of Ministers. Under the 1999 
Amsterdam Treaty, and later the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, this status was further expanded.40 If the 
EP’s opinion of legislation has increased in its own value, then so too must report allocation have 
                                                 
40 A condensed guide to the EP’s additional competencies, following the instatement of the Lisbon Treaty, is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/docs/legal_bases_en.pdf.  
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become increasingly valuable to MEPs, whose individual opinions now have the opportunity to 
derail entire pieces of proposed Commission regulation.  
Consider the following expected number of committee reports, generated using predicted 
probabilities from model (5). Prior to the possibility of co-decision, the average MEP with some 
degree of higher education could expect to receive 2.98 committee reports per term, while the 
analogous MEP without any higher education could expect to receive 2.38 reports per term—a 
difference that is not significant at a 95% level of confidence. However, since the ability of the 
EP to veto Commission proposals under co-decision, that number has greatly diverged. MEPs 
with some level of higher education can now expect to receive, on average, 2.25 reports per term 
and MEPs with no higher education are only likely to receive 1.32 reports per term—a difference 
in effect that is both statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence and substantively 
different on a magnitude of two. Remember that these predicted effects are taken from the mean 
values of all variables in model (5), changing only the possibility of co-decision. While 
education and seniority both matter to varying degrees, the possibility of co-decision has 
particularly augmented the importance of MEP education, supporting H6.   
5.4.2 Additional explanations 
As the EP has expanded its membership, other signifiers—such as leadership on EP committees 
or in the legislature’s internal institutions—clearly impact the possibility of increased report 
allocation—perhaps as a way of distinguishing those MEPs with additional stature from a 
growing sea of other politicians. Unsurprisingly, MEPs who select out of the EP before the term 
concludes (the dropout variable) receive fewer reports, while MEPs who sought re-election for a 
following term were advantaged. Both of these variables proxy the sorts of self-selection that we 
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might expect from MEPs who are professionally invested in their EP-level work and have no 
interest in going elsewhere. MEPs from new member states having just joined the EP are even 
less likely to receive reports than the average freshman MEP and members from major party 
groups are advantaged—a function of their parties having more points to ‘buy’ the committee 
reports.  
Consider also how the findings track with the extant literature on report allocation. 
Høyland’s (2006) position that MEPs from governing parties are more likely to be awarded 
reports than those in their national opposition is not supported by the data. Why might this be so? 
The main reason would seem to be that Høyland’s data examine only a selection of politically 
sensitive co-decision reports, as opposed to a more complete sample of committee work. Thus, 
as in Lindberg’s (2008) discussion of the services directive, the findings are driven by the sample 
selection and are not shown to apply more broadly. By expanding the set of reports taken up by 
my analysis to the full breadth of committee work, I am able to offer a more broadly 
generalizable picture of the average rapporteur.  
A look at the full results suggests other ways that the most productive rapporteurs differ 
from ‘normal’ MEPs. Across the various models, a picture of rapporteurs as ‘serious’ MEPs 
emerges. Rapporteurs are likely to from come from the major party groups—an obvious finding, 
as the bartering system favours the large groups in rapporteur assignment—but also from the 
leadership of the EP, itself. Thus, committee chairs and quaestors—a subset of MEPs whose 
internal ambition has already led them to self-select into a leadership role—also have more 
legislative clout. This finding is not entirely unlike the experience variable and suggests that 
interpersonal networks and individual social capital matter a great deal.  
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Another set of variables examines the professional ambition of MEPs more directly. 
Those MEPs who did not intend to seek another term in the EP at the end of their current 
mandate were also less likely to seek out the office of rapporteur—demonstrating their lack of 
enthusiasm or participation on the job. MEPs who did not complete their mandate—mostly 
because they entered national office during an EP session—were also less engaged in the 
committee work process. At the limit, old age also dampens ones likelihood of serving as a 
rapporteur. The most prolific rapporteurs appear to be at the peak of their careers. Moreover, the 
careers of productive rapporteurs are also clearly centered in the EP and not elsewhere. Finally, 
although women make up only 24% of EP membership, on average, Table 12 does indicate that 
they receive somewhat more reports than their male counterparts—a finding that should certainly 
be given additional consideration in future explorations.  
Another basis of comparison for rapporteurs is national background. Mamadouh and 
Raunio (2003) find that a disproportionate number of reports go to German and British MEPs, as 
compared with the French and Italians, during EP 4 (1994-1999). The pooled regression results 
do not replicate an advantage for the Germans or British, yet French and Italian MEPs do 
underperform in authoring reports. The reason for this is likely twofold. Thinking back to earlier 
chapters, we recall that French and Italian MEP delegations are much more volatile—MEPs from 
these countries spend less time in Europe and often cycle back to their ‘main’ careers in national 
politics. By comparison, the average UK or German MEP has spent the bulk of their political 
career in the EP, with more limited experience in national politics. Thus, experience on the EP 
level is reinforced by differences in national background.  
An additional reason for this discrepancy is differences in the interpersonal networks of 
French and Italian MEPs from their German and UK colleagues. Although MEPs are provided 
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with top-notch translation and interpretation services, in order to guarantee their ability to work 
in their national languages, a tendency for informal work in the EP to be carried out in English is 
a growing reality within the EP—particularly since the accession of Central and East European 
members after 2004. The increased dominance of English in the EP clearly marginalizes MEPs 
who are not comfortable speaking English in the more or less formal settings of committee work. 
It is no secret that English language capabilities are less prevalent in France, as well as in the 
southern European countries. Thus, we might anticipate these deputies to be less central to the 
committee work process and therefore serve less often as a rapporteur.  
One final caveat to the analysis of report allocation comes from the discussion of 
rapporteurs as ideological moderates. To check for the possibility that ‘extremist’ ideologues 
might receive below average shares of committee reports, I run additional robustness checks on 
all models featured in Table 12 to include proxies for ideological extremism. Two variables are 
constructed from MEP NOMINATE scores—a method of rating ideological differences in MEP 
voting behavior developed in work by Hix et al. (2007)—where one dimension represents 
traditional left-right ideological differences and the other positive-negative attitudes towards 
European integration. I calculate median ideological scores for each party group in each wave of 
the EP and then construct measures of extremism for an MEP’s distance from that median party 
group-wave ideal point. On balance, the additional variables are insignificant across most models 
(although pro/anti-EU extremist MEPs receive somewhat fewer reports in models (5) and (6) of 
Table 12). The main conclusions of the chapter remain robust. This would likely suggest that the 
decision to prevent extremist MEPs from serving as rapporteur is mostly subsumed by the 
bidding process for committee reports between party groups, a process where fringe MEPs are 
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already at a disadvantage, given their below average party group size (and corresponding lack of 
points for bidding).  
5.4.3 Robustness at the committee level 
The macro quantitative results indicate the presence of a strong and statistically significant 
relationship between education, experience, and the allocation of committee reports—providing 
evidence of an increasingly educated and veteran subset of MEPs who wield a majority of the 
EP’s real legislative power. Such a relationship is particularly striking when the breadth and 
scale of the data used in the multivariate analysis is considered. Given the extent of the data, it is 
worth considering whether these same relationships are robust to smaller samples of 
rapporteurships within the EP.  
In order to test the sensitivity of my findings at a lower level, I consider a random 
selection of reports concluded during the most recently completed wave of the EP, 2004-2009. 
This wave of Parliament is particularly worth closer consideration, as it is the first wave to take 
place after the 2004-2007 EU membership expansions. It also contains the most legislation 
decided under the co-decision procedure, where the EP essentially has veto power over the 
Council of Ministers. I randomly select 100 reports decided under co-decision during the term, as 
well as an additional 82 reports decided via the consultation procedure: an older method of EP 
legislation, where the EP does not have a veto, but may propose amendments to the Council. The 
two random samples represent approximately 25% of all legislation decided by either co-
decision or consultation, which in turn constitute the vast majority of EP legislation from 2004-
2009.  
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Table 13. Report Allocation by Education, Political Group, and Country of Origin (%) 
 
Table 13 displays the relative distribution for the consultation and co-decision reports 
considered, based upon the rapporteur’s highest level of education, as well as the relative balance 
of the rapporteur’s EP party group and country of origin. The sample distribution essentially 
confirms results from the multivariate analysis. Under both legislative modes, MEPs with either 
an undergraduate or a graduate degree hold the majority of rapporteurships, although the 
distribution is roughly the same as among all MEPs in the wave.  
More interesting, however, is the balance of rapporteurs from the different party groups. 
Under co-decision, MEPs from both the socialist and green blocks successfully outperform their 
relative size in the EP—particularly as compared with the smaller, more ideologically extreme 
groups, as well as MEPs from the unaffiliated non inscrit bloc. MEPs from outside of pre-
enlargement EU-15 also receive a highly disproportionate balance of important co-decision 
reports: MEPs from enlargement countries received only 9% of co-decision rapporteurships, 
although they occupied over 27% of the seats in the EP. 
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Table 14. Report Allocation by Committee, 2004-2009 (%) 
 
Although the sampling exercise confirms the large-scale multivariate findings, the data 
contains further added value, insofar as it allows us to consider which committees are deciding 
the most important rapporteurships. Table 14 displays the balance of legislative reports decided 
in the most recently completed wave of the EP, by both decision mode and standing legislative 
committee. Committees that did not decide consultation or co-decision reports are excluded. The 
top five committees are bolded and underlined.  
The results are interesting for their uneven and varied distribution. Most notably, the 
ENVI (Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety) and TRAN (Transport and Tourism) 
committees decide more than half of all co-decision reports from 2004-2009. This likely explains 
the high incidence of green and socialist MEP influence on co-decision reports during the wave, 
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as these issue domains are generally considered important bases of concern for the center-left 
and green political movements. 
 By contrast, the LIBE (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs), PECH (Fisheries), and 
AGRI (Agriculture and Rural Development) committees decided a disproportionate majority of 
consultation reports. Micro-analysis of consultation reports assigned to these committees reveals 
a high concentration of consultation decisions not only in a small number of committees, but 
among a small group of MEPs, themselves. One liberal French MEP is listed as reporteur for 
more than 10% of all reports decided in the PECH committee from 2004-2009, indicating a 
personal specialty in regional fishing treaties. Similarly, a Romanian MEP from the LIBE 
committee is listed as the only rapporteur on separate consultation proposals on visa issues for 
each non-EU country in the Balkans.  
Powerful sounding committees in issue areas where both the EP and EU actually have 
little to no policymaking competence, such as AFET (Foreign Affairs), decided virtually no 
major reports during the term. This presents a problem for MEPs who wish to appear powerful 
and productive to their constituents. A former Polish MEP hinted at this peril in a recent 
interview, bemoaning his national colleagues’ tendency to seek assignments on flashy sounding 
committees, such as international trade or foreign affairs, where the Parliament exerts very little 
influence, rather than seeking an assignment to a drier sounding regulatory or economic 
committee, where the EP’s actual power lies.41  
The connection between committee power, individual MEP characteristics, and 
professional ambition are interesting, when viewed in terms of such a lower level analysis. MEPs 
whose career ambition involves serving as an active legislator are best suited not only to 
                                                 
41 MP, personal interview, December 20, 2011. Sejm, Warsaw. 
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cultivate a personal background of education and experience at the EP level, but also to seek 
assignment to more substantively productive committees. By contrast, MEPs may also wish to 
‘appear’ powerful, serving on committees that are easily identifiable to constituents, but are of 
little to no importance to the functioning of the EP, itself.  
Following the ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the co-
decision procedure was expanded to include a number of new issue areas—including agriculture, 
fishing, and trade—which had previously existed only under the consultation procedure. In 
expanding its purview, co-decision was renamed the ‘ordinary’ legislative procedure and a 
number of other less-used legislative modes were condensed under the ‘special procedures’ 
heading.42 It will be interesting to see how this further strengthening of the EP’s power in EU 
decision-making further changes the process of rapporteur selection in the current 2009-2014 
session, once the wave is complete. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
MEP career behavior is viewable in light of both internal and external patterns of professional 
advancement. As seen in the third chapter, the institutionalization of the EP has led to an 
increased number of MEPs who build their entire political careers on the European level. The 
fourth chapter examined uses of the EP for those politicians whose professional goal is a 
different office. The present chapter has attempted to place the outcome of these different styles 
                                                 
42 A condensed guide to the EP’s additional competencies, following the instatement of the Lisbon Treaty, is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/docs/legal_bases_en.pdf.  
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of career behavior in context by examining the internal advancement of MEPs within the various 
positions available in the EP.  
According to Strøm (1997), politicians, as well as political parties, have three basic 
goals: the winning of votes, office, and policy. The office of committee rapporteur is not only 
linked to prestige, with longer serving MEPs and those holding administrative power in the EP 
more often receiving reports, but also the main way that an individual MEP can shape EU policy. 
Thus, for serious MEPs with the professional goal of an extensive career in European politics, 
the accrual of reports is an important way of contributing to both the power and content of the 
EP’s work. My analysis has shown that these careerist MEPs are indeed more likely to be 
selected as a rapporteur.  
Nonetheless, a key contribution of this chapter has been to show that education also 
matters for the accrual of rapporteurships. This finding supports the view of the EP as an 
increasingly specialized legislature—stemming also from the technically complex nature of EU 
policymaking in general. However, what are the normative consequences for a parliament in 
which a select clique of legislators are favored in the making of policy, based upon their previous 
experience in the EP, as well as their individual backgrounds? 
Indeed, much of the discussion behind the EP’s expanding powers is cast in terms of a 
perceived democratic deficit in EU politics. If the EP is supposedly the bastion of representative 
democracy and citizen participation at the European level, is it a favorable finding that a cartel of 
specialists and careerists wield a disproportionate amount of influence in the formation of the 
EP’s legislation? How much specialization is good for a legislator or a legislature? In the EU’s 
political culture, where a premium is already placed on complicated regulations and where policy 
outputs are increasingly viewable as either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, one might argue that the EP’s role 
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as a representative institution is to provide popular oversight for such attitudes. Instead, the 
evidence presented by this chapter suggests that the EP is simply another instance of the EU’s 
premium on technocracy.  
The uneven distribution of rapporteurships is also of potential concern for national 
political parties. In systems such as France, where MEP turnover is quite high, members are 
handicapped from participating in the report system. Indeed, every single French MEP 
interviewed, regardless of their ideological background, mentioned their party as the 
predominant determinant of their future career path. Four of the sitting members interviewed 
even suggested that while French MEPs would prefer to become more active in EP committee 
work, the party’s overwhelming control over their future in the EP limits their ability to build the 
individual profile and legacy needed to be selected as rapporteur. Thus, for example, French 
conservatives are potentially disadvantaged, as compared with their German colleagues from the 
EPP, in the selection and management of committee work and reports. Political parties, more 
than any other unit of political life in the EP, must be aware of the externalities of candidate 
selection with regard to the unique processes of committee work at play.   The selection of quality candidates for the European Parliament should be of major interest to scholars, practitioners, and popular observers of the EU alike. As the main principal for democratic input in the EU institutions, the public has an interest in selecting skilled agents to represent them at the EP. Political parties also stand to benefit via the allocation of rapporteurships, which provide a direct and meaningful input into the policymaking process. For EU scholars, an increase in MEP quality can also lead to a decrease in the sorts of volatility explored by Scarrow (1997). By contrast, however, the growth of an ‘elite’ cartel of educated MEPs, concentrating the decision-making phase of 
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the legislative process into the hands of a few, may also serve as a detriment to representative democracy in the EU.  In the following chapter, I shift my attention on the career behavior of MEPs to three major country cases—France, Germany, and Poland—where the variation in patterns of internal and external advancement, as well as party control, is particularly noticeable. The following chapter continues to rely heavily upon original interview and archival data; however, the method of analysis shifts from a large-scale quantitative framework to a selection of qualitative case studies. In so doing, I am able to take the broadly applicable findings of the past three chapters and apply them to specific national instances, providing more nuanced support for my theory of MEP career behavior.  
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6.0  ILLUSTRATIONS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND POLAND 
The previous three chapters have presented and tested an institutional theory for the career 
behavior of members of the European Parliament. Chapter Three demonstrated the positive 
effect of the legislature’s professionalization and expanding institutional power on MEP 
reelection seeking and careerism, while Chapter Four addressed federalism and policymaking 
decentralization as two major national sources of variation with effects on the careers of 
politicians, well beyond the national level. The previous chapter addressed consequences for 
MEP career behavior on the balance of power within EP policymaking, demonstrating a positive 
effect for both seniority and MEP level of education on a given MEP’s success in procuring 
legislative rapporteurships.  
The empirical chapters provide broad support for changes in the structure of MEP career 
paths since the initiation of direct elections to the EP in 1979. Although the statistical models 
offer varying degrees of support for the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two, it is clear that the 
diverse backgrounds of MEPs, as well as their individual behavioral choices, present difficulties 
for the efficient estimation of the quantitative models. In particular, country-level fixed effects 
used throughout the study absorb a great deal of variance in the data. While specific differences 
in an MEP’s country of origin do not detract from the significance or generalizability of the 
empirical findings across the legislature as a whole, national differences in a multinational 
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setting such as the EP do suggest the potential usefulness of considering just how the major 
claims of the study play out in specific country delegations.  
Table 15. Hypotheses Illustrated in France, Germany, and Poland 
 
To shed additional light on a few of these major national differences, the present chapter 
considers MEP career behavior within three notable delegations: France, Germany, and Poland. 
Although the case studies presented in this chapter are selected in accordance with George and 
Bennett's (2005) advice for developing “structured” and “focused” comparisons, the principal 
utility of the case studies is not to offer substitute tests for the theory of MEP career behavior, 
but rather to illustrate how the theory operates ‘on the ground.’ As shown in Table 15, each of 
the hypotheses tested in the three previous chapters is supported by evidence from at least one of 
the three countries. I begin by briefly recalling the justification for the case selection, before 
documenting how the major hypotheses of the dissertation play out in France, Germany, and 
Poland. 
6.1 CASE SELECTION 
France and Germany represent the largest delegations to the EP and are both founding members 
of the European Coal and Steel Community’s General Assembly—the fledgling advisory board 
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that would one day evolve into the current EP. However, the two major players contain a number 
of internal differences. Under the Fifth Republic, the French party system has moved towards a 
majoritarian arrangement with two dominant parties, while post-war Germany has tended to 
operate under multi-party coalition governments. France remains the epitome of a highly 
centralized state, although recent reforms have diffused some power to the regions. Germany, 
with its diverse collection of subnational Länder, remains a balanced federal system. By 
examining differences and similarities in the professional behavior of MEPs from these two 
systems, we can highlight realities from the two ‘most different’ cases that nonetheless provide 
the largest delegations to the EP.  
However, recent structural changes in the EU necessitate new considerations from 
beyond the long established members of the EP. The 2004-07 enlargement brought an additional 
twelve members into the EU, massively reorganizing the EP and other European institutions. 
Traditional Christian Democratic and socialist party blocs were forced to rethink ideological 
partnerships within the transnational party groups, positions of power within the EP were 
reallocated to include representation from new members, and the spirit of debate within the EP 
policymaking process faced numerous new challenges.  
The Polish delegation is not only the largest of these new member states, but also one of 
the more vocal participants in the enlarged EP. Led by the dominant center-right Platforma 
Obywatelska (Citizens Platform) party in both recent domestic and European elections, the Civic 
Platform has proven to be a strong new partner within the leading European People’s Party 
(EPP) at the EU level—even supplying the EP’s president for the first half of the 2009-2014 
term. Any consideration of MEP career behavior would be remiss not to consider this largest of 
the EU enlargement members.  
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6.1.1 Major findings 
In the remaining sections of the chapter, I use country-level data from the French, German, and 
Polish cases to demonstrate my theory for MEP career behavior in practice. The French case 
illustrates a challenge for the development of careerist MEPs posited by H3, as the French 
national parties produce comparatively extreme turnover rates among their MEPs—even 
removing those from office who would otherwise prefer to stay in the EP. By contrast, the 
German EP delegation has witnessed much lower levels of volatility and membership turnover 
since 1979. The strong regional basis for party organization within Germany is suggested as a 
possible explanation for this low turnover. The benefits of low volatility among MEP delegations 
are also demonstrated by the two cases: German MEPs have had much higher rates of success at 
securing committee rapporteurships than the French—findings that are germane to H4 through 
H6.  
Finally, Polish MEPs provide an interesting contemporary illustration of the power of 
legislative professionalism on the careers of MEPs, as well as their political parties. As compared 
with the national Polish Sejm, the EP provides much higher salaries, better working conditions, 
and a higher level of prestige and addresses H2. The Polish case asks more questions than the 
current data can answer, however, and suggests that much of the impact of most recent 
expansion on the EP’s development as a legislature remains to be seen in future sessions of 
parliament. 
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6.2 FRANCE: PARIS, PARTIES, AND PRESTIGE 
The itinerant European legislature is formally seated in the French city of Strasbourg, although 
the EP maintains most of its administrative infrastructure in Luxembourg and the majority of 
usual business is conducted in Brussels. Nonetheless, the country that gave us Jean Monnet is 
central to any study of EU politics and is therefore worthy of consideration within the scope of 
the current project. In this section, I examine MEP career behavior within the French delegation. 
In so doing, I depict French MEPs as the traditional black sheep of the legislature: exhibiting 
unusually high turnover rates, used by the French political parties as a waste bin for defunct 
national politicians, and underperforming in EP policymaking, relative to its size. Although the 
French case is a ‘tough case’ for supporting the broader claims made about MEP career behavior, 
there may yet be signs of an increased importance accorded to the EP from both its French 
membership, as well as the central political leadership back in Paris.  
 I first consider the level of institutional professionalization witnessed in EP for French 
members, taking time to compare the institution with both the Assemblée Nationale and Sénat, 
who have undergone significant processes of professionalization in recent years. Data from each 
venue illustrates that membership volatility has decreased as the legislatures expand their power 
and professional capacity, as was also the case with the EP in Chapter Three. In a unitary setting 
such as France, however, the national political parties remain the major source of influence for 
MEP career behavior and I next consider their impact on European elections. I also examine how 
a 2004 decision to ‘regionalize’ formerly national electoral lists for the EP have somewhat 
decreased the stranglehold of the national parties on candidate nomination practices. Finally, I 
explore the effect of continued turnover among French MEPs for both the legislature’s seniority, 
as well as the productivity of the membership in policymaking. 
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6.2.1 Power and Professionalization (H1 & H2) 
The first two hypotheses explored in Chapter Three examined the effect of the EP’s 
professionalization as a legislature and its relative power in the EU policymaking process as 
determinant of increases in levels of MEP reelection seeking. Because of the notoriously volatile 
nature of the French EP delegation, it is worth considering whether or not these hypotheses are 
also supported by data from the French, as well as how the level of EP professionalization and 
power compares to the national French legislative bodies.  
Classic work from Gibel (1981) examines a similar story of legislative 
professionalization within the Assemblée Nationale. Greatly weakened by the constitutions of the 
Fourth and Fifth Republics, the French lower house did not institute fixed salaries for its 
members until 1958, nor did it reimburse travel and housing costs from deputies to attend 
plenary sessions in Paris until the early 1970s. A new administrative complex adjacent to the 
Palais Bourbon provided MPs with much needed office space, only beginning in 1974. Impacted 
by each of these changes, Gibel demonstrates the effect of the Assemblée’s professionalization of 
the face of its membership, which only came to be dominated by a professional class of 
politicians in the early 1980s. Recent work by Costa and Kerrouche (2009) extends the analysis 
through the 2007 elections, where a full 82% of current MPs indicated an interest in seeking 
reelection to the body—citing the legislature’s prestige and professional character as a major 
source of its attraction—and 70% of outgoing MPs were eventually able to successfully defend 
their seats.  
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Table 16. Incumbency Rates in Select French and German Elections, 1979-2009 
 
Table 16 provides incumbency rates for French and German legislators in national and 
European contests held between 1979 and 2009.43 An examination of the French politicians 
shows a fairly modest, yet stable, rate of reelection to the national parliament and routinely lower 
rates of return for French MEPs—although the percentage did grow from about 35% throughout 
the 1980s and 90s to just shy of 48% in the 2004-2009 session of the EP. Taking into account the 
initiation of co-decision and veto powers during the 1990s, the relative incumbency boom among 
French MEPs in 2004 may indicate the power of co-decision argued by H1—particularly when 
compared with the steady baseline of incumbency at the national level.   
                                                 
43 The 1990 German federal elections are not listed in the table due to the large influx of new legislators from former 
East Germany.  
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Figure 9. The Effect of Time and Salary on Ambition (French MEPs) 
Figure 9 illustrates the relation between reelection seeking to the EP and French MEP 
salaries. By 1979, both the EP and Assemblée Nationale offered identical salaries and similar 
levels of indirect compensation and support for their members. Nonetheless, the figure indicates 
that reelection seeking to the EP hovers at around 40% of outgoing French MEPs throughout the 
bulk of the 1979-2009 period, reaching the 50% mark only in 2004. In fact, data collected on 
MEP careers indicates that about 20% of French MEPs routinely ran for national office directly 
following their mandate as an MEP. Although reelection seeking does increase somewhat, it is 
unclear whether this effect can be attributed to mostly modest changes in French MEP salaries—
particularly when compared with a national parliament that Gibel suggests was already well 
professionalized by the mid-1980s. This may suggest that the professionalization hypothesis put 
forth in H2 is less useful for understanding the French case. What beyond power, then, do we 
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attribute the large differences between French incumbency rates at the national and European 
levels? 
Beauvallet (2003) compares the profile of French MPs with their MEP analogues, finding 
that French MEPs tend to be younger, less politically experienced, and more gender balanced 
than their national MP counterparts. He attributes this differentiation to the use of the EP by 
national political parties as a sort of reserve for elected talent. However, he also notes with irony 
the tension at play in selecting French MEPs. Parties may wish to use the EP in order to groom 
greenhorn politicians or exile the disgraced, but the expanding policymaking power of the EP 
makes the wasting of European slots on political featherweights a dangerous enterprise. As 
Rozenberg (2005) notes, “Today’s MEPs have more power vis-à-vis public policymaking than 
national MPs, but rare are the French MPs and senators who would trade in their position” for 
one in Europe (p. 508).44 The difference is clearly one of prestige. As one French MP, who had 
spent some time in the EP after losing her seat in Paris, put it, “After the deputies and some 
senators, you are just one of the masses.”45  
6.2.2 ‘Partitocrazia’ à la française? (H3) 
If the evolution of the EP’s power has only slightly raised the specter of the possibility of an 
extensive career in European politics among French MEPs, then one major source of the 
continued career volatility lies within the political parties, themselves. A number of the major 
French political parties got off to a bad start with the EP during the initial 1979 elections. The 
                                                 
44 Translated from the original French: <<Un eurodéputé a aujourd’hui plus de pouvoir vis-à-vis des politiques 
publiques qu’un parlementaire national mais rares sont les députés et sénateurs français qui échangeraient leurs 
postes>>. 
45 French MP, personal interview, November 15, 2011, Assemblée Nationale, Paris. 
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French right was divided on the Europe question and a sizeable number of rightist MEPs ran on 
the Gaullist RPR (Rassemblement pour la République, Rally for the Republic) list, led by a 
particularly Eurosceptic Jacques Chirac. Once elected, MEPs from the RPR practiced what is 
known in French as the tourniquet system—resigning their seats on a frequent basis, in an order 
to stunt the possibility of a worthy contribution from the French conservatives to the fledgling 
legislative body. The French Greens used this practice throughout the 1980s, in order to give 
more of their members a chance to serve in elected office, and even the extreme right Front 
National cycled multiple MEPs through their seats in the early 1990s—training new recruits for 
future national runs (Marrel and Payre 2006).  
The use of European seats to promote the national parties is exceptionally common in 
France. Presidents Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy, and François Hollande—as well as a 
number of prime ministers from Lionel Jospin to Edith Cresson—all filled visible positions on 
EP lists. None fulfilled their term, however, and most abdicated their spot to politicians ranked 
lower on the list, directly after their election. Other high-ranking French politicians, such as 
Philippe de Villiers and Charles Pasqua, used their campaigns for the EP in order to protest 
decisions made by their national parties—in that case, forming their own list, independent of 
former colleagues in the RPR. Beauvallet (2003) also details uses of the EP elections by small 
parties, such as Chasse Pêche Nature Tradition (Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Tradition), to raise 
attention to their cause. Whether building enthusiasm for domestic platforms, resolving a 
political row, or searching for new supporters, it is clear that the French political parties have 
done little to react in a productive manner to the increased power of the EP.  
If the parties are to be held somewhat responsible for their shortsighted usage of 
European elections for domestic political gain, individual French politicians must also bear some 
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of the blame. The French system of the cumul des mandats is very much responsible for a large 
portion of the volatility among French MEPs. Under the cumul des mandats, French politicians 
accumulate multiple elected positions simultaneously. Although the office of MEP and French 
national MP has technically been incompatible with the dual mandate since 1984, a plurality of 
French MEPs and MPs continue to hold regional and local offices alongside their national and 
European mandates. By 2003, 91% of French MPs still retained multiple mandates; a whopping 
41% of MPs from the 2002-07 Assemblée served as local mayors (Costa and E. Kerrouche 
2009). Similarly, 44% of MEPs held similar local positions during the course of their European 
mandate (Navarro 2009).  
Historically, the cumul was a matter of necessity for poorly paid MPs, as well as a way of 
connecting national policymakers with local and regional concerns. However, the abuse of the 
cumul in recent years has left the mayors of major urban areas splitting time between running 
their municipalities and debating national legislation. While somewhat forgivable in national 
politics, given the Assemblée and Sénat’s relatively short legislative calendars, the pressure on 
MEPs to retain local mandates as a way of keeping a foot in national politics, while 
simultaneously commuting to committee meetings in Brussels and plenary votes in Strasbourg, 
raises major doubts about the ability of politicians to successfully do their jobs.  
The sizeable share of MEPs continuing the exercise the cumul des mandats can also shed 
light on the eventual ambition of these politicians. If we were to examine the life of a French 
MEP with no other mandate and whose family had purchased a flat in Brussels and was sending 
their children to school there and contrast her with an MEP who continued to serve as the mayor 
of a sizeable town in the Atlantic southwest, we might expect one MEP to have different political 
aims than the other. The tendency for French MEPs to use the EP as a way of saving a spot in 
 157 
national politics for a later run or as a temporary pit stop outside of the Hexagon is far from 
anecdotal.  
 
Figure 10. MEP Ambition over Time (French MEPs) 
As Figure 10 demonstrates, roughly 30% of all French MEPs since 1979 have made a run 
for either a national legislative or executive position, following the conclusion of their respective 
mandates. Although the graph also indicates a decline in the total number of French politicians 
having served in each term, as systems like the tourniquet fall out of favor with party bosses, the 
news for turnover among French MEPs is far from rosy. As suggested in Chapter Four, the high 
turnover among French MEPs is likely a combination of political parties, individual politicians, 
and the French system, itself. In the unitary French system, local politicians accumulate 
subnational positions as a way of securing bailiwicks for national campaigns.  
 158 
The funnel to Paris also works from above, however, as the inexperienced French MEPs 
are groomed by their parties for an eventual national run. Numerous current and recent members 
of the French cabinet—from Pierre Moscovici to Elisabeth Guigou and Harlem Désir—all built 
their careers in the EP, before securing positions in the national government. As one French 
MEP put it, regardless of her own personal ambitions for future service in the EP, a renewal of 
her mandate in 2014 will likely have more to do with her party’s needs than her own.46 As 
Beauvallet and Michon (2009) discuss, the 2004 move to split the national party lists for French 
MEP elections into smaller regional ones has aided somewhat in releasing the stranglehold of the 
national party—as MEPs stand a slightly better chance of creating an individual profile and 
thereby retaining their position. Nonetheless, satisfying the national party—particularly within 
the UMP—remains a key to retaining ones position in the EP.  
In sum, the highly centralized French party system appears to be both a consequence of 
and continuing factor in France’s legacy of centralized, unitary policymaking—offering support 
for H3. Traditionally used by the national French party as a reserve, a reward, or a punishment, 
the French delegation to the EP continues to face a tough road to fully utilizing the powers of the 
institution.  
6.2.3 Why High turnover hurts the French (H4 – H6) 
So far, I have demonstrated the above average turnover presented among French MEPs, as well 
as its relation to the structure of French national political parties and party politics. While the 
incidence of extreme party dominance and persisting cumul des mandats system may present 
                                                 
46 MEP, personal interview, April 26, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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normative concerns for those worried about the quality of representation and the internal 
dynamics of party democracy, it is also worth noting that high volatility among MEPs also stunts 
the possibility of seniority within the EP among its membership. As both Costa and Kerrouche 
(2009), as well as Kerrouche et al. (2011), have shown in their respective studies of the French 
national legislature, parliamentary professionalization usually correlates with growth in member 
seniority. This has clearly not been the case among French MEPs.  
 
Figure 11. Seniority and Committee Report Allocation 
As demonstrated in Figure 11, the percentage of French MEPs having served at least one 
previous elected term in the EP is much lower than in the German delegation, across all waves of 
the EP. The result, as support by the empirical analysis in Chapter Five, is a subpar number of 
reports concluded by French MEPs. Whether or not the European political classes view the EP as 
a prestigious and worthwhile institution is a matter of personal taste, but it is clear from the 
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snapshot provided by the first three figures of this chapter that higher turnover among French 
MEPs comes with the cost of a lack of influence in EU policymaking. As the EP continues to 
strengthen its legislative power vis-à-vis the other European institutions, as well as the national 
parliaments, it is imperative that a separate culture of French politicians, both interested and 
allowed to participate in elected European politics, but permitted to develop. While French 
MEPs do not show below average levels of education, their comparative lack of seniority and 
rapporteurships supports the position of H5 and H6.  
6.3 GERMANY: JUST ANOTHER DAY AT THE OFFICE? 
If the French MEPs continue to be somewhat of the black sheep among the European legislators, 
then their neighbors across the Rhine are the comparative favored sons and daughters in the EP’s 
rise to prominence. In the current section, I revisit theories of legislative professionalization, 
federalism, and policymaking power—illustrating that German MEPs have succeeded in creating 
a distinct class of politicians, interested predominantly in EP service. With their comparatively 
high rates of reelection seeking to the EP and little exchange between national and European 
legislative bodies, the Germans have accrued an impressive portfolio of lifelong MEPs who are 
able to expend their personal political capitol in a manner yet unthinkable for the French. 
6.3.1 High professionalization, low turnover (H1 & H2) 
Unlike in the French case, both the national German Bundestag and regional Landtag have been relatively well professionalized since the days of the Weimar Republic. Although the 
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post-World War II era brought a wave of younger politicians into elected politics in the regions encompassed by the former West Germany, volatility in Bonn’s Bundestag remained low, with a majority of West German MPs seeking multiple terms and 90% above the age of 40 at the time of German reunification in 1990. West German MP salaries were among the highest in Europe and MPs enjoyed an average of six assistants each by the early 1990s—higher than most national MPs still enjoy today (Saalfeld 1997). Even if the challenges of reunification brought in less politically experienced MPs from former East Germany, the German Bundestag has been consistently viewed as a highly professional legislature of skilled and experienced politicians (Patzelt 1997). A quick review of Table 16 also indicates the persistence of high incumbency rates at the national and EU levels, aside from a brief dip during German reunification. This may suggest that the theories put forth by H1 and H2 operate somewhat differently across the Rhine. 
The institutional complexities of German federalism suggest that these professional 
realities also exist at other levels of government, such as in the regional Landtag. Directly 
integrated into the national legislative apparatus, the German regional parliaments, in concert 
with the federal Bundesrat, have enjoyed a privileged veto over legislation pertaining to regional 
policymaking powers since the drafting of the Grundgesetz in 1949. The German regions are 
also privileged in their ability to comment directly on European legislation pertaining to these 
competences, as detailed in work by Cygan (2001). The result is a national career structure 
where regional and national political careers are viewed as equally prestigious, if functionally 
distinct (Müller and Saalfeld 1997; Saalfeld 1997).  
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Figure 12. The Effect of Time and Salary on Ambition (German MEPs) 
If the nature of German federalism places little emphasis on differing levels of prestige, 
but rather attempts to differentiate politicians with interests in either regional or national 
policymaking, then the preexisting ability to self-select into a given professional level may be 
relevant to our discussion of German MEPs and their comparatively low levels of volatility. As 
displayed by Figure 12, the salary of both German national MPs and MEPs remained relatively 
consistent between 1979 and 2009, as did rates of reelection seeking among the delegation, with 
a majority of German MEPs seeking reelection at the conclusion of each term. Even more 
striking is the comparatively low number of German MEPs who sought national legislative 
careers directly following their EP mandate, with numbers well below 10% of German MEPs 
seeking a national mandate in each wave of the EP.  
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If we consider the state of affairs present in German national politics, with politicians 
choosing to specialize at either a local or national level of elected office—both of which 
containing real power and a cadre of professional politicians—then we might view the stability 
of German MEP careers as simply evidence of the addition of another level of elected 
government, able to attract yet another set of politicians—this time, with a specific interest in 
European policymaking. Further, the existence of multiple levels of elected government in 
Germany would seem to have diminishing effects of the relative level of prestige associated with 
national office. Just as Saalfeld’s (1997) work suggests little difference in the level of prestige 
between the Landtag and Bundestag, nor is a career in the EP something to scoff at. As one 
German MEP put it, “the European Parliament and the national parliament are on different 
levels; not higher than the other, just different.”47 
6.3.2 All Politics is local? Or, how German MEPs circumvent Berlin (H3) 
It would be naïve to assume that all German voters view the prestige of their MEP as equal to 
that of their MP, just as it would be naïve to assume that all French MEPs yearn only to work in 
Paris and have no respect for the European project. Nonetheless, an intervening variable seems to 
have impacted the German political class in such a way that German politicians are more capable 
than the French at selecting into a level of policymaking most interesting to them. If the French 
case study demonstrated a situation of extreme dominance by the national parties, with 
committed MEPs losing seats to party loyalists and EP seats reserved to keep mid-level 
politicians in the system until their entry into mainstream national politics, then the defining 
                                                 
47 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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difference in the German case is a party system in which the national parties have comparatively 
less direct sway over the lives of their current and aspiring MEPs.  
A byproduct of German federalism is the division of EP elections into distinct regional 
lists, controlled by the selection boards of regional (and not national) political parties. In this 
way, access to German electoral lists for the EP is comparatively easier—one need only 
connections and sway with local party bosses. As one MEP without any prior elected experience, 
but sizeable local business connections, put it, “It would be unthinkable of someone my age with 
no experience” to run for national office.48 While a connection in Berlin would certainly do no 
harm, each of the German MEPs interviewed told a similar story of having petitioned their local 
party selection committee for access onto the EP ballot.  
Most of the German MEPs interviewed revealed a specific policy interest addressed most 
directly at the European level. One, an enthusiast of farming and agricultural issues, said that he 
had “never considered” a run in national politics—petitioning his local party for a spot on the 
ballot as early as 1979.49 Another, having spent considerable time abroad as a child and 
interested in German politics from the outside, used her foreign language credentials and travel 
experience to supplement for the lack of a preexisting political resume.50 Finally, a former local 
politician, active in European labor rights in her region’s Landtag was identified by her own 
party as someone better suited for working at the European level and accepted her initial 
nomination to the EP in that manner.51 In each case, the combination of interest in European 
policymaking areas and the support of local party members ensured ballot access and electoral 
success at the European level.  
                                                 
48 MEP, personal interview, March 19, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. 
49 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. 
50 MP, personal interview, May 9, 2012, Bundestag, Berlin.  
51 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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Figure 13. MEP Ambition over Time (German MEPs) 
In fact, with few institutional impediments for candidate selection at the European level 
and an appropriate match between the supply of seats and the career demands of Euro-enthusiast 
politicians, it is hardly surprising that the German delegation to the EP has seen among the 
lowest levels of member turnover over time. As suggested by Figure 13, both the number of 
German MEPs cycling through the EP, as well as the percentage seeking reelection over time, 
has remained remarkably stable—suggesting that German MEPs wish not only to remain in 
office for a complete term, but also to seek multiple terms. Also notable are the extremely low 
numbers of German MEPs who sought a national position, be it legislative or executive, after 
their time in the EP. With such low levels of MEP turnover among the German delegation, it is 
worth reminding ourselves of the benefits of seniority.  
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6.3.3 With Seniority comes power (H4 – H6) 
Recall Figure 11, in which German and French reelection seeking were shown to track closely 
with rapporteurship allocations. In fact, as recently as 1999, German MEPs were receiving twice 
the number of rapporteurships per session as the average French MEP. Given the similar size and 
ideological distribution of the two delegations, as well as their virtually identical educational 
profile, it is likely that considerable difference in French and Germany MEP seniority levels has 
driven this result. Between 1999 and 2009, roughly 70% of German MEPs had previously served 
at least one term in the EP. The same can be said for only 46% of French MEPs during the same 
time period. Recalling from Chapter Five that a majority of freshman MEPs are not granted a 
rapporteurship, the comparative seniority of German MEPs has placed the delegation in the 
driver’s seat, just as the EP’s institutional power is beginning to be fully acknowledged.  
 When German MEPs were quizzed on why they felt they had been granted so much 
influence in the drafting of reports in their own committees, one noted the “special kind of 
person” needed to successfully balance the institutional complexities of the EP, the national party 
stance, the desires of the transnational party group, and local constituents.52 The juggling act 
calls for a certain degree of pragmatism, experience, and connections to be sure. It is 
unsurprising, then, that among the most senior of MEPs over time, many were responsible for 
holding dozens of rapporteurships per session, while their freshman colleagues were barely given 
any notice in the balance of committee work. 
                                                 
52 MEP, personal interview, March 7, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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6.4 POLAND: A HINT OF WHAT’S TO COME? 
The German and French case studies shed some light on the more interesting findings of the 
study, particularly with regard to the way that national regime type and party systems can 
produce tremendously different outcomes in the careers of MEPs. Nevertheless, the most 
dynamic shifts in the future career behavior of MEPs are likely not to come from established 
members, but rather from the recently added Central and East European countries. Among this 
set of new member states, none has made a bigger splash in the EP than the Polish delegation—
responsible for nearly as many MEPs in the current EP as Italy and enthusiastic about the 
possibility of imposing a very different worldview upon the inner workings of the EU. As in 
Germany, a majority of Polish MEPs (58%) sought reelection to the EP after the conclusion of 
their first term concluded in 2009. More similarly to the French case, however, is the clear use of 
Polish political parties to treat the EP as an extension of the national political discourse of 
Poland, reflecting a lack of understanding as to what the EP is—and what it is not.  
6.4.1 Professionalization and matters of scale (H2) 
While Polish MEPs would not have had to the opportunity to work in the EP before co-decision, 
they nonetheless benefit directly from its current high levels of professionalization. It is no secret 
that the harmonization of MEP salaries in 2004 left a number of its members better off 
financially than they might otherwise have been. Nowhere is this reality more pronounced than 
in the Central and East European expansion states, where MEPs have the possibility to make as 
much as four times the base salary of a national MP back in their home country (as compared 
with national salary figures in Brans and Peters 2012).  
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While politicians run for office for a number of noble and altruistic reasons, the material 
gains of becoming an MEP are especially clear for those hailing from 2004-07 expansion 
members. To put it bluntly, between untraceable per diem allowances and comparatively high 
base salaries, MEPs from countries such as Poland “could build an empire with all that 
money.”53 And many do, as recently told by a British MEP whose Bulgarian colleague bragged 
over a dinner with colleagues about his newly constructed estate and ability to use EP money on 
hired car service between the new home and the airport upon each return from Brussels.54  
 
Figure 14. The Conditional Effect of Time on EP Reelection Seeking 
If personal anecdotes and popular media accounts of wasteful European spending are to 
be believed, we might expect that the lavish material benefits offered by the EP would have the 
                                                 
53 MEP, personal interview, March 17, 2011, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh. 
54 MEP, personal interview, March 22, 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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strongest effect on delegations from the relatively poorer expansion states, such as Poland. 
Indeed, the overall predicated likelihood of seeking reelection to the EP for all members, as 
demonstrated by Figure 14 (reprinted from Chapter Three), does witness its highest jump 
between the 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 waves of the EP, coinciding with the first reelection 
wave for MEPs from enlargement countries. Considering the effect of salary increases controlled 
for by the graph, one might infer that the EP’s harmonized salary increases, in concert with the 
addition of poorer politicians, has had a pronounced increase on aggregate reelection seeking 
rates.  
Beyond differences in their national levels of pay, however, the Polish delegation to the 
EP doesn’t look particularly different from delegations from elsewhere. One finds, for example, 
a mean age of 55 years among Polish MEPs, between a minimum age of 33 and a maximum of 
77. This is virtually identical to the distribution found across all MEPs, with an average of 55, a 
minimum of 29, and a maximum of 90. As demonstrated by Chiva (2012), both Polish national 
MPs and MEPs have relatively similar levels of female politicians, at about 20% of total 
membership. Women represented about 30% of all MEPs during the same time period. 
 In fact, if anything, Polish MEPs were actually more educated than the rest of their EP 
colleagues between 2004-2009, with more than 80% holding postgraduate degrees, compared to 
only 43% of all MEPs in the wave. Among the Polish delegation are a number of notable former 
ministers and academics, as well as historical figures having played key roles in the country’s 
democratic transition in the early 1990s. If the material and professional perks of the EP are 
enough to have persuaded most Polish MEPs to seek reelection in 2009, then it is certainly 
incumbent upon Polish political parties that so many of their ‘best and brightest’ were nominated 
to the EP to begin with. 
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6.4.2 Strong parties or confused MEPs? (H4 & H5) 
The relatively scant academic literature on Polish MEPs suggests a strong role for political 
parties in the selection and management of their candidates at both the national and European 
levels. Killingsworth, Klatt, and Auer (2010) discuss work done by Polish MEPs to 
commemorate nationally important events—such as the Soviet massacre at Katyń or the creation 
of the Solidarność movement in the 1980s—at the European level. Szczerbiak's (2012) entire 
volume on Poland in the EU is similarly concentrated on what Poland can bring to the EU, as 
opposed to what impact the EU has had on Polish politics (see also Szczerbiak and Bil 2009). 
While Poland’s misunderstood and troubled history is certainly worthy of broader understanding 
and the EU is a suitable forum to initiate a number of these dialogues, it is clear that the use of 
the EU institutions as a soapbox for Polish national political parties has had a negative effect on 
the ability of Polish politicians to contribute to EU policymaking as efficiently as they might 
otherwise hope.  
One former Polish MEP and current member of the Polish Sejm tells the story of a 
national delegation “totally unprepared” to work within the EP during the 2004-2009 term, 
lacking even an “elementary knowledge of Europe… and [its] languages.” According to him, 
Polish MEPs “thought they were there to fight for Poland,” not to participate in a continent-wide 
policymaking project for consensus building. The same former MEP discussed with dismay the 
dozens of Polish MEPs who lined up for selection on the EP’s Security and Defense 
committee—an area in which both the EP and the EU in general have limited power—thus 
forgoing the possibility of making a valuable contribution on a committee in which the EP has 
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real possibilities of impacting legislation that would eventually impact Polish law.55 Another 
Polish MEP put the situation somewhat differently, saying that he was glad to be “seen as a 
diplomat… someone sent by my country to represent Poland’s interests.”56  
Whether one takes the skeptical view of a misguided delegation, sent to be the 
mouthpiece of the Polish national political platforms in a forum not designed for such debates, or 
the more positive imagery of a collection of national political legends and dignitaries, sent to 
bear witness to Poland’s triumphant return into the heart of Europe, it’s clear that the relationship 
between Polish political parties, politicians, and the EP is quite different from anything seen 
among the established members of Germany and France. Polish politicians may not have 
developed a full grasp on the EP’s power and its abilities (or lack thereof) to help Polish interests 
in EU debates, but the EU and its institutions do seem to inspire some awe among the Polish 
political elite, however misattributed in reality.  
                                                 
55 MP, personal interview, December 20, 2011, Sejm, Warsaw.  
56 MEP, personal interview, March 17, 2011, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh. 
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Figure 15. Jerzy Buzek boards a Warsaw-bound jet, to applause 
One additional anecdote worth mentioning in support of Poles’ enthusiasm for the EU 
and its institutions arose entirely by happenstance during the interview stage for the data 
collecting process of this project. On my way to Poland, I boarded a commuter flight in 
Copenhagen. Before the plane was allowed to take off, it backed away from the gate and 
reopened the door, allowing one final passenger to board directly from a motorcade brought out 
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on the tarmac. Much to my surprise, the additional passenger was none other than the EP’s 
outgoing President, Jerzy Buzek, a member of the Polish Civic Platform who itself is a member 
of both majority center-right EPP bloc in the EP and the majority party within the Sejm. Even 
more surprisingly, my fellow passengers actually recognized President Buzek and broke into a 
round of applause as he boarded the plane.  
I spent the next few weeks in Warsaw keeping an eye on the Polish media’s coverage of 
the EU financial crisis and the fiscal pact negotiations that had just begun to take shape during 
the many emergency summits held in Brussels that winter. Throughout it all, I was struck by 
number of the times that a current Polish MEP would appear on the national news broadcast or in 
the papers, dutifully outlining the need for Poland to participate willingly in the reshaping of the 
European monetary system. The centrality of Polish MEPs to the dialogue at play in the Polish 
media was striking in comparison to the characterization that I had already developed for the 
importance of MEPs in France, sent to professional time-out in Brussels, or for the diligent and 
highly specialized German MEP, amending complicated policy matters outside of the limelight.  
As in France, the Polish national parties have thus far remained supreme in the 
recruitment and selection of Polish MEPs. One socialist MEP characterized the decision to run as 
a “compromise between… [him and his party’s] wanting him to be there,”57 while a member 
from the center-right said his nomination was a result of the national party identifying him as 
someone who could raise support for the Civic Platform list in a region where he had already 
been particularly active.58 Evidence from such interviews, as well as the descriptive data 
presented above, suggests that Polish MEPs may not know quite what it is that they are doing in 
Brussels, but certainly think that they stand to benefit from it, while their national parties have 
                                                 
57 MEP, personal interview, June 9, 2010, European Parliament, Brussels. 
58 MEP, personal interview, June 8, 2010, European Parliament, Brussels. 
 174 
aims well beyond the scope of the institution, although successful to the extent that both the EU 
and EP are pervasive in the lives of at least some Poles. More similar to the French case, in 
which strong national parties dominate political careers, the jury remains out on just what impact 
the Polish parties will have on the careers of their MEPs, as well as their productivity and power 
within the legislature. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided descriptive data, as well as some qualitative illustrations for the claims 
made by the empirical chapters, as it applies to the cases of MEPs from France, Germany, and 
Poland. France was presented as a case in which strong national parties dominate the selection 
and advancement strategies of their politicians, even at the expense of a clear loss of influence 
for the legislating capacity of the delegation, both of which are the byproduct of a heavily 
centralized and unitary political system. The German case, among the EP’s most productive in 
terms of rapporteurships, was presented as an example of how national systems, already used to 
working across multiple levels of representative government, can adapt to the addition of new 
layers of governance to the mutual benefit of national parties and individual political careers, 
alike. Finally, the Polish case foreshadowed what might be yet to come in the development of 
MEP careers, as emerging national party systems in Central and Eastern Europe clash with the 
aims and capacity of the EU, creating yet another potential mismatch for individual ambition and 
institutional capabilities.  
If we return to an examination of the dissertation’s hypotheses, as summarized in Table 
15, we see a patchwork of support for each of the six major hypotheses from among the three 
 175 
selected countries. Yet, 24 additional countries were not mentioned by this chapter and may have 
additional support for the hypotheses if examined at a similarly national level. Although the case 
selection used in this chapter was certainly nonrandom, the variation in the systems explored can 
be viewed as a serious illustration of just how diverse the national political systems of Europe 
still remain.  
While some of the empirical claims made in the previous chapters—such as increases in 
EP power of and its impact on reelection seeking or correlations between advanced degrees and 
legislative productivity—may seem trivial, it is remarkable that any empirical evidence can be 
found for institution-wide change in a relatively new legislative body that unites so many 
differing national and political traditions. In the following and final chapter, I summarize the 
major findings of the project, before discussing a number of new research venues that this study 
has provoked.  
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7.0  TOWARDS A BROADER APPRECIATION FOR POLITICAL CAREERS 
The central aim of this dissertation has been to ask how institutions and institutional changes 
shape the behavior of individuals. Within this very broad and general framework, I have 
specifically examined the effect of developments in the institutional structure of the European 
Parliament and its constituent units on the career behavior of individual members. Individual 
politicians are the foot soldiers of powerful political institutions, yet their professional 
movements have been most overlooked by the literature.  
By examining the careers of MEPs, however, I have offered concrete evidence of the 
EP’s growing institutional and professional capacity, as well as examined the fingerprints of the 
EP’s many component parts that also impact the professional decisions of its members: 27 
institutionally diverse member states, each with a richly varied national party system, 
contributing individuals to serve in the rapidly evolving EU legislative institution. In the 
remaining pages of the dissertation, I briefly review the major findings and contributions of the 
project, before suggesting how these findings might contribute to further research. 
7.1 REVIEW OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
The project set out in Chapter Two to craft a tripartite theory for the career behavior of MEPs: 
the development of careerist politicians within the EP, the use of the EP within the broader array 
 177 
of national and European offices, and the benefits of stable membership within the EP for the 
balance of legislative power. The six key hypotheses posited by the study stem from specific 
aspects of these three parts. The theory is derived and tested using assumptions from rational 
choice—that is, MEPs are individual actors who make a rational decision to further their 
professional careers, given the constraints and pressures of the institutions in which they are 
embedded—as well as a respect for claims made by historical institutionalism that institutions 
change over time in response to exogenous historical developments.  
Chapter Three tested the first two hypotheses of institutional power and 
professionalization. H1 posited that an increase in the EP’s institutional power will lead to 
growth in reelection seeking (‘static ambition’) on the part of its membership, as politicians are 
attracted to work in a meaningful policymaking institution and not simply a ‘talk shop’ 
parliament. Multi-level logistic regression techniques using new data on the EP’s elected 
membership, 1979-2009, clearly indicate that the advent of co-decision—whereby the EP gained 
veto power over proposed legislation—led to a sharp increase in reelection seeking on the part of 
MEPs, even when various demographic and institutional factors were controlled for.  
H2 posited that an increase in the EP’s level of professionalization as a political 
institution should also lead to increased rates of reelection seeking, as Weberian MEPs seek out 
professional opportunities that allow them not only to live ‘for’ politics, but also ‘from’ it. Here, 
the quantitative results were somewhat mixed. The diverse salary structures offered to MEPs 
based upon their country of origin mean that MEPs from historically low-earning countries are 
more likely to respond to salary increases favorably and seek reelection at higher rates. However, 
the majority of EP members were already presented with a high level of professionalization in 
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their work as an MEP as early as 1979 and were accordingly less affected by modest changes in 
their salaries, benefits, and working demands between 1979 and 2009.  
Chapter Four offered empirical evidence for H3, which posited that MEPs from either 
formally federal or functionally decentralized countries will be more likely to seek reelection to 
the EP (and less likely to quit the EP for a job in national politics). The mechanism explored by 
this chapter assumes that political parties in federal and decentralized systems have adapted their 
candidate selection and management practices to acknowledge the varying demands and 
purviews of each level of representation. Conversely, highly unitary and centralized contexts 
should have party systems more accustomed to funneling candidates from the local to the 
national level. The addition of the EP as a supranational level of representation likely only serves 
as an extra layer of work on the way to the goal of national political office. Logistic regression 
analysis confirmed H3, using a variety of measures for both federalism and decentralization, and 
multinomial logistic regressions showed the comparative likelihood that an MEP from a unitary 
(federal) system would be more (less) likely to quit the EP in favor of a variety of possible 
national offices.   
Chapter Five addressed the consequences of professional pathways taken by MEPs on the 
balance of power within the EP’s committee legislation process. H4 posited that MEPs with 
higher levels of education will be more likely to be granted committee rapporteurships—
uniquely valuable in their ability to direct the course of EU legislation from the Commission’s 
proposal to the EP’s acceptance or rejection. The proposed mechanism suggests that more 
educated MEPs will either work more effectively with technically complex topics in specific 
areas and be more generally inclined to researching and assembling a balanced position on a 
given issue. H5 posited that seniority will also provide MEPs with additional rapporteurships, as 
 179 
the institutional complexity of the EP favors contributions from politicians accustomed to the 
particular demands of the EP policymaking process.  
Regression analysis using negative binomial logistic regression techniques indicates clear 
support for education and seniority to positively impact the individual accrual of rapporteurships 
across all waves and specifications, although the effect of co-decision serves only to make report 
allocation even more selective than before. This confirms the relationship posited by H6 that 
education and seniority should matter more since the advent of co-decision and is explored in 
more detail at the conclusion of the chapter, using qualitative data from the balance of committee 
reports under both the consultation and co-decision procedures between 2004 and 2009.  
Finally, Chapter Six attempted to clarify the main findings of the dissertation as they 
pertain to the selected case studies of France, Germany, and Poland. While France and Germany 
are both founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community, they diverge on 
everything from federal organization to the dynamics of their political party systems and 
represent the consequences of two ideal types of MEP career behavior. French MEPs are shown 
to seek reelection to the EP at routinely lower rates than German MEPs, with the major 
consequence of reduced importance in the committee report allocation process relative to country 
size. The Polish case study offers yet another glance of what may be to come from the EP’s 
continued development, illustrating the enthusiastic—if somewhat misunderstood—nature of EU 
support among the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe.  
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7.2 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
The dissertation has provided a number of findings that are immediately relevant to our 
understanding of the European Parliament and its membership. Particularly useful is the 
development of a fully comprehensive body of quantitative data on MEPs, themselves, 
containing information of individual backgrounds, career choices, and professional involvement 
within the EP. The creation of the dataset, alone, will hopefully further work on the EP and its 
members for many years to come and is formatted in such a way that will allow researchers to 
add additional information on future waves of the EP, as it becomes available.  
The study also contributes to the growing body of work on individuals that comprise 
political institutions, far beyond the EP. Scholars interested in the study of individual behavior 
and its pertinence to topics ranging from candidate selection, federalism, legislative and 
committee behavior, political ambition, and institutional development will all find something of 
use in the findings taken from this particular political venue. The EP, with its legacy of 
thousands of current and former elected members from nearly 30 separate political histories and 
traditions, is shown to develop and behave in a way that will ring familiar to devotees of scholars 
from all regional contexts—even within the bounds of this most eccentric of legislatures.  
For as much as the dissertation provides new sources of data and methodological 
innovations for future analyses both the EP and other political institutions, it also is meant to 
connect and complement existing—yet often isolated—research agendas in comparative politics 
more broadly. It provides the first comprehensive analysis linking the institutional evolution of 
the EP with generalizable changes in the career pathways of European politicians. It provides the 
first comprehensive analysis linking sources of national institutional variation with observable 
differences in elected career paths at the EU level. Finally, the analysis of committee report 
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allocation is the first to link new data with existing questions on the balance power within the 
EP. It is particularly this last point that opens the gate for future research on the career paths of 
MEPs and their consequence for the EP’s institutional development, national party election and 
candidate selection strategies, and even the importance of national systemic variations. For as 
many questions as the dissertation has attempted to answer, it has also sparked possibilities for 
further research.  
7.3 FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY 
Further work on the topic can take place in a number of ways. Work on the EP itself might 
examine the recruitment strategies of all EP parties in a more systematic way, which will further 
our understanding of why some party systems have been more quick to adapt to the growing 
power of the EU institutions than others. A more thorough examination of movement between 
committees can provide us with evidence of how power and membership volatility varies within 
specific committees, themselves, which may help us to better understand the impact of MEP 
seniority and education on rapporteurships. Finally, future analyses of other EU and national 
institutions can examine how the EP fits into the array of professional opportunities in European 
politics in greater detail. 
Beyond extending the dataset to further waves of the EP, I propose that we can also 
analyze the individual backgrounds of politicians from other domestic and international 
institutions in similar ways. Such research will provide us with key insights on individual 
policymaking behavior, as well as the interpersonal networks constructed across multiple levels 
of elected government in Europe. I have already completed some exploratory coding in this area 
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for the Austrian Nationalrat, German Bundestag, and French Assemblée Nationale, and I look 
forward to expanding my coding of these institutions to a more diverse set of time periods and 
venues. Indeed, any historical study of a political organization would be remiss not to consider 
the power of the individual elites that have comprised its previous iterations.   
The European Parliament remains somewhat of an enigma among the comparison of 
global legislative bodies. Its specialized committee system closely resembles that of the US 
Congress, yet it’s extreme partisan variation—even at the transnational group level—is more 
reminiscent of the Italian Camera dei Deputati or French Fourth Republic. Its lack of initiation 
powers and difficulty overruling the agenda-setting powers of the European Commission might 
lead one to think of the UK House of Commons, whereas the technical nature of policymaking 
and amending might lead us to believe that MEPs would be best left to the windowless, faceless 
bowels of a government bureaucracy. Nonetheless, MEPs remain the only directly elected 
members of the EU apparatus and provide the crucial function of democratic oversight for at 
least some of the decisions made for the EU’s more than 500 million residents.  
Figure 1 of the dissertation displayed three ideal pathways for MEP careers. The first 
column indicates what the EP was and might have always been: a klatch of politicians relegated 
to a second order legislature—banished or retired from a life of national political prestige. Yet, 
the previous pages ought to have suggested a different reality for the careers found within 
Europe’s legislature. While some MEPs might use the EP as a steppingstone for a tour of duty in 
national office (and some parties might even encourage this via candidate selection practices), a 
growing number of MEPs do want to remain in Europe, do seek reelection to the EP, and do 
contribute to the amendment and passage of the EU’s growing body of legislation and regulation.  
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While scholars of electoral behavior and public opinion may be quick to insist that the EP 
and its elections are still of secondary importance to the average EU citizen, one can’t help but 
step back from the findings of this project with the impression that the EP and its members won’t 
always be viewed as less important than their colleagues in national political life. In fact, it 
seems that at least a non-negligible set of MEPs already view their role in EP life as important 
enough to merit the dizzying professional commitment that a five-year mandate in Brussels and 
Strasbourg entails. Either that or there is a surprisingly high number of European politicians 
obsessed with collecting miles from frequent flyer programs. 
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APPENDIX A 
HISTORICAL PARTY GROUPS BY PARTY FAMILY 
Table 17. Historical Party Groups by Party Family (EP abbreviations) 
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APPENDIX B 
NEW MEMBER STATES ADDED TO EP, BY WAVE 
Table 18. New Member States added to EP, by wave 
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